Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-02T23:36:27.796Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

There Is No Asymmetry of Identity Assumptions in the Debate over Selection and Individuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Casey Helgeson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A long-running dispute concerns which adaptation-related explananda natural selection can be said to explain. (The issue is conceptual—not empirical—and orthogonal adaptationism.) At issue are explananda of the form: why a given individual organism has a given adaptation rather than that same individual having another trait. It is broadly agreed that one must be ready to back up a “no” answer with an appropriate theory of trans-world identity for individuals. I argue, against the conventional wisdom, that the same is true for a “yes” answer. My conclusion recasts the landscape and opens the door to a potential resolution.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 1 , January 2015 , pp. 21 - 31
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

For discussion and advice on several precursors to this article I heartily thank John Basl, Joshua Filler, Dan Hausman, Marek Kwiatkowski, Brian McCloon, Bence Nanay, Larry Shapiro, Elliott Sober, and Naftali Weinberger. Comments from three referees also improved the article.

References

Birch, J. 2012. “The Negative View of Natural Selection.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2): 569–73.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cummins, R. 1975. “Functional Analysis.” Journal of Philosophy 72 (20): 741–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Forber, P. 2005. “On the Explanatory Roles of Natural Selection.” Biology and Philosophy 20 (2): 329–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helgeson, C. 2013. “What Selection Can and Cannot Explain: A Reply to Nanay’s Critique of Sober.” Philosophy of Science 80 (1): 155–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, S. A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lewens, T. 2001. “Sex and Selection: A Reply to Matthen.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 589–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewontin, R. 1983. “Darwin’s Revolution.” New York Review of Books 30:21–27.Google Scholar
Matthen, M. 1999. “Evolution, Wisconsin Style: Selection and the Explanation of Individual Traits.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1): 143–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matthen, M. 2002. “Origins Are Not Essences in Evolutionary Systematics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 167–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLoone, B. 2013. “Selection Explanations of Token Traits.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science C 44 (3): 342–46.Google ScholarPubMed
Millikan, R. G. 1990. “Seismograph Readings for ‘Explaining Behavior.’” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 807–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mogensen, A. 2014. “Do Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake about Evolutionary Explanations?” Paper presented at Experiments and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conference, University of Oxford, June 7.Google Scholar
Nanay, B. 2005. “Can Cumulative Selection Explain Adaptation?” Philosophy of Science 72 (5): 1099–1112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nanay, B. 2010. “Natural Selection and the Limited Nature of Environmental Resources.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41:418–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. 1988. “What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to Sober.” Philosophy of Science 55 (3): 422–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. 1995a. “Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober’s ‘Reply to Neander.’” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4): 583–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. 1995b. “Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning.” Philosophical Studies 79 (2): 109–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. 1995c. “Pruning the Tree of Life.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1): 59–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neander, K. 1996. “Dretske’s Innate Modesty.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2): 258–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pust, J. 2001. “Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 201–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pust, J. 2004. “Natural Selection and the Traits of Individual Organisms.” Biology and Philosophy 19 (5): 765–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Setiya, K. 2012. Knowing Right from Wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sober, E. 1984. The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Sober, E. 1995. “Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3): 384–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walsh, D. 1998. “The Scope of Selection: Sober and Neander on What Natural Selection Explains.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2): 250–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodward, J. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar