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How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

David Atkinson ,
Jeanne Peijnenburg  and
Theo Kuipers
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Abstract

Could some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it might, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further, we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 76 , Issue 1 , January 2009 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

We would like to thank Igor Douven for having made most useful comments. He brought our attention to the fact that a particular class of examples of what we in Appendix B shall call the Alan Author Effect has been recently published by him (Douven 2007, 155–156). We acknowledge also the lively and helpful comments of the members of the Groningen research group PCCP (Promotion Club Cognitive Patterns).

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