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Neuroscience and Anna; a Reply to Glenn Hartz

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2000

Colin Radford
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Abstract

Glen Hartz argues, that neuroscience reveals that persons moved or frightened by fictional characters believe that they are real, so such behaviour is not irrational.

But these beliefs, if they exist, are not rational and, in any case inconsistent with our conscious rational beliefs that fictional characters are not real. So his argument fails to establish that we are not irrational or incoherent when moved or frightened by such characters. It powerfully reinforces the contrary view.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Philosophy , Volume 75 , Issue 3 , July 2000 , pp. 437 - 440
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000

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