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Hume on Justice and Allegiance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Extract
In this paper I shall analyse in detail one part of Hume's writing on politics in order to explain and criticise his method of inquiry there. This will involve me in assessing the value of Hume's contribution in this section of his work to the theory of politics. I shall make my investigation into Hume's method bearing in mind his admiration of Newton and other natural scientists and his intention of adopting their methods in his studies.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1965
References
page 36 note 1 The Philosophical Works of David Hume, ed. Green, T. H. and Grose, T. H. (London 1875 and 1878), vol. 2, 259–265, 273, 300–307, 317–319.Google Scholar
page 37 note 1 When Hume speaks of the ‘laws’ of justice he means rules, without any political connotation.
page 38 note 1 Hume discusses the rules of property, or justice, in the Treatise, Book III, Part II, Section IIIGoogle Scholar (Philosophical Works, vol. 2, 273–282);Google Scholar and the rules, or objects, of allegiance in Section X (ibid., 317-328).
page 40 note 1 At the institution of government and then alone men can choose governors for their merits.
page 41 note 1 A second rule, which is admitted in deciding political title, but not in determining property, is that of conquest. As Hume says, ‘this right resembles very much that of present possession’. There is a further rule of allegiance which has no parallel in the rules of justice. This is where government derives its authority from positive laws. Although a constitution must necessarily be formulated by a legislature, which itself depends upon one or more of the rules of allegiance for its authority, yet the terms of a constitution form a separate although poor, title to government.
page 42 note 1 Philosophical Works, vol. 2, 283–284Google Scholar
page 42 note 2 In the Essays Hume does say ‘the cession of the ancient proprietor, especially when joined to conquest, is likewise deemed a good title’Google Scholar (Philosophical Works, vol. 3, 459).Google Scholar
page 42 note 3 Ibid., Vol. 3, 451.
page 43 note 1 By ‘succession’ Hume means the passing of property or government to the previous owner's or ruler's nearest relation.
page 46 note 1 In the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals Hume does discuss ‘particular laws’ and ‘the reasonings of lawyers’ in his account of justice.Google Scholar (Philosophical Works, vol. 4, 187190.)Google Scholar
page 46 note 2 In his History Hume talks of prescription in relation to government (The History of England (London 1822), vol. 8, 132).Google Scholar
page 47 note 1 It is now possible to understand why Hume mentions positive laws as a title to government, but not as a title to property. Most titles to government are not expressed in positive laws, so it is natural to treat positive laws which determine the form of government as a special title to allegiance. But the rules of justice are normally expressed in positive laws (whether made by judges or legislators), so Hume does not consider positive laws a separate title to property. All positive laws which determine right to property Hume has analysed and reduced to the rules of justice which he describes.
Hume imagines that justice can exist before the invention of government and hence before positive laws. In a pre-political society property would in no sense be decided by positive laws. Once government was instituted the existing rules of justice would be formulated in positive laws. In this sense positive laws would add greater authority to the rules of justice and might be thought of as a separate source of property right.
page 50 note 1 Philosophical Works, vol. 3, 446–447,.Google Scholar
page 50 note 2 Hume is eager to point out that nearly all governments have disreputable origins. ‘’Tis certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every nation, we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion, and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain.’