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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
THE question which I am to raise for discussion is one which has long been debated by philosophers, and consequently I consider it doubtful whether anything very new can be said on the matter. But it may be profitable to review once more the present position of the controversy and to have in mind the reasons which at present make the question of interest and of importance.
page 467 note 1 Dissertation on the Passions, finis.
page 468 note 1 E.g. by James Ward.
page 470 note 1 For a general view of this movement and for references to some of the relevant literature see International Journal of Ethics, April, 1924, p. 243, “The Functional View of Legal Liability,” Finkelstein; and July, 1924, p. 364, “Current Religious Thought and Modern Juristic Movements,” Albertsworth. Dean Pound is associated with this movement.
page 471 note 1 Albertsworth, International Journal of Ethics, July, 1924, p. 376.
page 472 note 1 Esp. McDougall's.
page 475 note 1 Further consideration of this would lead too far away from the present topic. McDougall makes the psychical factor essentially an “emotion.” But it may be questioned whether an emotion is present, unless an appraisement of a situation occurs first. Without such an appraisement, there will be no emotion. Hence the psychical factor will disappear, and a purely physical view of human action will remain.
page 475 note 2 Marx, : Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (1859). Eng. trans., Stone, , pp. 11–12.Google Scholar
page 476 note 1 E.g., an institution, like Parliament, is assigned a nature and made to fulfil a function which are quite different from its original nature and function.
page 477 note 1 And “abnormality” remains rather vaguely defined.
page 480 note 1 Contemporary British Philosophy, p. 283.