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Reconsidering Perceptual Content
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according to accumulated past experience. A corollary is that a longstanding problem concerning the indeterminacy of visual content is dissolved.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank Güven Güzeldere, Alexander Rosenberg, Dale Purves, and Fred Dretske for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
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