Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T21:47:00.807Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Marc Alspector-Kelly
Marc Alspector-Kelly*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University
*
†Send requests for reprints to author, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008–5022; email; [email protected].
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Van Fraassen does not argue that everyone should be a constructive empiricist. He claims only that constructive empiricism (CE) is a coherent post-positivist alternative to realism, notwithstanding the realist's charge that CE is arbitrary and irrational. He does argue, however, that the empiricist is obliged to limit belief as CE prescribes. Criticism of CE has been largely directed at van Fraassen's claim that CE is a coherent option. Far less attention has been directed at his claim that empiricists should be constructive empiricists. I consider his various attempts to support this claim, conclude that they are unsuccessful, and suggest that the empiricist who repudiates CE does not thereby abandon contemporary empiricism itself.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , December 2001 , pp. 413 - 431
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Tammy Alspector-Kelly for her comments and encouragement.

References

Alspector-Kelly (2001a), “On Quine on Carnap on Ontology”, Philosophical Studies, 102: 93–122.10.1023/A:1010353825006CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alspector-Kelly (2001b), “Stroud's Carnap”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Boyd, Richard (1985), “Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi”, in Churchland and Hooker, 3–34.Google Scholar
Churchland, Paul (1985), “The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues”, in Churchland and Hooker, 35–47.Google Scholar
Churchland, Paul and Hooker, Clifford (eds.) (1985), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Creath, Richard (1985), “Taking Theories Seriously”, Synthese 62: 317–345.10.1007/BF00869409CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellis, Brian (1985), “What Science Aims to Do”, in Churchland and Hooker, 48–74.Google Scholar
Glymour, Clark (1984), “Explanation and Realism”, in Leplin, Jarrett (ed.), Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 173–192.10.1525/9780520337442-010CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gutting, Gary (1983), “Scientific Realism versus Constructive Empiricism: A Dialogue”, The Monist 63: 336–349.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1981), “Do We See through a Microscope?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 305–322.10.1111/j.1468-0114.1981.tb00070.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hooker, Clifford (1985), “Surface Dazzle, Ghostly Depths: An Exposition and Critical Evaluation of van Fraassen's Vindication of Empiricism against Realism”, in Churchland and Hooker, 153–196.Google Scholar
Kukla, Andre (1995), “The Two Antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 26: 431–454.10.1016/0039-3681(95)00010-KCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ladyman, James, Douven, Igor, Horsten, Leon, and Fraassen, Bas van (1997), “A Defence of van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Inference: Reply to Psillos”, The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 305–321.10.1111/1467-9213.00061CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Musgrave, Alan (1985), “Realism versus Constructive Empiricism”, in Churchland and Hooker, 197–221.Google Scholar
Psillos, Stathis (1996), “On van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning”, The Philosophical Quarterly 46: 31–47.10.2307/2956303CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Psillos, Stathis (1997), “How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: A Rejoinder”, The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 369–372.10.1111/1467-9213.00066CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Psillos, Stathis (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1966a), The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. (1966b), “Posits and Reality”, in Quine 1966a, 246–254.Google Scholar
Railton, Peter (1990), “Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 220–252.Google Scholar
Richmond, Alasdair (1999), “Between Abduction and the Deep Blue Sea”, The Philosophical Quarterly 49: 86–91.10.1111/1467-9213.00131CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, Gideon (1994), “What is Constructive Empiricism?”, Philosophical Studies 74: 143–178.10.1007/BF00989801CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, Wesley (1985), “Empiricism: The Key Question”, in Rescher, Nicholas (ed.), The Heritage of Logical Positivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1–21.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1980), The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198244274.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1985), “Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science”, in Churchland and Hooker, 245–308.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1989), Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0198248601.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1993), “Against Naturalized Epistemology”, in Leonardi, P. and Santambrogio, M. (eds.), On Quine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 68–88.Google Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1994a), “Against Transcendental Empiricism”, in Stapleton, T. J. (ed.), The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 309–335.10.1007/978-94-011-1160-7_13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1994b), “The World of Empiricism”, in Hilgevoord, J. (ed.), Physics and Our View of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 114–134.10.1017/CBO9780511622823.007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Fraassen, Bas (1997), “Sola Experientia?—Feyerabend's Refutation of Classical Empiricism”, Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings): S385–S395.10.1086/392616CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, Mark (1985), “What Can Theory Tell Us about Observation?”, in Churchland and Hooker, 222–244.Google Scholar