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Explanation, Emergence, and Quantum Entanglement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Andreas Hüttemann
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Abstract

This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with thoroughgoing reductionist explanations. I will distinguish two kinds of microexplanation (or micro-‘reduction’). I will argue that even though quantum entanglement provides an example of the failure of one kind of microexplanation, it does not affect the other. Contrary to a recent paper by Kronz and Tiehen, I claim that the explanation of the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems is just as reductionist as it used to be in classical mechanics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 114 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This paper was presented in Paris at a conference on reduction and emergence in November 2003. I would like to thank Anouk Barberousse, Max Kistler, and Soazig Le Bihan for helpful criticism and suggestions. Further thanks go to Alexander Altland and Claus Kiefer for valuable comments on separable and nonseparable Hamiltonians.

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