Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
In discussing Disembodied Persons we need to confront two problems:
A. Under what conditions would we consider that a person was present in the absence of the normal bodily cues?
B. Could such circumstances arise?
The first question may be regarded as epistemic and the second as metaphysical.
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13 Op. cit. note 10, p. 79.
14 Op. cit. note 6.