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Post-Structuralist Angst—Critical Notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ronald Endicott
Ronald Endicott*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Arkansas State University Department of Philosophy & Religion, North Carolina State University
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy & Religion, North Carolina State University, Campus Box 8103, Raleigh, NC 27695–8103.
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Abstract

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Type
Review Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 3 , September 2001 , pp. 377 - 393
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

A version of this paper entitled “Bickling Over Token Models” was presented at the University of Mississippi Symposium on Psychoneural Reduction, 27 Feb., 1999. I thank coordinators Michael Lynch and Kenneth Sufka, as well as John Bickle, David Henderson, Terence Horgan, William Lawhead, John Post, John Tienson, and Robert Westmoreland for many fine discussions. I also thank Kenneth Schaffner for a kind note about his 1977 paper.

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