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Is Mathematical Competence Innate?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robert Schwartz
Robert Schwartz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
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Abstract

Despite a vast philosophical literature on the epistemology of mathematics and much speculation about how, in principle, knowledge of this domain is possible, little attention has been paid to the psychological findings and theories concerning the acquisition, comprehension and use of mathematical knowledge. This contrasts sharply with recent philosophical work on language where comparable issues and problems arise. One topic that is the center of debate in the study of mathematical cognition is the question of innateness. This paper critically examines the controversy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 227 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Society for Philosophy and Psychology symposium. Karen Wynn was the other speaker and Robert Matthews provided thoughtful comments. I hope it is clear that my aim here is not to support “anti-nativist,” “empiricist” doctrines, but to downplay the significance of such labels by bringing into focus what the genuine issues are. A further goal of this essay is to provide a basis for comparing and contrasting arguments and claims in mathematical cognition with those found in language studies. Space limitations, however, preclude much discussion of the likenesses and differences found.

My work was supported by an N.E.H. Fellowship.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201.

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