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Ambiguity in Cooperative Signaling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Carlos Santana
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Abstract

In game-theoretic signaling models, evolution tends to favor perfectly precise signaling systems, but in the natural world communication is almost always imprecise. I argue that standard explanations for this discrepancy are only partially sufficient, and I show that communication is often ambiguous because signal senders take advantage of context sensitivity. As evidence, I make two additions to the signaling model: a cost for more complex signaling strategies and the ability to combine information in signals with independent information. Analysis and simulation of the altered model shows that it leads to the predicted outcome of evolution favoring ambiguous signaling.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 398 - 422
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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