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Emotions as Natural and Normative Kinds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul E. Griffiths
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Abstract

In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not ‘natural kinds’. Here I clarify what I mean by ‘natural kind’, suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories.

Type
Biological Kinds and Human Kinds
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 901 - 911
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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