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Rich and Poor in the Courts of Corinth: Litigiousness and Status in 1 Corinthians 6.1–11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Alan C. Mitchell
Alan C. Mitchell
Affiliation:
(Department of Theology, Georgetown University, Washingon, D.C. 20057-0998, USA)
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Extract

Compared with that of classic Pauline texts, the history of exegesis of 1 Cor 6.1–11 is modest. Still, the fact that this text has not been studied much does not render it problem-free. On the contrary, it continues to elude an easy interpretation. The standard treatment discusses the integrity of these eleven verses, looks at their placement within the context of chapters 5 and 6, and attempts to explain whether and how Paul envisioned Christians settling their legal disputes. Little attention, however, has been given to the social situation of the community that may have occasioned Paul's remarks about lawsuits in Corinth. This study examines that social situation on the premise that Paul sees the problem of lawsuits on two levels. One looks to the community's relationship to the outside world. The other looks to the community's internal life, where Paul understands the litigiousness of some Christians to be part of the larger problem of social division in the Corinthian churches.

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Articles
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New Testament Studies , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , October 1993 , pp. 562 - 586
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

1 For a brief history of exegesis up to 1955 see Vischer, L., Die Auslegungsgeschichte von 1. Korinther 6.1–11 (BGBE 1; Tübingen: Mohr, 1955).Google Scholar See also Lee, G. M., ‘Corinthians vi.5’, ExpTim 79 (1967/1968) 310;Google ScholarStein, A., ‘Wo trugen die korinthischen Christen ihre Rechts-handel aus?’ ZNW 59 (1968) 86–90;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMeurer, S., ‘Auslegung von 1. Kor 6:1–11’, in id., Das Recht im Dienst der Versöhnung und des Friedens (Zurich: Theologischer, 1972) 141–56;Google ScholarRichardson, P., ‘Judgment in Sexual Matters in 1 Corinthians 6:1–11’, NovT 25 (1983) 37–58;Google ScholarDuncan, J.Derrett, M., ‘Judgement and 1 Corinthians 6’, NTS 37 (1991) 22–36.Google Scholar

2 In a paragraph, Theissen, G., The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 97,Google Scholar infers class matters at the heart of the problem and concedes that Paul may hint at the status of the litigating Christian, but does not explain the situation further. Cf. Meeks, W. A., The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University, 1983) 66.Google ScholarGordon, Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1987) 229,Google Scholar simply notes the possible sociological dimension of the problem.

3 Cf. Fee, , First Corinthians, 229Google Scholar, who thinks it likely that the problem refers only to two individuals, who have property and may be leaders in the community. Winter, B. W., ‘Civil Litigation in Secular Corinth and the Church: The Forensic Background to 1 Corinthians 6.1–8’, NTS 37 (1991) 559–72,CrossRefGoogle Scholar shares the view that the litigating parties are of equal upper status rank. For him, litigation is another expression of the problem of factionalism in the community. See Mitchell, M. M., Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (HUT 28; Tübingen: Mohr, 1991) 116–18.Google Scholar

4 ‘Zum Problem der Ethik bei Paulus: Rechtsnahme und Rechtsverzicht (1 Kor. 6:1–11)’, ZTK 49 (1952) 167–200.Google Scholar

5 ‘“Since Then You Would Need To Go Out Of The World”: Group Boundaries in Pauline Christianity’, in Critical History and Biblical Faith: New Testament Perspectives (ed. T. J. Ryan; Villanova, Pa.: College Theology Society, 1979) 4–29.Google Scholar See also id., First Urban Christians, 128–9; Fee, First Corinthians, 228–48.

6 ‘Since Then’, 9.

7 See Fee, First Corinthians, 237.

8 See Kuck, D., Judgment and Community Conflict: Paul's Use of Apocalyptic Judgment Language in 1 Corinthians 3:5–4:5 (NovTSup 66; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992) 242–3.Google Scholar

9 Meeks, , First Urban Christians, 104.Google Scholar

10 See Volf, J. M. G., Paul and Perseverance: Staying in and Falling Away (WUNT 2.37; Tübingen: Mohr, 1990) 135.Google Scholar

11 Conzelmann, H., 1 Corinthians: A Cqmmentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 104, n. 12,Google Scholar does not believe Paul is commenting on the corruption of the legal system here. Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 563, is correct, however, to suggest that corruption is an issue.

12 Cf. Dinkier, , ‘Zum Problem der Ethik’, 183Google Scholar; Fee, , First Corinthians, 240.Google Scholar

13 See Fee, , First Corinthians, 237.Google Scholar

14 See 1 Cor 15.34 where Paul uses the same expression to correct them regarding the resurrection of the dead. In 4.14 Paul distinguishes between shaming (έντρέπων) and admonishing (νουθετ⋯ν) in a context that suggests that the former is more serious. The use of νουθετεν in Rom 15.14,1 Thess 5.12,14, and 2 Thess 3.15 confirms that admonishing is a less forceful way of bringing about a change, which seems more along the line of corrective instruction, or a gentle prodding of those who have become lax.

15 ”Ηττημα in 6.7 is best translated as ‘defeat’ (EWNT, 2.311; BAGD, 349; cf. Epictetus 2.18.6).

16 Fee, First Corinthians, 240, has Paul referring to the cause of the litigation and not the act of going to court.

17 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 106, supports this when he says of άδικεν and άποστερεν that their conditions are ‘already fulfilled, in light of the standard indicated in v. 7, by the very act of going to law’. But he does not go far enough. The issue also concerns the way they go to law, i.e. έπί άπίστων, and its effect on the community as a whole.

18 Some commentators waver over whether Paul is prescribing a method for settling minor disputes or would prefer that they not have differences at all. See Stanley, A. D., The Epistles ofSt Paul to the Corinthians (London: Murray, 1882) 85;Google ScholarGodet, F., Commentary on St Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886) 293–4;Google ScholarMcRory, J., The Epistles of St Paul to the Corinthians (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1915) 74–5;Google ScholarDinkier, , ‘Zum Problem der Ethik’, 182Google Scholar; Héring, J., The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians (London: Epworth, 1962) 41;Google ScholarConzelmann, , 1 Corinthians, 105Google Scholar; Talbert, C. H., Reading Corinthians: A Literary and Theological Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (New York: Crossroad, 1987) 21–2.Google Scholar

19 See Meeks, , First Urban Christians, 104.Google Scholar

20 Two inscriptions from the first century CE attest to the process of private arbitration, CIL, 4.1268 and 9.2827. Another important source are the Tablets of Herculaneum originally published in a series in La Parola del Passato from the years 1946 to 1955: Mauir, A., ‘Tabulae Ceratae Herculanenses’, La Parola del Passato 1 (1946) 373–9;Google ScholarCarratelli, G. P., ‘Tabulae Herculanenses I’, La Parola del Passato 1 (1946) 379–85;Google Scholar id., ‘Tabulae Herculanenses II’, La Parola del Passato 2 (1948) 165–84;Google Scholar id., ‘Tabulae Herculanenses III’, La Parola del Passato 8 (1953) 448–77;Google Scholar id., with Vincenzo, Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Tabulae Herculanenses IV’, La Parola del Passato 9 (1954) 54–74;Google Scholar id., ‘Tabulae Herculanenses V’, La Parola del Passato 10 (1955) 448–77.Google Scholar See also Corte, Matteo Delia, ‘Tabulae Cerato Ercolanese’, La Parola del Passato 6 (1951) 224–30Google Scholar and Ziegler, K. H., Das private Schieds-gericht im antiken römischen Recht (Munich: Beck, 1971), 162Google Scholar and passim; Magdalen, A., ‘Aspects arbitraux de la justice civile archaïque à Rome’, RIDA 27 (1980) 205–81;Google ScholarWlas-sak, M., ‘Arbiter’, PW, 3.410Google Scholar; Broggini, G., Judex Arbiterve (Cologne: Graz) 1957;Google ScholarCohen, B., ‘Private Arbitration in Jewish and Roman Law’, RIDA 5 (1958) 134–232;Google ScholarModzrejewski, J., ‘Private Arbitration in the Law of Greco-Roman Egypt’, Journal of Juristic Papyrology, 6 (1958) 239–56.Google Scholar

21 Derrett, ‘Judgement’, 26–7, translates 6.4 as an imperative ‘place in the (judge's) seat those whom the church holds in low esteem’, and argues that Paul prefers to judgment and private arbitration ‘an ascetic's non-judgmental advice to antagonists’, i.e. one of the poorest members of the community. As intriguing an option as that is, it has its problems. First, it puts Paul in the position of designating someone from one status level only to decide such cases. This is not typical of his advice in 1 Corinthians, where he seeks to avoid fostering factionalism. Second, how likely is it that in a socially divided community he would use such a negative term, έξουθενημένοι, to refer to those who already suffered shame at the hands of those better off? Any attempt to romanticize this term on an analogy with its use in 1.28 fails because there it is qualified by κόσμος, whereas here it is qualified by έκκλησία. Those things despised by the world could be the same things upper status people in the church would despise, but the Opposition Of κόσμος to έκκλησία is broader than that. For Derrett's translation to work έκκλησία in 6.4 could only apply to the upper status offenders. Third, an imperative here does not fit with the following verse. What sense has πρός έντροπήν ύμ⋯νλέγω (6.5a) unless the preceding verse states the problem that some were taking others before pagan judges (cf. Robertson, A. and Plummer, A., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle ofSt Paul to the Corinthians [ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911] 114)Google Scholar? See Fee, First Corinthians, 236, for additional reasons against the imperative.

22 Stein, A., ‘Wo trugen die korinthischen Christen ihre Rechtshändel aus?’, ZNW (1968) 86–90,Google Scholar has suggested that Paul wanted the Corinthians to establish their own court, on the model of a Jewish court, because that is where they were taking their cases already. Thus, rather than go before a Jewish , they should appoint a Christian σοφός to act as judge in a tribunal of their own. Stein's view has not met with wide approval, largely because it would make the terms ἄδικοι and ἄπιστοι refer to Jews, and he cannot show how these can be meaningful designations for Jews in Paul's thought (see Fee, , First Corinthians, 236;Google Scholar Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 560, n. 5). Others before him have made similar suggestions: cf. Allo, E.-B., Saint Paul: Premiére Épître aux Corinthiens (Paris: Gabalda, 1935) 140;Google ScholarLietzmann, H., An die Korinther I–II (HNT 9; Tübingen: Mohr, 1949) 26;Google ScholarDinkier, , ‘Zum Problem der Ethik’, 171Google Scholar; Vischer, , Die Auslegungsgeschichte, 15Google Scholar; Héring, First Corinthians, 38–9.

23 Theissen, , Social Setting, 70–3;Google Scholar cf. Wuellner, W. H., ‘The Sociological Implications of I Corinthians 1:26–28 Reconsidered’, Studia Evangelica 4 (TU 112; Berlin: Akademie, 1973) 666–72.Google Scholar

24 Cf. Plutarch's Quomodo Adul. 16 (Mor. 58E) referring to the Stoics who call the wise man rich, handsome, well born, and a king, and De Fort. Rom. 1 (Mor. 316D) where wisdom accompanies high repute, power, and dominion. Theissen, Social Setting, 72, cites Philo, De Som. 155. Fee, First Corinthians, 80, strengthens Theissen's argument by pointing to Jeremiah 9. 23–4 as possible background for Paul's use of these terms: ‘Let not the wise man (σοφός) glory in his wisdom, let not the mighty man (ίσχυρός) glory in his might, let not the rich man (πλούσιος) glory in his riches, but let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me, that I am the Lord who practice steadfast love, justice, and righteousness in the earth; for in these things I delight, says the Lord’ (RSV). As in 1 Cor the language in Jeremiah is sociologically and theologically significant. See, however, O'Day, Gail R., ‘Jeremiah 9.22–3 and 1 Corinthians 1.26–31: A Study in Inter-textuality’, JBL 109 (1990) 259–67,Google Scholar who stresses the theological significance of this language over the social.

25 Theissen, Social Setting, 125.

26 Ibid., 138.

27 Ruth 2.15 attests to the social value of καταισχύνειν. There Boaz instructs his men not to humiliate Ruth as she gleans from the fields, a practice of the poor from the Deuteronomic perspective (Deut 23.25; cf. 24.21). As Meeks, First Urban Christians, 68, points out, the ‘have-nots’ may be either those who do not have houses, or those absolutely who are without, i.e. the poor.

28 Ibid., 69–72.

29 Ibid., 72–3. Cf. Theissen, Social Setting, 125.

30 It is likely Paul came from a higher status than was previously thought (cf. Deissmann, A., Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History [New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1926] 4, 6, 49–54;Google Scholar id., Light from the Ancient East [New York: Harper, 1927] 313–14;Google ScholarTheissen, , Social Setting, 104Google Scholar; Judge, E. A., The Social Pattern of Christian Groups in the First Century: Some Prolegomena to the Study of New Testament Ideas of Social Obligation [London: Tyndale, 1960] 56–61;Google ScholarHock, R., ‘Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class’, JBL 97 [1978] 555–64,Google Scholar esp. pp. 560–4; id., The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980] 26–49;Google ScholarMalherbe, A. J., Social Aspects of Early Christianity [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983] 33–41;Google ScholarMeeks, , First Urban Christians, 52).Google Scholar

31 Martin, D. B., Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1990) 123;CrossRefGoogle Scholar cf. Theissen, , Social Setting, 138Google Scholar, who connects Paul's critics in chap. 9 with the strong and suggests that he is encouraging them to rethink social privilege.

32 Cf. Fee, First Corinthians, 84.

33 On the transfer from one state to another see Sanders, E. P., Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983) 6–10;Google ScholarMeeks, , First Urban Christians, 95Google Scholar; Newman, C. C., Paul's Glory-Christology: Tradition and Rhetoric (NovTSup 69; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992) 214.Google Scholar

34 O'Day, ‘Jeremiah 9:22–3 and 1 Corinthians 1:26–31’, 266, understands this positive triad to signal a shift from anthropocentric to theocentric, and finally to christocentric categories, since she sees the triad to represent what God accomplished in Christ. In downplaying the social dimension of 1.26–30, she fails to grasp the parenetic value of Paul's interpretation of Jeremiah at this point in the letter.

35 Cf. Martin, , Slavery as Salvation, 142.Google Scholar

36 Social Setting, 97.

37 The model, of course, is Socrates (see Plato Apol. 30C–D, 41D; Gorg. 469B, 473A; 474B; 475C–E).

38 In Cora, Lutz, Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates (New Haven: Yale University, 1947) 76–81.Google Scholar See on this Van Geytenbeek, A. C., Musonius Rufus and the Greek Diatribe (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1963) 134–42.Google Scholar

39 Musonius advances this imperturbable Stoic philosopher as a corrective for some Cynics who sought legal recourse for the public abuse they received. Giving in to adversity shows a lack of wisdom. The idea appears elsewhere in his thought, for example, in his instruction about enduring trials. He says there that doing a wrong is most hateful while suffering one is honourable (Lutz, , Musonius Rufus, 9.142–3, p. 76Google Scholar; cf. 9.120–35, p. 74).

40 See Epictetus 1.28.10; 2.10.24–8; cf. 1.29.18; 1.25.29–30; 4.5.10 and Seneca De Con. Sap. 2.1; 4.1; 7.6; 9.3–5; 12.3; 13.5; 16.1; Ep. Mor. 9.16; De Ira 2.3.1–2.7.3 for further evidence that the topos was well established in Paul's day. See also Timothy, H. B., The Tenets of Stoicism Assembled and Systematized from the Works of L. Annaeus Seneca (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1973) 95–109.Google Scholar

41 This philosophical tradition is not as irrelevant as Fee, First Corinthians, 241, claims.

42 Seneca De Con. Sap. 19.2–3.

43 Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 570, rightly understands Paul's insistence that upper status people not have an advantage in the community. He fails, however, to see that this loses its meaning unless that advantage is working against people of lower status. The issue involves more than just the fact that the magistrates are ‘outsiders’.

44 Έντροπή appears only here and in 15.34 in the NT. Cf. LXX, Ps 34.26 and Iamblichus VP 2.10 where it is paired with αίδώς.

45 The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981) 39.Google Scholar

46 Garnsey, , Social Status, 98,Google Scholar mentions patrons who take clients to court, or masters who take slaves. See Derrett, , ‘Judgement’, 24–5.Google Scholar

47 For an extensive treatment of the forensic background, see Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 561–9.

48 Social Pattern, 60; cf. Theissen, , Social Setting, 106Google Scholar; Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 561–2.

49 Cf. The Behavior of Law (New York, San Francisco, London: Academic, 1976).Google Scholar See also Laura, Nader, ‘The Anthropological Study of Law’, American Anthropologist 67 (1965) 3–32.Google Scholar

50 Behavior of Law, 2–10,105–17.

51 Ibid., 6.

52 The more stratified a society is the more law it will have. But stratification not only affects the amount of law, it also determines the kind of law a society adopts. Black, Ibid., 5, 11–36, identifies four styles of social control that dictate a society's styles of law: penal, compensatory, therapeutic and conciliatory.

53 Ibid., 13–21.

54 Ibid., 21–4.

55 Ibid., 24–5.

56 Ibid., 25.

57 Ibid., 29–30.

58 Ibid., 24–8.

59 The Rise of the Roman Jurists: Studies in Cicero's Pro Caecina (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985) 27–41.Google Scholar Ethnographic pattern analysis is useful here because it confines itself to the study of a pattern within particular cultures. Methodologically this helps to make a transition from one society to another, from one historical period to another. See Mary, Black and Duane, Metzger, ‘Ethnographic Description and the Study of Law’, American Anthropologist 67 (1965) 141–65.Google Scholar

60 Frier, Rise, 29.

61 See Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 566–8.

62 Frier, Rise, 29–30.

63 Ibid., 30–4.

64 Ibid., 35—41. In another work, Frier, , Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980) 185,Google Scholar shows that Roman lease law was ‘landlord friendly’, an example of the State's interest in a socially acceptable outcome to private litigation. The final chapter outlines the relationship between Roman jurisprudence and social control (Ibid., 196–219).

65 Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon) 1970.Google Scholar

66 Ibid., 65–100.

67 Cf. Ziegler, , Das private Schiedsgericht, 163.Google Scholar

68 The Roman Rhetorical Schools as a Preparation for the Courts under the Early Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1945) 30, 54.Google Scholar

69 Suetonius, Augustus, 33.

70 Roman Rhetorical Schools, 55. Parks cites Satyricon, 4, where Petronius berates parents who forced their children to become lawyers and then to be driven unripe (cruda) into the lawcourts.

71 Dio Cassius 54.18.

72 Ann. 11.7.

73 Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire (New York: Arno, 1979) 1.162–3.Google Scholar See also Alföldy, G., The Social History of Rome (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1985) 114.Google Scholar

74 See Frier, Rise, 33.

75 Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) 69–84.Google Scholar

76 Frier, Rise, 27–33.

77 Kelly, Roman Litigation, 69, 78–84. Kelly, Ibid., 79, deduces the shortage of money in the early Empire from literary sources like Plutarch, whose reference to a scarcity of currency in Solon's time likely reflects the monetary situation of his own day.

78 See Crook, J. A., Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C.-A.D. 212 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1967) 49, 75–6, 248–9.Google Scholar

79 See Garnsey, , Social Status, 194–5Google Scholar; Kelly, , Roman Litigation, 69, 79–80.Google Scholar

80 Garnsey, Social Status, 277, concludes: ‘… the unequal distribution of wealth, influence, and knowledge of the law prevented the lower orders from making full use of the legal system, and neither the formulary system nor the official presiding over it made allowances for this fact’. See also Christ, K., The Romans: An Introduction to Their History and Civilization (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1984) 129,Google Scholar and Crook, , Law and Life, 95–7.Google Scholar

81 Garnsey, , Social Status, 65–100.Google Scholar

82 So the judge in the case from the Satyricon was one of the equites. See also Parks, , Roman Rhetorical Schools, 43,Google Scholar who shows that judges were drawn from among senators, knights, and tribunii aerii. Garnsey, , Social Status, 207–18,Google Scholar documents the aristocratic biases of judges.

83 Ibid., 234–59. See also Crook, , Law and Life, 97Google Scholar and Kelly, , Roman Litigation, 1,33–68.Google Scholar

84 Gamsey, , Social Status, 103–78.Google Scholar

85 Roman Litigation, 37.Google Scholar For additional examples of corruption and enmity in the legal system see Winter, ‘Civil Litigation’, 564–8.

86 Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago, 1990) 44.Google Scholar See also Stambaugh, John E. and Balch, David L., The New Testament in Its Social Environment (Library of Early Christianity 2; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986) 157–8.Google Scholar

87 Roman Corinth, 44.

88 Or. 8.9.

89 Or. 46.27.

90 Social Setting, 73,95–6,137.

91 First Urban Christians, 59; cf. Theissen, , Social Setting, 92–4.Google Scholar

92 Ibid., 137.

93 Philo, De Vita Mos. 2.31.158;Google ScholarQuod Omn. Prob. Lib. Sit 7.49; 8.51, 52; Epictetus 1.26.1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus Th. 49.20, places βιωτιά in the realm of private conversation, as opposed to speech in the assembly and the law court; cf. Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 5.5 (Mor. 679C). Fee, First Corinthians, 234, n. 28, claims Philostratus (Vit. Soph. 1.25.3) uses the word to distinguish matters of everyday life which should be settled at home from more serious things one should take to court. But he seems to depend here on BAGD, 142, which does not actually claim Philostratus uses the word. Βιωτικός does not occur in the Philostratus text. Nevertheless, the reference to the practice of Polemo's preventing certain matters over money (τ⋯ς ὐπ⋯ρ χρημάτων) from going to court is an interesting parallel to Paul's recommendation for βιωτικά in 1 Cor 6.5. Cf. Meeks, , First Urban Christians, 66.Google Scholar

94 Fee, , First Corinthians, 234.Google Scholar

95 Cf. Philo, De Spec. Leg. 1.51.278;Google ScholarDe Virt. 19.100,152.

96 Engels, , Roman Corinth, 43–65.Google Scholar

97 Here the analogy with social distinction at the community meal may illuminate this point. Paul did not prevent those of upper status from having such a meal. He asked them not to have it within the context of the Lord's Supper where those of lower status were being excluded (11.33–4). Similarly, in the case of eating meat offered to idols, he does not prohibit it absolutely, but only where it offends the weaker member (8.9–13). Cf. Theissen, , Social Setting, 138–9.Google Scholar

98 Moore, Sally Falk, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London, Henley and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) 55.Google Scholar

99 Ibid., 57. See also, Laura, Nader and Harry, Todd Jr, The Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies (New York: Columbia University, 1978) 1–40.Google Scholar

100 First Urban Christians, 84–110.