I defend the view that many biological categories are defined by homology against a series of arguments designed to show that all biological categories are defined, at least in part, by selected function. I show that categories of homology are ‘abnormality inclusive’—something often alleged to be unique to selected function categories. I show that classifications by selected function are logically dependent on classifications by homology, but not vice-versa. Finally, I reject the view that biologists must use considerations of selected function to abstract away from variation and pathology to form a canonical description of a class of biological systems.

This paper examines a novel notion of causality, namely, fuzzy-set-theoretic causality. Over the last decade, a number of conceptual models of causality, in the language of fuzzy-set theory, have appeared in the scientific literature and have been applied to empirical research. They have circulated widely from one scientific discipline to another, weaving a unifying thread through them. However, they have received no philosophical attention. In this paper, I will discuss the value and limitations of this type of model and will read into its application several dimensions of philosophical significance.

Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B, that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning:$B^{E}(\cdot) $ should be$B(\cdot \wedge E) / B(E) $ . Probability is also important in classical statistics, where it is generally supposed that probabilities are frequencies, and that inference proceeds by controlling error and not by conditioning. I will focus on the tension between these two approaches to probability, and in the main part of the paper show where and when Bayesian conditioning conflicts with error based statistics and how to resolve these conflicts.

A common complaint against the increasing privatization of research is that research that is conducted with the immediate purpose of producing applicable knowledge will not yield knowledge as valuable as that generated in more curiosity-driven, academic settings. In this paper, I make this concern precise and reconstruct the rationale behind it. Subsequently, I examine the case of industry research on the giant magnetoresistance effect in the 1990s as a characteristic example of research undertaken under considerable pressure to produce applicable results. The example permits one to arrive at a more optimistic assessment of the epistemic merits of private, application-driven research. I attempt to specify the conditions that, in this case, advanced the production of interesting and reliable knowledge.

The aim of this paper is to examine in detail the similarities and dissimilarities between Werner Heisenberg's account of closed theories and Thomas Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions. My analysis draws on a little-known discussion that took place between Heisenberg and Kuhn in 1963, in which Heisenberg, having just read Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions, compares Kuhn's views to his own account of closed theories. I conclude that while Heisenberg and Kuhn share a holist conception of theories, a revolutionary model of theory change, and even a notion of incommensurability, their views diverge fundamentally when it comes to the issue of scientific realism. I show that, contrary to popular opinion, Heisenberg is not an instrumentalist, but rather a pluralistic realist.

I. C. Jarvie interprets Popper's philosophy of science as a theory of the institution of science, explains how the social aspect of his theory developed, and suggests that an updated version of Popper's social theory should be used to study both scientific and nonscientific societies today. Although (1) Jarvie's description of the emergence of Popper's theory suffers because he takes no account Popper's research conducted before Logik der Forschung (1994), (2) his portrayal of Popper's framework overlooks important problems, and (3) his program is by no means new, his essay throws light on the relation between Popper's philosophy of science, his social theory, and his social studies of science.