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Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance is the Kind of Stability That Matters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jim Woodward
Jim Woodward*
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, 101–40, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125.
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Abstract

This paper develops an account of explanation in biology which does not involve appeal to laws of nature, at least as traditionally conceived. Explanatory generalizations in biology must satisfy a requirement that I call invariance, but need not satisfy most of the other standard criteria for lawfulness. Once this point is recognized, there is little motivation for regarding such generalizations as laws of nature. Some of the differences between invariance and the related notions of stability and resiliency, due respectively to Sandra Mitchell and Brian Skyrms, are explored.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue 1 , March 2001 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Earlier versions of this paper were read at MIT and at the University of Pittsburgh. I thank members of the audience at both institutions and especially Evelyn Fox Keller, Peter Machamer, and Sandy Mitchell for helpful comments.

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