This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two “presupposed theories”: of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading.

The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. 'Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. 'Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed.

The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes ‘Rt(a,p,q)‘ as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q.

The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so.

The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus “meaning” of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.

The problem of scientific ethics or experimental morality creates for the scientific methodologist a profound dilemma. To the extent that he makes his investigations scientific he fails at the essence of morality. Conversely, if he attempts to found himself securely in morality, his efforts to become scientific lead to mere utilitarian “moralizing.” In the older language of Kant, the imperatives of morality are categorical; those of science, hypothetical. “Is” and “ought” are incommensurable categories, as they are for logical positivism which simply accepts the dualism as irreducible and advises against what it views as the inevitable consequence of any attempted synthesis: confusion.

In the fall of 1956, President Margenau appointed a Committee charged to draw up proposals for a reorganization of the Philosophy of Science Association. This Committee eventually prepared a new Constitution and By-Laws, more in line with the present needs and status of the Association than were those under which it had until then been operating. That Constitution and those By-Laws were adopted by the members at the December 1957 election and are published in the January 1959 issue of Philosophy of Science.

This discussion recounts the development of several anthropological definitions of human nature. It then examines conclusions of studies in other disciplines that make possible a revised empirical definition of human nature and which have led to reexamination of paleoanthropological data classed as unimportant under the rubrics of precceding studies. Finally, this discussion appraises certain of these data, as they pertain to the question: “Do empirical evidences suggest that a human nature, as well as a human structure, may be the product of evolutionary processes ?”

Recent impasses reached by nuclear theory, a recurrent desire to interpret quantum phenomena in mechanistic terms and a certain loss of glory suffered by the general theory of relativity make it appear timely, perhaps, to review discarded attempts at common-sense explanations of atomic and relativistic physics, making sure that they have not been too hastily rejected. Mr. Hartley has been a persistent and circumspect advocate of a mechanical view which, even if it cannot claim to solve all problems in the universal flash of brilliance for which physicists and philosophers have waited in vain for decades, raises worthwhile points for consideration. The nature of this task and the preoccupation of technical journals with imminent matters singles out our journal as the proper carrier for Mr. Hartley's thoughts. They are here presented without mathematical detail but in a manner suggestive of the unity of his treatment. Technical details are discussed in some of the items of the bibliography.

This paper attempts to outline some of the important concepts and ideas used in system analysis which is taken to be a general mode of analysis used in all sciences. Systems are seen from three perspectives: (1) that involving the relationship between system and environment, (2) that involving interaction between several systems, and (3) that involving one type of system composed of other types of systems. The writers also discuss the concepts “structure” and “equilibrium” as they apply to system analysis, the point being made that the use of these concepts in the social sciences has often been vague or even incorrect.

The author discusses some difficulties involved in the application of “degree of confirmation” to the confirmation of lawlike-statements. An alternative analysis is proposed, which is based on interval estimation. It is argued that this analysis is superior to the criticized method, in that it is better able to show how instantial confirmations are inductively relevant to a law, and in that it requires fewer undesirable extra-logical assumptions.

This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false.

The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, declarative, interrogative, or imperative. The analysis aims to show that meaning is to be attributed to the uttered or written sentence-token, rather to the thereby exhibited sentence-type. Further, the meaning of the sentential token is to be identified with a purpose of the speaker, that the speaker would reveal to the addressee by uttering the sentence.

The to be revealed purpose is analysed into two components: an ultimate concern (that the addressee stand in such and such a relation—e.g., of believing, or informing the speaker about, or making it true that) and an ultimate topic of concern (the state of affairs, i.e., proposition, relative to which the speaker would have the addressee stand in the specified relation).

Sentential utterances “signify” different purposes by “expressing” different ultimate concerns and “indicating ”different ultimate topics of concern. Variations in expressed concern are correlated with variations in sentential form, such as declarative, interrogative and imperative. Variations in indicated topic of concern are correlated with variations in the subject and predicate of the uttered sentence. Thus, for example, utterances of “Johnny will jump in the lake,” “Will Johnny jump in the lake?” and “Johnny, go jump in the lake! ” all indicate one and the same ultimate topic of concern but express different ultimate concerns with this topic.

A sentential utterance is true or false according as its indicated topic of concern is true or false. Hence, declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives may all be classified as true or as false. But honesty or dishonesty is a function (explained in the paper) of the expressed concern, rather than of the topic of concern. Hence, although utterances of all sentential forms are honest or dishonest, their honesty or dishonesty is logically independent of their truth or falsity.

This article consists in a critical examination of an argument which purports to prove that many scientific hypotheses held to be probable are actually certain. The argument rests on the assumption that since the nonphilosopher would say of many scientific hypotheses that they are certain and would deny that the best-established hypotheses are merely probable, philosophers who say that no scientific hypotheses are certain must be mistaken. Examination reveals that the argument fails to take account of the technical nature of the claim that even the best-established hypotheses are probable.

Prompted by Alfred Landé's appraisal of individual indeterminacy in both ordinary and quantum games of chance [Mind, n.s. 67: 174-181 (April, 1958)], this paper suggests an alternative assessment in terms of the model-structure of physical theory. Whereas Landé explains such indeterminacy by appeal to “the Leibnitzian principle” of causal continuity, the author sees no need for such a special explanation. Instead, he indicates how the partial interpretation of the kinetic and quantum models limits us to statistical generalities—to limited “areas of relative chance.” The alleged indeterminism of physics thus resides in the model and its partial interpretation in the sense that the statistical nature of statements about “the next throw” or about individual particles is built into the model that enables the scientist to talk at all about such outcomes or entities.

The issue of materialism has recently been raised again. Mr. Putnam argues against philosophical behaviorism [4]. Such a position holds, as he construes it, that statements like ‘Jones is angry’ can be analyzed in solely behavioral terms. When one argues against philosophical behaviorism, he might be expected to distinguish this metaphysical position from behavior science. Putnam, however, does not make the distinction. Consequently he argues against both. I shall first state the distinction between these two different things, namely, philosophical behaviorism and behavior science, as I see it. The behavior scientist adopts the thesis that in principle it is possible to predict future behavior on the basis of data concerning environmental, behavioral, and physiological variables. All three of these he considers in physical terms. The behavior scientist thus speaks about physical objects and properties of such. Talking in such terms, he believes that it is in principle possible to coordinate to statements asserting that person X has or is in state of mind Y another statement, employing only the above mentioned physical terms, such that either both are true or both are false. The reasons for the behavior scientist's program are the well known quandaries involved in the observation of other people's minds and the need for intersubjective verification in science. One can further distinguish between a narrower and a broader view of behavior science. The former restricts itself to environmental and behavioral variables at what some call the macro level; the latter includes, or even concentrates upon, physiological variables. As scientists neither the behaviorist nor the physiologist asks or answers philosophical questions, either epistemological or ontological, about minds, bodies, and mental contents.

Peirce conceived of methodology, or methodeutic, as he preferred to call it, as one of the three major parts of logic taken broadly—the other two being the theory of signs and formal logic. Unlike these two, however, his theory of methodology remained mostly programmatic, and there is little more than fragmentary suggestions about it scattered through his writings. But by gathering them together and pursuing their insights, it is possible to indicate how he might have divided and developed it: 1) The nature of scientific discourse and how it differs from non-scientific. 2) The logic of inquiry, both heuristic and systematic, according to the modes of argument as deductive, inductive, or abductive (i.e. hypothesis) or a combination or all three. 3) The assurance of science considered in the factors that thwart or promote inquiry.

Definition is viewed in this paper as a cohesive element of theory, providing links between scientific constructs. The problem is approached first in terms of three orders—the historical, the logical, and the heuristic—in which the structure of science may be put together; a study of these is necessary if difficulties about priority of definition are to be resolved. The main part of the paper is devoted to an exercise in theory-construction which illustrates the five principal functions of definition—the grounding of constructs in observation, their descriptive interrelation, the development of logico-mathematical calculi, the interpretation of these calculi, and the provision of precise, quasi-mathematical relations between the constructs themselves. Reference is made throughout to the many names for the defining process found in earlier works, and problems of contextual definition, reduction, stipulative and lexical definition, etc., are dealt with briefly. The theory thus constructed is represented diagrammatically. It is shown that the analysis may be simplified, in general terms, by the use of two new categories, “internal” and “external” definition; and that this innovation may prove helpful in clarifying some traditional obscurities, and in preserving a necessary balance between a purely logical and a purely empirical approach to the philosophy of science.

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,—the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend.

The methodology of the empirical sciences is treated from a set-theoretical point of view. Starting from Tarski's formulation of the methodology of the deductive sciences, a relation between terms, called degree of centrality, is introduced. Epistemic correlation, and therefore the notion of interpretative system, is defined using this relation.

This article is devoted to the question: does the Duhemian argument support the position taken by those contemporary philosophers who—like W. V. O. Quine and M. White—reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements? The term “Duhemian argument” is used to refer to the following statement: it is impossible to put to the test one isolated empirical statement; testing empirical statements involves testing a whole group of hypotheses. An analysis of the logical structure of reductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that the Duhemian argument is valid and that it entails the following statements: (1)—experience alone cannot compel us absolutely to the acceptance of any isolated empirical statement whatsoever, independently of our acceptance or rejection of some other statements, and (2)—no isolated empirical statement can be conclusively falsified by experience, independently of our acceptance or rejection of some other statements. The Duhemian argument seems then to establish conclusively the cogency of the claim that, in principle, it is possible to reject or to maintain any particular empirical statement, provided we make appropriate changes in the system of hypotheses which is put to test. The philosophers who reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements—in particular Quine—claim that the same line of reasoning supports their contention. It is alleged that: (1)—the Duhemian argument makes impossible a definition of statement synonymy and, consequently, a definition of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and (2)—that the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science or the total science, and (3)—that it is a folly to seek a boundary between synthetic and analytic statements, because all our statements are equally open to revision. The article tries to show that these conclusions do not follow from the Duhemian argument. In particular it is shown: (1)—that the Duhemian argument does not exclude the definition of statement synonymy, (2)—that this argument does not support the contention that the enigmatic entity called “the whole of science” or the “total science” is involved in each and every testing procedure, (3)—that the principle of fundamental revisability of every statement does not change the fact that in scientific practice the situation is never so hopeless as the Duhemian argument seems to imply, because even inconclusive arguments may differ in their adequacy, and (4)—that the term “revision” is ambiguous and only this ambiguity lends an air of plausibility to Quine's formulations. The conclusion is that the Duhemian line of reasoning does not support the contention of philosophers who reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

Recent writings of Professor Frank raise basic questions concerning the nature of science and its relations to social, political, theological and metaphysical issues.

This paper concentrates on several of these questions. What determines the acceptance of an hypothesis in the sciences? Is it explanation of the facts and confirmation by experimentation or is it the capacity of a theory to guide human conduct? Professor Frank's espousal of the latter criterion raises the question of whether this criterion can clearly be applied. Equally important: it places on the scientist the responsibility of (a) reliably predicting the effects of a theory on human conduct and (b), deciding which effects ought to be achieved, assuming we could reliably achieve them. Another set of problems arises concerning the relation between scientific views and metaphysical, political and religious beliefs. Are the former relevant to the latter? If so, how? Does not scientific method at least involve the rejection of certain political and religious philosophies? We conclude that each and all of these difficulties could be relieved if not resolved by accepting a thoroughgoing empiricism.

There is a biological controversy of long standing between proponents of the Wilsonian view that all organisms of a certain class have at least one part that is a cell and proponents of the contradictory, or Dobellian, view that some organisms in the same class have no parts that are cells. The controversy is considered from the standpoint of the methodology of explication. It is concluded that on the grounds of prevalent biological usage, precision, utility and generality the Wilsonian view may be defended successfully against attacks that have been made upon it.

It is commonly the case that a problem concerning a mathematical or physical system can be solved in two quite different ways—by an internal or an external approach. For example, the area of a triangle can be found by integration or by showing it to be half that of a certain rectangle. In general, the first approach is, to analyse the given system into component parts, and the second approach is to deal with the system as a whole.

It seems that even in cases where solutions to physical problems obtained according to these two approaches are equally valid, and are equally good as explanations, scientists prefer the solution obtained by the internal approach.

The reasons for this preference are examined. And it is suggested that whatever the reasons, this preference may have been partly responsible for the 19th century preference for the Kinetic Theory rather than Thermodynamics.

Professor Isaiah Berlin has written an extremely lively polemic against those metaphysical theories of history which by regarding all human actions as inevitable, make it morally improper to censure the actors. Such theories attempt to give a comprehensive explanation of historical change in terms of some abstraction such as The Masses, The Absolute Spirit, Tradition, etc. which is supposedly the real dynamism or determinant of human history. What he opposes in these theories is that they seem to entail that individuals are at the mercy of forces they are not aware of, much less understand; they have no choices or alternatives, for their actions are predetermined by the necessity of the fulfillment of some over-all Plan or Realization. Such a view if taken seriously would make it improper for the historian or anyone else to blame, say, Napoleon, or claim that he could have pursued a different policy.