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Minds, materials and metaphors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2020

Adam Toon
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Abstract

What is the relationship between mental states and items of material culture, like notebooks, maps or lists? The extended mind thesis (ExM) offers an influential and controversial answer to this question. According to ExM, items of material culture can form part of the material basis for our mental states. Although ExM offers a radical view of the location of mental states, it fits comfortably with a traditional, representationalist account of the nature of those states. I argue that proponents of ExM would do better to adopt a fictionalist approach to mental states. In so doing, I suggest, they could retain the important insights underlying the extended mind thesis, while avoiding its more problematic consequences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 96 , Issue 2 , April 2021 , pp. 181 - 203
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2020

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