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The Idea of a Necessary Connection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

H. O. Mounce
Affiliation:
University College of Swansea

Extract

Hume is not a philosopher who has been viewed, on the whole, with excessive sympathy. Slips and inadequacies of argument, which are the inevitable consequence of human fallibility, are treated by his critics not with charity but with delight; and there are few who think it necessary to state his argument at its strongest before proceeding to refute it. A striking example of this procedure may be found in Antony Flew's paper ‘Another Idea of Necessary Connection’. The example is striking because Flew is normally one of the most sympathetic of Hume's critics and he might have been expected, in dealing with Humes view of causal necessity, to have proceeded with exceptional fairness, the incidental being identified and discarded and the essential view standing forth at its strongest. This, as I shall show, is not what occurs; but first let us consider what we are to take the essential view to be.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1985

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References

1 Philosophy 57 (1982).

2 ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’, trans. P., Winch, Philosophia 6, Nos. 34.Google Scholar