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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
John Macquarrie has written of John Henry Newman that “in emphasizing conscience, he is thinking along the same lines” as theologians such as Karl Rahner, “who have claimed that the human being has the capacity for transcendence towards God”. The purpose of this paper is to investigate this claim, with specific reference to the similarities that exist in Newman and Rahner in their respective treatments of the ‘way to faith’. I shall show how the role of mystagogy as a way to faith in Rahner can help us understand the role of conscience as a way to faith in Newman. In particular, I shall address the issue of Newman’s proof of God from conscience, and how its effectiveness is dependent on its not being regarded as a proof of God in the sense of the traditional proofs. Finally, having responded to some Wittgensteinian objections to the apparently grandiose claims of Newman and Rahner, I shall show how a passage in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can help us understand the pastoral effectiveness of the Rahnerian and Newmanian ways to faith, and shall suggest why Newman felt unable to publish the work he planned on the argument from conscience.
1 This paper was originally presented at the Third lnternational Newman Conference, Keble College, Oxford, 12 August 2001. It has been further developed in response to questions raised by Professor D.Z. Phillips.
2 ‘Newman and Kierkegaard on the Act of Faith’ in Ker, I. (ed.), Newman and Conversion, Edinburgh 1997, pp. 86fGoogle Scholar.
3 See also Fries, H., Fundamental Theology, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 227fGoogle Scholar: “[Newman] calls conscience a primordial human experience. He speaks of conscience as a moral instinct. Conscience is a moral sense and a sense of obligation, a judgement of reason and an authoritative command. Conscience does not rest in/on itself but touches on a reality beyond itself and recognizes an approval of its actions that is higher than itself. This becomes knowable in the consciousness of unconditional obligation and responsibility.”
4 J.H. Newman, ‘The Proof of Theism’, p. 12, in Sillem, E., The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, 2, Louvain 1970, p.53Google Scholar. The text of the Proof of Theism is also to be found in Boekraad, A. and Tristram, H., The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God According to J.H. Newman, Louvain 1961Google Scholar. See also Newman, J.H., Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 1857, pp. 64fGoogle Scholar.
5 Newman, J.H., An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 1906, p. 107Google Scholar.
6 See Kerr, F., ‘Newman and Oxford Philosophy’ in Merrigan, T. and Ker, I., edd., Newman and the Word, Louvain 2000, p. 171Google Scholar. See also J. Cameron, ‘Newman and Empiricism’ in The Night Battle: Essays, 1962, pp. 219–236.
7 Artz, I., ‘Preface’ in Norris, T.J., Newman and His Theological Method: A Guide for the Theologian Today, Leiden 1977, p. xiiiGoogle Scholar: “The anthropological starting‐point which Karl Rahner uses in his theology, as well as his rather Kantian‐flavoured transcendental method, are already present in Newman.”
8 K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, 1978, p. 10. We can see Newman's influence on Rahner elsewhere, particularly with reference to the argument of convergence. See ‘Argument of Convergence’ in K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler, edd., Concise Theological Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1983 26–27.
9 For the definitive account see K. Rahner, ‘Faith: I. Way to Faith’ in Sacramentum Mundi, 2, pp. 310–313.
10 ibid, p. 311.
11 Concise Theological Dictionary, pp. 416–418. Although I have no direct evidence that Rahner wrote this particular article, one of his pupils implies this is the case, cf. Weger, K.‐H., Karl Rahner: Eine Einführung in sein theologisches Denken, Freiburg 1978, p. 56Google Scholar. It is also repeated almost verbatim in Rahner's Foundations, pp. 68–71.
12 Rahner, K., ‘Atheism and Implicit Christianity’ in Theological Investigations, 9, 1972, p. 160.Google Scholar
13 Mystagogy can be described in various ways. In anthropological terms, it is an initiation in to the mystery of man's self‐experience, see Fischer, K., Der Mensch als Geheimnis: Die Anthropologie Karl Rahners mit einem Brief von Karl Rahner, 2nd edition, Freiburg 1974, p.410Google Scholar; in theological terms, the initiation into the mystery of the self‐communication of God, see K. Rahner, ‘Ein Brief von P. Karl Rahner’ in Fischer, p. 407; in theological anthropology, the initiation into the mystery of man's original experience of God, see Weger, p. 56.
14 ‘Obedience to God the Way to Faith in Christ’ in Parochial and Plain Sermons, 8, 1901.Google Scholar
15 ibid, p. 202. He goes on to say: “It is One God, and none other but He, who speaks first in our consciences, then in His Holy Word.”
16 J.H. Newman, University Sermons, 3rd edition, 1871, pp. 248f.
17 Grammar, pp. 397f.
18 Rahner, K., ‘Anonymous and Explicit Faith’ in Theological Investigations, 16, 1979, pp. 55f.Google Scholar
19 Ibid, p. 56
20 See Foundations, p. 59
21 ‘Atheism and Implicit Christianity’, p.159.
22 ibid: “If he is really acquainted with unconditional faithfulness, absolute honesty, selfless surrender to the good of others and other fundamental human dispositions, then he knows something of God, even if this knowledge is not present to his conscious reflection.”
23 ‘Proof of Theism’; p. 19, Sillem, p. 69.
24 ‘Proof of Theism’; p. 10, Sillem, p. 49.
25 See H. Fries, Die Religionsphilosophie Newmans, Stuttgart 1948, p. 138.
26 ‘Proof of Theism’, p. 16; Sillem, p. 65 21 University Sermons, p. 248.
28 See ibid, p. 70.
29 Of course, Newman does not use the Kantian term ‘transcendental’ in relation to the experience of conscience. He shows little interest in Kant in his writings. However, for evidence of similarity of thought with regard to conscience see Kant, I., The Metaphysic of Morals, New York 1991, p. 233Google Scholar: “All human beings have a conscience and find themselves watched over by an inner judge, threatened, and kept in line; and this power watching over the laws within them is not something that they themselves arbitrarily make, but is embodied in their being.”
30 K. Rahner, Herausforderung des Christen, p. 125: “ein sehr unmittelbares seelsorgliches und spirituelles interesse”.
31 Fries, H., ‘Theologische Methode bei John Henry Newman und Karl Rahner’ in Fries, H., Becker, W., Biemer, G., edd., Newman Sfudien: Eljte Folge, Heroldsberg 1980, pp. 195–197Google Scholar
32 University Sermons, p. 199. See also Parochial and Plain Sermons, 6, p. 340: “Religious convictions cannot be forced.” See also Grammar, p. 90: “Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot found comers, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism.”
33 ‘Proof of Theism’, p. 18; Sillem, p. 67.
34 ‘Proof of Theism’, p. 15; Sillem, p. 63.
35 Parochial and Plain Sermons, 6, pp. 339f.
36 F. Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 1997, p. 14. Note that Kerr subsequently modified his views in the light of some recent readings of Rahner—see F. Kerr, Immortal Longings, 1997, p. ix.
37 This is not to deny the call for an unsystematic reading of Rahner. See Kerr, Immortal, p. 178. There is fundamental coherence in Rahner's thought even where it is unsystematic, which arises out of his transcendental anthropology.
38 Rahner, K., ‘Theology and Anthropology’ in Theological Investigations, 9, 1972 28–45, p. 38.Google Scholar
39 See MarCchal, J., A Maréchal Reader, New York 1970, p. 27Google Scholar: “the originality of Cartesian philosophy consisted less in the theses which it professed than in the spirit which animated it and in the point of view which it opened up.”
40 ibid, p. 28.
41 See K. Rahner, Spirit in the World, 1968, p. 48: “There is no actual intellectual knowledge which is not already a conversion to the phantasm.” This is the position out of which Rahner develops his metaphysics of knowledge in response to the Kantian critique. Even the title of Rahner's work is instructive here.
42 Ernst, C., ‘Introduction’ in Rahner, K., Theological Investigations, 1, 1961, p. xiiiGoogle Scholar.
43 This world is not so much that of sense experience, of which Newman wrote suspiciously on many occasions (see, for example, The Arians of the Fourth Century, 6th edition, 1890, p. 272: “the tyranny of the visible world”), but that of moral action and decision.
44 R. Reno, The Ordinary Transformed: Karl Rahner and the Christian Vision of Transcendence, Cambridge 1995, p. 188.
45 ibid, p. 197.
46 See Rahner, K., ‘Theology and Anthropology’ in Theological Investigations, 9, 1972, pp. 39f.Google Scholar
47 Kerr, Theology, p. 14.
48 The importance of these popular works for the understanding of Rahner's though has not been properly appreciated, although as early as 1963, Herbert Vorgrimler classed Encounters with Silence (Worte ins Schweigen) as “the best and most influential” of Rahner's works alongside his 1946 Lenten Sermons. See H. Vorgrimler, Karl Rahner: His Life, Thought and Works, 1965, p. 43. The relation between Worte ins Schweigen (1938) and Rahner's major philosophical works Geist in Welt (1939) and Hörer des Wortes (1941) would be worthy of investigation.
49 K. Rahner, Encounters with Silence, 1975, p. 48.
50 Rahner, K., ‘Experience of the Holy Spirit’ in Theological Investigations, 18, 1984, p. 203.Google Scholar
51 Grammar, p. 385.
52 Quote from Rush Rhees in D.Z. Phillips, Faith after Foundationalism, 1989, p. 107.
53 ibid, p. xiv.
54 ibid, p. xiii. Proponents of Reformed epistemology would undoubtedly prefer the term, ‘basic propositions’, but we are not concerned with the details of that debate here.
55 ibid, p. 113.
56 L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 1969, §262.
57 Phillips, Faith, p. 89.
58 Wittgenstein, $143.
59 See ibid, §§341–343.
60 Phillips, p. 92.
61 Foundations, p. 59.
62 See University Sermons, p. 55.
63 See J.H. Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr Gladstone's Recent Expostulation, 1875, p. 56.
64 Mitchell, B., ‘Newman as a Philosopher’ in Ker, I. and Hill, A., edd. Newman after a Hundred Years, Oxford 1990, p. 243Google Scholar.
65 Quoted from J.H. Newman, ‘Opus Magnum’ ms, 'In festo S. Gregorii, 1857, in Pailin, D. A., The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman's Grammar of Assent as a Response to the Search for Certainty in Faith, London 1969, p. 82Google Scholar.
66 See Sillem, p.6 — Note of Newman, dated 22 September: “What I write, I do not state dogmatically, nor have I confidence enough in what I have advanced to warrant publication.”
67 Grammar, p. 315f.
68 Grammar, p. 369.
69 H. Fries, Die Religionsphilosophie, p. 89. 10 Parochial and Plain Sermons, 6, p. 339.
70 Parochial and Plain Sermons, 6, p. 339.
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