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The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Daniel Steel
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Abstract

In a recent essay, John Norton proposes a material theory of induction, according to which all justification for inductive inference ultimately stems from the particular facts of the case at hand. Despite being sympathetic to the pluralistic spirit of this proposal, I argue that central controversies among leading theories of inductive inference turn not on material facts but upon normative judgments regarding the proper standards and aims of induction. Thus, a pluralistic approach to induction can be successfully developed only given an explanation of how the choice of such aims and standards depends on features of particular cases.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 188 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank John Norton for helpful discussion and comments regarding this essay.

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