No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2016
Although there has been a good deal of important new work on Greek political philosophy, there has not, until recently, been the same intensity or volume of scholarly debate as in the case of Greek ethical philosophy; and it would not be so easy to define prevalent trends. I offer, instead, a personal treatment of one important strand in Greek political theory, which both draws on some recent scholarly thinking and complements the themes of other chapters in this book.
1. For instance, Aristotle’s Politics (Pol.) has been less intensively discussed, until recently, than his ethical works (on which, see Ch. III, text to nn. 45-51, 72-81); for recent work on Pol., see text to nn. 76-85 below. A partial exception is the post-war debate stemming from Popper’s work (on which, see n. 53 below). An important book in preparation is the Cambridge History of Ancient Political Thought, edd. Rowe, C. J. and Schofield, M. (Cambridge, forthcoming)Google Scholar.
2. See e.g. Lukes, S., Individualism (Oxford 1973)Google Scholar; MacIntyre, , After Virtue (London, 2nd edn. 1985), chs. 1-9Google Scholar; Taylor, C., Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 1989)Google Scholar. On the partly parallel way in which the Cartesian ego (the unitary self-conscious ‘I’ ) became fundamental to the theory of mind, in a way that helped to shape subsequent thinking about the ‘self’, see Ch. II, text to nn. 7,10.
3. See e.g. for debate about PL R., considered as a work of political theory, text to nn. 53-4 below.
4. See further on this line of though Hollis, M., ‘Of Masks and Men’, in Carrithers, M., Collins, S., Lukes, S., edd., The Category of the Person (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 217-33Google Scholar.
5. This is a feature not just of P1 R. or Laws (esp. 2.6-7), but also Arist. Pol. (1.7-8); see also the ‘political’ elements in NE 8.9-11,13-14, EE 7. 9-10, treated by Aristotle under the broad heading of ‘friendship’, philia. On the latter topic, see Cooper, J., ‘Political Animals and Civic Friendship’, with commentary by Annas, J., in Patzig, G., ed., Aristoteles: Politik, Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum (Göttingen, 1990), pp. 221-42Google Scholar.
6. See further G. Herman, ‘Reciprocity, Altruism, and Exploitation: the Special Case of Classical Athens’, and Millert, P., ‘The Rhetoric of Reciprocity’, both in Gill, , Postlethwaite, , and Seaford, , edd., Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, forthcoming)Google Scholar. Hermann, G., Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987)Google Scholar, also discusses social and economic ties between members of different city-states.
7. Relevant political factors include the collapse of communism in the former USSR, and a reaction against the ‘consumer’ individualism of conservative governments in the UK and USA in the 1980’s. On ‘communitarianism’, see e.g. Etzioni, A., The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda (New York, 1994)Google Scholar; A Responsive Agenda (New York, 1991). The work of A. MacIntyre, in After Virtue and other works, is an important influence on this way of thinking.
8. For a similar suggestion regarding modern responses to Aristotle, see the thoughtful introduction by R. F. Stalley to his revision of Ernest Barker’s translation of Aristotle’s Politics for World Classics (Oxford, 1995), pp. xxx-xxxii.
9. Modern ‘identity-politics’, centred on the idea that politics should be based on (e.g.) one’s sexual (or gender) ‘identity’ might be seen as parallel to this feature of Greek thought, though Greek thought combines this feature with a stronger sense of the overall community (typically the polis) in which different types of relationship occur: see n. 64 below.
10. See text to nn. 43-5 below.
11. There is a partial overlap with the distinction between two types of ethical thinking outlined in Ch. III, text to n. 38; see further text to nn. 51-2 below.
12. Parry, A., ‘The Language of Achilles’, TAPA 87 (1956), 1–7 Google Scholar; key relevant lines include Il. 9. 337-8, 387.
13. See e.g. Reeve, M. D., ‘The Language of Achilles’, CQ NS 23 (1973), 193-5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Claus, D. B., ‘Aidos in the Language of Achilles’, TAPA 105 (1975), 13–28 Google Scholar. Redfield, J. M., Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector (Chicago, 1975), pp. 103-8Google Scholar, esp. 105, also sees the speech as expressing Achilles’ alienation from his warrior-role, but does so on a different (largely structuralist) understanding of the nature of the role and of Achilles’ alienation.
14. Martin, R., The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad (Ithaca, 1989), pp. 160ff Google Scholar For instance, Martin shows that much of the speech is structured around the reasons that Achilles gives for ‘not being persuaded’ when you might expect him to be: see e.g. Il. 9. 315, 345, 376, 386, and Martin, pp. 202-3.
15. On ‘generalized’ and other forms of reciprocity in Homeric ethics, see Ch. III, text to n. 14.
16. See esp. Il. 9.316-20,337-9,401-9.
17. Seaford, R. A. S., Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State (Oxford, 1994), pp. 65–73 Google Scholar, esp. 69-70, treats the episode as a crisis in reciprocity, which is resolved at the level of ritual.
18. This interpretation assumes a connection between the rejection of the gifts in 9. 378-87 (and 388-97) and the complaints made in 315-43, esp. 334-41. The reiterated idea of ’not being persuaded’ (see n. 14 above), in 315, 345, 375-6, 386, underlines the structure of Achilles’ argument.
19. See 9. 378-400, esp. 391-2. Also, Agamemnon has not come in person to apologize (nor is his apology, such as it is, in 9. 115-20, passed on by Odysseus), nor made supplication (which Achilles might have looked for). Instead, he has sent Achilles’ own philoi (9. 641-2) as his (Agamemnon’s) agents. See further Donlan, W., ‘Duelling with Gifts in the Iliad: As the Audience Saw It’, Colby Quarterly 29 (1993), 155-72Google Scholar. See also, esp. on the absence of supplication, Edwards, M., Homer: Poet of the Iliad (Baltimore, 1987), pp. 233-4Google Scholar; Thornton, A., Homer’s Iliad: Its Composition and the Motif of Supplication (Göttingen, 1984), pp. 126-7Google Scholar; Tsagarakis, O., ‘The Achaean Embassy and the Wrath of Achilles’, Hermes 99 (1971), 257-77, esp. pp. 259-63Google Scholar.
20. Note the stress on ‘wishing’ and absence of compulsion in 9. 356, 428-9, taken with Claus, ‘Aidos in the Language of Achilles’.
21. The point that Agamemnon’s failure disqualifies him as a partner in reciprocal comradeship with anyone, not just Achilles, is implied in 9. 370-2,417-20.
22. An indication of this is the fact that Achilles modifies his decision of 9. 357-63, in response to the speeches of Phoenix (9. 618-19), Ajax (9. 650-5), and, eventually, Patroclus (16. 64-100), i.e. partners with whom some form of comradely reciprocity is still possible, though it is no longer possible with Agamemnon.
23. See Ch. II, text to a 25, on Medea’s infanticide as an exemplary gesture, and see further Gill, C., Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy, 2.4–8 Google Scholar, esp. 2.8.
24. Blundell, M. W., Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge,1989), p. 84 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Winnington-Ingram, R. P., Sophocles: An Interpretation (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 47 (n 109) and 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Knox, B. M. W., Word and Action (Baltimore, 1979), pp. 12–14, 20-3Google Scholar; and, on the conception of heroism presupposed, Knox, , The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy (Berkeley, 1965), ch. 1, esp. pp. 18–24 Google Scholar.
25. For individualism of this radical kind (e.g. as expressed by Nietzsche or Sartre), see refs. in n. 2 above, esp. MacIntyre and Taylor.
26. See refs. in n. 24 above. Knox (and, in a modified way, Blundell) also sees Ajax’s stance as the expression of an archaic ethical framework (the ethics of shame and honour), the limitations of which are highlighted by the more cooperative and (in some sense) ‘developed’ ethical attitudes of Odysseus, as expressed in lines 121-6,1332-45.
27. Soph. Ajax 442-9; Odysseus, who was the one who received the arms, in effect endorses this claim, in describing Ajax as ‘the best of the Achaeans... after Achilles’ (1340-1); cf. Teucer’s account of Ajax’s acts of bravery, 1266-87, which he presents as deserving special gratitude (charts), 1267.
28. Like Achilles, Ajax can be interpreted as highlighting the kind of abuse of comradely behaviour that might emerge in the Atreidae’s treatment of any of the Greek leaders; see text to nn. 21-3 above, esp. n. 21.
29. See Soph. Ajax 457-80; on the role of his father Telamon as the ‘internalized other’ before whom Ajax must prove his nobility, see 462-5, and Williams, B., Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, 1993), pp. 84-5, also 73-5Google Scholar; see Ch. III, text to n. 24. The gesture must also be directed at the Atreidae and Odysseus, whom he regards as objects of justified anger.
30. Soph. Ajax 485-524, esp. 522-4, in which Tecmessa appeals to the idea that favours merit reciprocal favours (χάρις χάριν . . .).
31. See e.g. Knox, Word and Action, pp. 135-44; Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles, pp. 54-5; Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies, pp. 84-5. For a different way of explaining the enigmatic character of the speech, by reference to mystery religion, see Seaford, R., ‘Sophocles and the Mysteries’, Hermes 122 (1994), 275-88, esp. pp. 282-4Google Scholar.
32. The attitude of the Atreidae (though not Odysseus) towards Ajax, as shown in 1067-9,1087-8, 1250-4, bears out this picture of what would be required. The reversal of the expected phraseology in 666-8 (‘yield to’ the gods but ‘worship’ the Atreidae) is evidently deliberate. On the significance of sōphronein in this play, see Goldhill, S., Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 193-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also text to nn. 27-9 above.
33. See further Gill, Personality, 3.4.
34. This view is argued for strongly by Vlastos, G., Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge, 1991), chs. 2-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A similar view is taken, as regards Plato’s Apology, by Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N. D., Socrates on Trial (Princeton, 1989)Google Scholar, and Reeve, C. D. C., Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis, 1989)Google Scholar. See also Penner, T., ‘Socrates and the Early Dialogues’, in Kraut, R., ed., The Cambridge Companion in Plato (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 121-69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
35. For a rare attempt to see in Aristophanes ’ Clouds a significant contribution to our evidence for the historical Socrates, see Havelock, E. A., ‘The Socratic Self as it is Parodied in Aristophanes’ Clouds’, Yale Classical Studies 22 (1972), 1-18Google Scholar. On the history and fundamental difficulties of the Socratic problem, Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1971) (=HGP) vol. 3, ch. 12, remains usefulGoogle Scholar.
36. On one respect of the ancient reception of Socrates, see Long, A. A., ‘Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy’, CQ NS 381 (1988), 150-71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37. These considerations are among those that lead Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates on Trial, 3.3, esp. pp. 143-9, to regard the contradiction as less fundamental than it seems.
38. See further Woozley, A. D., ‘Socrates on Disobeying the Law’, in Vlastos, G., ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, 1971), pp. 299–318 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Woozley, , Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Phto’s Crito (Chapel Hill, 1979)Google Scholar. The question whether ‘civil disobedience’ is conceptually available in Greek culture forms part of this debate; another possible instance of this is Antigone’s exemplary burial of her brother in defiance of Creon’s edict, Sophocles, Antigone, esp. 450-70. On the related idea of an ‘exemplary gesture’, see text to a 29 above.
39. See P1. Crito 51b9-c1, also ‘persuade or obey’ in 51b3-4, 51e6-52a3. See Kraut, R., Socrates and the State (Princeton, 1984), ch. 3Google Scholar.
40. This is to raise the question of the function of the Platonic dialogue-form, and of whether this is to convey determinate doctrines or to present, and encourage, ongoing dialectical argument. On this issue, see e.g. Griswold, C. L., ‘Plato’s Metaphilosophy: Why Plato Wrote Dialogues’, in Griswold, C. L., ed., Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (London, 1988), pp. 143-67Google Scholar; Frede, M., ‘Plato’s Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, in Klagge, J. C. and Smith, N. D., Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dia-logues, OSAP supp. vol. (Oxford, 1992), pp. 201-19Google Scholar; Gill, C., ‘Afterword: Dialectic and the Dialogue Form in Late Plato’, in Gill, C. and McCabe, M. M., edd., Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford, forthcoming)Google Scholar. On the periods and chronology of Plato’s writings, see Ch. V., n. 44.
41. The extent to which Socrates’ ‘divine’ mission depends on Socrates’ own reflective response to the divine messages received is stressed by Vlastos, Socrates, ch. 6, referring to e.g. Apology 21b, 28e.
42. Socrates is sometimes presented by Plato as perpetuating the heroic intensity of key poetic figures: see e.g. Apology 28c-d, alluding to Achilles’ readiness to die, providing he can avenge Patroclus’ death (Il. 18. 98-126).
43. This demand is implied in the Athenian Laws’ concession that the citizen may persuade ‘in accordance with the nature of justice’, even if this fails to coincide with the Laws’ normal command: see Crito 5 lb-c, and text to n. 39 above. Snell also stresses the combination of individual reasoning and an appeal to universal principles, but on a more Kantian picture of what properly moral reasoning requires; see The Discovery of the Mind (New York, 1960), pp. 182-90; see also Ch. III, text to nn. 5-6.
44. Socrates’ ‘paradoxes’ are, principally, that virtue is one, that it is knowledge, and that nobody goes wrong willingly; for a full discussion of these, see Santas, G. X., Socrates (London, 1979)Google Scholar. See further Vlastos, Socrates, pp. 3-5; examples of Socrates’ claiming to have reached true conclusions are said to be Gorgias 473b, 479e. For the final versions of Vlastos’s key articles on this question, see Vlastos, G., Socratic Studies, ed. Burnyeat, M. (Cambridge, 1994), chs. 1–2 Google Scholar.
45. Kahn, C., ‘Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias ’, OSAP 1 (1983), 75-122Google Scholar. For a full-scale study of a Platonic dialogue that is broadly in line with Vlastos’s approach, see Schmid, W. T., On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s Laches (Carbondale, Illinois, 1992)Google Scholar.
46. See e.g. Kraut, R., ‘Comments on Vlastos’ “The Socratic Elenchus”‘, OSAP 1 (1983), 59–70 Google Scholar; Lesher, J., ‘Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1987), 275-88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and reviews of Vlastos, Socrates, by Kraut in Philosophical Review (1992), 353-8, and by Reeve, C. D. C. in Polis 11 (1992), 72–82 Google Scholar.
47. P1. Protagoras 322d-326e; the term ‘internalization’ (for which, see Ch. III, text to n. 24) is mine, not Protagoras’; but it matches the process described, esp. in 325c-326e.
48. For this view, see e.g. Irwin, T., Classical Thought (Oxford, 1989), p. 61 Google Scholar, referring to Prt. 325c-326e, taken with Theaetetus (Tht.) 167c, 172a-b; for doubts about this interpretation, see Kerferd, G. B., The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), p. 130 Google Scholar. On Protagorean relativism more generally, see e.g., Guthrie, HGP, vol. 3, pp. 170-5; Kerferd, Sophistic Movement, pp. 85-93. The difficulty of disentangling Protagoras’ relativism from the Platonic elaboration of this is brought out, in connection with the Theaetetus, by M. Burnyeat, in The Theaetetus of Plato, tr. M. J. Levett, with introduction by Burnyeat (Indianapolis, 1990), pp. 7-19.
49. On Aristotle, see text to nn. 76-85 below. For surveys of Greek political theory, see Barker, E., The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London, 1906, repr. 1959)Google Scholar; Sinclair, T. A., A History of Greek Political Thought (London, 1951, 2nd edn. 1967)Google Scholar; Rowe, C. J. and Schofield, M., edd., Cambridge History of Ancient Political Thought (Cambridge, forthcoming)Google Scholar.
50. This is true of PL R., Aristotle, and the Stoics; see Annas, J., The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, 1993), chs. 15, 18–21 Google Scholar, and (on the rather different position of the Epicureans), ch. 16. See further Ch. III, text to nn. 35,45-58.
51. See text to nn. 46-8 above.
52. On this threefold division, see text to n. 11 above.
53. See Popper, K. R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (London, 1945, 5th. edn, 1966)Google Scholar; Levinson, R. B., In Defense of Plato (Cambridge, Mass., 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crossman, R. H. S., Plato Today (London, 1963)Google Scholar; Bambrough, J. R., ed., Plato, Popper and Politics (Cambridge, 1967)Google Scholar.
54. See e.g. (in criticism of this way of analysing Plato) Dent, N. H., ‘Moral Autonomy in the Republic ’, Polis 9 (1990), 52–77 Google Scholar. For attempts to frame interpretative accounts which are closer to the ethical and political categories of the Republic, see e.g. Vlastos, , ‘The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato’s Republic ’, in North, H., ed., Interpretations of Plato, Mnemosyne supp. vol. 50 (Leiden, 1977), pp. 1-40Google Scholar; Dent, , ‘Plato and Social Justice’, in Loizou, A. and Lesser, H., edd., Polis and Politics: Essays in Greek Moral and Political Philosophy (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 111-27Google Scholar.
55. On the special structure of the argument, see e.g. Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), esp. chs. 3–6 Google Scholar; Reeve, C.D.C., Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton, 1988), esps. chs. 1,3,4Google Scholar; Kraut, R., ‘The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic ’, in Kraut, , ed., Cambridge Companion to Plato, pp. 311-37Google Scholar.
56. For the ideas of the ‘reason-ruled’ psuchē and polis, see R. 441c-444e, taken with 427d-434d, and 589c-592b. For two different approaches to the question of what ‘reason’ means in this connection, see Irwin, T., Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), chs. 13,15, 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gill, Personality, ch. 4. On the (complex) meaning of’reason’ in Greek thought, see Ch. II, text to nn. 29-31.
57. Ch. III, text to nn. 67-71.
58. See esp. R. 490e-498c on the corruption of those with the ‘philosophical nature’ in the wrong kind of communal context, and 537d-539d, on the dangers of dialectic which is not based on the prior foundation of a sound character-development in the right kind of community. See also 413c-414b, 503a-e; also Gill, C., ‘Plato and the Education of Character’, AGP 67 (1985), 1–26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
59. See R. 498e-502e, esp. 498e and 500d-501b, taken with 400d-402c.
60. Thus e.g. Socrates makes it plain that he (who has not experienced the kind of education that he outlines) speaks with ‘beliefs not knowledge’ about the Form of the Good that is the goal of this programme, R. 506c-e, taken with 519b-521b. see Gill, C., ‘Plato on Falsehood – not Fiction’, in Gill, C. and Wiseman, T. P., edd. Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World (Exeter, 1993), pp. 38–87, esp. p. 61CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, p. 273. For possible exceptions to this general principle, see R. 496b-497a.
61. This point is acknowledged, by implication at least, in R. 498e-499d, 540d-541a, 592a-b, taken with refs. in nn. 58-60 above.
62. For different ways of bringing out this last point, see also Lear, J., ‘In and Out of the Republic ’, Phronesis 38 (1992), 184–215 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, esp, chs. 2, 5.
63. On Plato’s thoughts on the role of women in the ideal state (R. 5), see Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic, pp. 181-5, and refs. on her pp. 188-9; also Okin, S. M., Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, 1979)Google Scholar. On women in antiquity, the most recent survey is that of Fantham, E., Foley, H. P., Kampen, N. B., Pomeroy, S. B., and Shapiro, H. A., edd., Women in the Classical World (Oxford, 1995)Google Scholar.
64. On the link between Greek and contemporary thinking about ‘communities’, see text to n. 7 above. However, Greek thinking about (e.g.) gender differs from (at least some versions of) ‘gender-politics’ or ‘identity-politics’, in that Greek thinkers see it as a requirement that they should place these aspects of human life in the larger context of the good life of the community, and do not merely argue for the claims of a particular group or perspective within the community.
65. See e.g. (embryos) Laws 775, 788-90; (the symposium) 637-50; (religious rituals) 772; (women as helping to shape ethical attitudes) 781, 784a-c, 808a. On Laws in general, see Saunders, T. J.’s Penguin Classics tr. with introduction (Harmondsworth, 1970)Google Scholar; also his Plato ‘s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology (Oxford, 1991), part 2; Stalley, R. F., An Introduction to Plato’s Laws (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar; Morrow, G., Plato’s Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton, 1960)Google Scholar; see further text to n. 74.
66. See Laws 739 and contrast R. 462-6; also, on the direction of the community with a view to the realization of virtue, see e.g. Laws 643a-644b, 716-17, 732e-734e, 964c-965a. For refs. on the relationship between R. and Laws, see n. 74 below.
67. On earlier (as well as later) Greek political theory, see Kagan, D., The Great Dialogue: History of Greek Political Thought from Homer in Polybius (New York, 1965)Google Scholar.
68. See text to nn. 54-6 above; hence, it is notoriously difficult to form any precise view about the ethical and political status of the third class in the ideal state; see e.g. Williams, B.’s (critical) treatment of the theory in ‘The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic ’, in Lee, E. N., Mourelatos, A. P. D., and Rorty, R. M., edd., Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1973), pp. 196–206 Google Scholar.
69. See Statesman 291d-311c, esp. 293c-e, 297b-c, 300a-d, 309a-d, 310e-311c. See further Rowe, C.J., ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum (St. Augustin, 1995)Google Scholar, which contains both M. Lane, ‘A New Angle on Utopia: The Political Theory of the Statesman’, pp. 276-91, and C. Gill, ‘Rethinking Constitutionalism in Statesman 291-303’, pp. 292-305; see also Rowe, , ‘ Politicus: Structure and Form’, in Gill, and McCabe, , edd., Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford, forthcoming)Google Scholar. For the view that the Statesman is ‘constitutionalist’ in a stronger sense than this, see e.g. Klosko, G., The Development of Plato’s Political Theory (New York, 1986), p. 194 Google Scholar.
70. See Laws 735-68,960-8. Like the ideal Athens of the Atlantis story in Plato’s Timaeus 21-6, Critias 109-12, this can be taken as an ideal version of the Solonian, pre-Persian Wars, ‘moderate’ democracy; on the political implications of the Atlantis story, see Gill, C., ‘The Genre of the Atlantis Story’, Classical Philohgy 72 (1977), 287–304, esp. pp. 294-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Vidal-Naquet, P., ‘Athènes et Atlantis’, Revue des Études Greques 77 (1964), 420-44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
71. See text to nn. 65-6 above and nn. 74-5 below.
72. See text to nn. 57-62 above, and on the normative sense of’reason’, Ch. II, text to nn. 29-31.
73. See refs. in n. 69 above; also Griswold, C. L., ‘ Politikē Epistēmē in Plato’s Statesman’ , in Anton, J. P. and Preus, A., edd., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 3 (Albany, NY, 1989), pp. 141-67Google Scholar.
74. See e.g. 718-23, 809-12, 890, 899d-900b, 964b-965a. See Laks, A., ‘Legislation and Demiurgy: on the Relationship between Plato’s Republic and Laws ’, Classical Antiquity 9 (1990), 209-29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bobonich, C., ‘Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato’s Laws ’, CQ NS 41 (1991), 365-88CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and ‘Reading the Laws’, in Gill and McCabe, edd., Form and Argument in Late Plato (forthcoming). See further, on the place of the Laws in Plato’s political thinking, Saunders, T.J., ‘Plato’s Later Political Thought’, in Kraut, , ed., Cambridge Companion to Plato, pp. 464-92Google Scholar.
75. See Ch. III, text to nn. 22-5.
76. NE 1. 7, esp. 1097b11, Pol. 1. 2, esp. 1252b29-1253a5. See further Kullmann, W., ‘Man as Political Animal in Aristotle’, in Keyt, D. and Miller, F., edd., A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford, 1991) (hereafter Keyt and Miller), pp. 94-117Google Scholar.
77. Hence, Aristotle dismisses the concept of the ‘minimalist state’ (as a mere ‘guarantee of just claims’) proposed by Lycophron, Pol. 3. 9, esp. 1280b8-12. For related reasons, he has reservations about democracy, as a constitution which presents freedom (understood as ‘living as one pleases’) as the greatest good; see e.g. 5. 9, esp. 1310a28-38, 6. 2, esp. 1317b11. See also Pol. 3. 4, 7. 1-3 on the linkage between human happiness and the community.
78. Aristotle is sometimes thought to see the individual simply as part of an ‘Organic’ state, e.g. because of Pol. 1. 2, 1253al8-23 (i.e. he is thought to hold a ‘totalitarian’ view of the relationship between the state and the individual; see e.g. Popper, , The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2, pp. 1-26)Google Scholar. This interpretation of his view rests on a distinction which is, arguably, alien to Greek thought; see section 1 above.
79. The issue of NE 10. 7-8 (on which, see Ch. III, text to nn. 72-81) whether practical or theoretical wisdom constitutes the best possible form of human happiness is referred to in Pol. 7.2, esp. 1324a23-1324b2; see further Depew, D.J., ‘Politics, Music and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State’, in Keyt, and Miller, , pp. 346-80Google Scholar. But the capacity for rule is not defined by Aristotle by reference to dialectically-based knowledge.
80. See further Rowe, C.J., ‘Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ’, in Keyt, and Miller, , pp. 57–74 Google Scholar; Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, pp. 352-5,466-8; also, more generally, Mulgan, R. G., Aristotle’s Political Theory (Oxford, 1977)Google Scholar.
81. See Pol. 3. 9-13. See further Leyden, M. von, Aristotle on Equality and Justice: His Political Argument (London, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; F. D. Miller, ‘Aristotle on Natural Law and Justice’, in Keyt and Miller, pp. 279-306; M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution’, in Patzig, ed., Aristotles Politik, pp. 153-76.
82. See text to n. 70 above; on the ‘mixed’ constitution preferred by both these works, the standard work is still Fritz, K. von, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity (New York, 1954)Google Scholar.
83. See Pol. 7-8, esp. 7.1-3,17; 8.1, 5; PL Laws is discussed by Aristotle in 2. 6.
84. See e.g. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, pp. 416-23.
85. See Pol. 1. 4-6, 12-13; on this aspect of PL R., see text to n. 63 above. See e.g. Fortenbaugh, W.W., ‘Aristotle on Slaves and Women’, in Barnes, J., Schofield, M., and Sorabji, R., edd., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2: Ethics and Politics (London, 1977), pp. 135-9Google Scholar; M. Schofield, ‘Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery, in Patzig, ed., Aristoteles Politik, pp. 1-27; also, more generally, Miller, F.D., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford, 1995)Google Scholar. On Aristotle’s teleological approach, see Ch. V, text to nn. 8-11,60-72.
86. Three revised translations of Arist. Pol. with introductions and notes have appeared recently: with introduction by S. Everson for the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, 1988); by T.J. Saunders for Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth, 1981); by R. F. Stalley for The World’s Classics (Oxford, 1995). See also T.J. Saunders’s own translation of Plato, Laws (Harmondsworth, 1970); also Rowe, C.J., Plato: Statesman (text, translation and Introduction) (Warminster, 1995)Google Scholar; Plato: Statesman, tr. with introduction and notes by J. Annas and R. Waterfield for the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, 1995).
87. Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N., The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987) (=LS), vol. 1 Google Scholar, translations and commentary, vol. 2, texts, notes and bibliography, is a contribution of fundamental importance; on Epicurean and Stoic social and political thinking, see sections 22 and 67. See also Laks, A. and Schofield, M., edd., Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
88. See LS 67A-E (also F-G, on Chrysippus); on Plato, see a 63 above. This represents the more Cynic side of Stoicism; on Cynicism and Stoicism, see Rist, J., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969)Google Scholar, ch. 4. On Cynicism, Dudley, D.R., A History of Cynicism (London, 1937)Google Scholar, remains useful; see also Malherbe, A.J., ed., The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition (Missoula, Montana, 1977)Google Scholar.
89. See esp. LS 67A(1),B(4); see further Schofield, M., The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge, 1991)Google Scholar, chs. 1-2, and J. Annas’s review of Schofield in Polis 11 (1992), 95-101. See also Erskine, A., The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action (London, 1990)Google Scholar.
90. On the Stoic understanding of what ‘nature’ means, see Ch. V, text to nn. 74-85.
91. On ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘proper functions’ in Stoic ethics, see LS 59; see further Kidd, I.G., ‘Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man’, in Long, A.A., ed., Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 150-72Google Scholar.
92. See Cicero De Officiis (On Duties), 1-2, esp. 1.107-21; for a good tr., see that of M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge, 1991). See further Lacy, P.H. De, ‘The Four Stoic Personae ’, Illinois Classical Studies 2 (1977), 163-72Google Scholar; Long, A.A., ‘Greek Ethics After MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of Reason’, Ancient Philosophy 3 (1983), 174-99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gill, C., ‘Personhood and Personality: the Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, De Officiis 1’, OSAP 6 (1988), 169-99Google Scholar. For a similar point, made about a wider range of Hellenistic and Roman writings, see Gill, C., ‘Peace of Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch’, in Haase, W. and Temporini, H., edd., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.7 (Berlin, 1994), pp. 4599–4640 Google Scholar. For refs. on more radical types of modern individualism, see n. 2 above.
93. See LS K-L, R-S; also Schofield, Stoic Idea of the City, chs. 3-4; Striker, G., ‘The Origins of Natural Law’, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1986), 79–94 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
94. See LS 67 A(l), B(3), also 57 F(= Cicero, , De Finibus 3.62-8)Google Scholar, and 57 G. For Cicero’s fusion of this idea with more conventional patterns of relationship, see De Officiis 1. 50-60. See further Annas, Morality of Happiness, pp. 262-76. On the question how far the Stoic validation of generalized other-benefiting motivation constitutes a change from the typical Greek validation of mutual benefit, rather than altruism (on the view suggested in Ch. III above), see C. Gill, ‘Altruism or Reciprocity in Greek Ethical Philosophy?’, in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite, and R. Seaford, edd., Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, forthcoming).
95. See LS 22 A-B, M; for related reasons, Epicurus stresses that justice of this type takes different forms in different societies, according to the needs of each society, and that, in conventional societies, fear of punishment is needed to induce people to obey laws. See LS. vol. 1, pp. 134-7, linking this theory with 5-4th c. ideas about justice as a ‘social contract’; also Long, A.A., ‘Pleasure and Social Utility – the Virtues of Being Epicurean’, in Flashar, H. and Gigon, O., edd., Aspect de la philosophie hellénistique, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, vol. 32 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1986), pp. 283–324 Google Scholar; Annas, Morality of Happiness, pp. 293-302.
96. The stages of human civilization are (1) pre-linguistic and pre-social; (2) pre-linguistic family and neighbourhood alliances; (3) social and political structures formed to counteract the mutual violence motivated by false beliefs about what is valuable. See Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 5, esp. 925-38, 953-61,1011-27, 1105-57 (=LS 22J-L). See also Nichols, J., Epicurean Political Philosophy: The De Rerum Natura of Lucretius (Ithaca, 1976), ch. 4Google Scholar; Segal, C.P., Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in De Rerum Natura (Princeton, 1990), ch. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Nussbaum, M.C., The Therapy of Desire (Princeton, 1994), ch. 7Google Scholar.
97. See LS 22 S, and M (3-4); also LS, vol. 1, p. 136.
98. See Cic. Fin. 1. 47, taken with LS 21 A-B, esp. B (6), H-I; see further Mitsis, P., Epicurus’ Ethical Theory (Ithaca, 1988)Google Scholar, ch. 2, esp. pp. 74-6.
99. See Ch. III, text to nn. 56-8.
100. This is clearer in the case of the Epicureans than the Stoics (on the relevant strand of Stoicism, see text to nn. 88-90 above); it can be linked with such features as their ‘worship’ of Epicurus as a quasi-god and the strongly ‘missionary’ character of the school. See further Frischer, B., The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece (Berkeley, 1982)Google Scholar; Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, ch. 4.