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I'd Love to Be a Naturalist—if Only I Knew What Naturalism Was

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Lawrence Sklar
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Abstract

Naturalists tell us to rely on what science tells about the world and to eschew aprioristic philosophy. But foundational physics relies internally on modes of thinking that can only be called philosophical, and philosophical arguments rely upon what can only be called scientific inference. So what, then, could the naturalistic thesis really amount to?

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 1121 - 1137
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Originally presented as the presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association Meetings, Pittsburgh, 2008.

References

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