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Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gerald Doppelt
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Abstract

Against the well-known objection that in the history of science there are many theories that are successful but false, Psillos offers a three-pronged defense of scientific realism as the best explanation for the success of science. Focusing on these, I criticize Psillos’ defense, arguing that each prong is weakened when we recognize that according to realist rebuttals of the underdetermination argument and versions of empiricism, realists are committed to accounting for the explanatory success of theories, not their mere empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability. I conclude by indicating how ‘explanationist’ realism might be recast to accommodate my arguments.

Type
Realism and Underdetermination
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1076 - 1087
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Laudan, Larry (1981), “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, A Confutation of Convergent Realism 48:19–49.Google Scholar
Psillos, Stathis (1999), Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London: Routledge.Google Scholar