

# Newman and Rahner on the Way to Faith — and Wittgenstein came too!

Ian Logan

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

John Macquarrie has written of John Henry Newman that “in emphasizing conscience, he is thinking along the same lines” as theologians such as Karl Rahner, “who have claimed that the human being has the capacity for transcendence towards God”.<sup>2</sup> The purpose of this paper is to investigate this claim, with specific reference to the similarities that exist in Newman and Rahner in their respective treatments of the ‘way to faith’. I shall show how the role of mystagogy as a way to faith in Rahner can help us understand the role of conscience as a way to faith in Newman. In particular, I shall address the issue of Newman’s proof of God from conscience, and how its effectiveness is dependent on its not being regarded as a proof of God in the sense of the traditional proofs. Finally, having responded to some Wittgensteinian objections to the apparently grandiose claims of Newman and Rahner, I shall show how a passage in Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* can help us understand the pastoral effectiveness of the Rahnerian and Newmanian ways to faith, and shall suggest why Newman felt unable to publish the work he planned on the argument from conscience.

There is clear evidence in Newman’s unpublished manuscript, the ‘Proof of Theism’, to support Macquarrie’s linking of conscience with the capacity for transcendence.<sup>3</sup> Newman writes: “This is Conscience, and, from the nature of the case, its very existence carries on our minds to a Being exterior to ourselves.... Its very existence throws us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height and depth, whose voice it is.”<sup>4</sup> Again, in the *Grammar of Assent*, we read, “conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions...”.<sup>5</sup>

Although Macquarrie is correct in identifying conscience as a capacity for transcendence in Newman’s thought, it is not immediately obvious how Newman’s understanding relates to that of Rahner. Newman is operating within the British empiricist tradition,<sup>6</sup> whilst Rahner emerges out of a marriage of German Idealism and Thomism. And yet, Johannes Artz has suggested that Rahner’s transcendental

method is already present in Newman.<sup>7</sup> This view is supported by the fact that Rahner is influenced by Newman's notion of the 'illative sense' and identifies it with his first level of reflection in the *Foundations of Christian Faith*.<sup>8</sup> It is precisely where Rahner is trying to set out the full implications of transcendental experience that he turns to Newman. This fact is not surprising given the similarity of approach that both Rahner and Newman take to the way to faith.

## The Way to Faith

For Rahner, the way to faith refers to the possibility of bringing unbelievers to explicit acceptance of God, given that every human being is already potentially a believer, is already in possession of God's self-communication.<sup>9</sup> This way is not found by following the formal, logical preambles to faith. Rather, it is by means of "connections of meaningful correspondence"<sup>10</sup> that the transcendental pre-reflexive awareness of God is made concrete, that the believer's experience of faith is vindicated, and the truth of this faith made a possibility for the unbeliever.

In an article on the 'Proof of the Existence of God' Rahner writes<sup>11</sup> that the proofs are not intended to present something external and previously unknown to us, but rather to articulate our fundamental transcendental experience of God, whether or not we reflect on or admit it. (I shall address below the apparently 'totalitarian' nature of the epistemic claims emerging here.) Rahner's task is to explain this transcendental experience in such a way that it functions as a proof of God. This means not simply employing formal proofs, but addressing the individual's personal experience and situation, so that they may be brought to see what lies at the heart of their own experience of themselves—the mystery of God. According to Rahner, such a 'mystagogy' is 'absolutely necessary' if the proofs of God are to be successful.<sup>12</sup> Rahner's way to faith is, then, mystagogical. It seeks to initiate the individual person into the meaning of his or her transcendental experience.<sup>13</sup>

Like Rahner, Newman talks explicitly of the way to faith.<sup>14</sup> For him it is the way of "obedience to conscience". Such obedience "leads to obedience to the Gospel". And obedience to the Gospel "is but the completion and perfection of that religion which natural conscience teaches".<sup>15</sup> My contention is that it will assist us to grasp Newman's position, if we understand his 'way to faith' in terms of a Rahnerian mystagogy. Even though Newman did not use the term, mystagogy, we find it described in outline in his account of St Paul in his twelfth University Sermon:<sup>16</sup>

"[Paul] appealed to that whole body of opinion, affection, and desire, which made up, in each man, his moral self; which, distinct from all guesses and random efforts, set him forward in one direction,—which, if

it was what it should be, would respond to the Apostle's doctrine, as the strings of one instrument vibrate with another,—which, if it was not, would either not accept it, or not abide in it. He taught men, not only that Almighty God was, and was every where, but that He had certain moral attributes; that He was just, true, holy, and merciful; that His representative was in their hearts; that He already dwelt in them as a lawgiver and a judge, by a sense of right and a conscience of sin."

In his discussion of natural religion in the *Grammar of Assent* we get a further glimpse of how mystagogy might work for Newman. He writes: "my true informant, my burdened conscience ... pronounces without any misgivings that God exists:- and it pronounces quite as surely that I am alienated from Him .... Thus it solves the world's mystery, and sees in that mystery only a confirmation of its own original teaching."<sup>17</sup> It is in his attempt to uncover the meaning of this mystery through the investigation of conscience that we see mystagogy operating in Newman's writings.

### **The Proof from Conscience and Transcendental Experience**

In what way, then, is Newman's mystagogy of conscience related to Rahner's mystagogy of transcendental experience, and how do they operate as 'proofs'? A comparison of their views on the constitutive nature of conscience for human experience can assist us in answering these questions.

For Rahner, experience of conscience is the condition for the possibility of all acts of knowledge and freedom. Conscience is the original categorical encounter with transcendental experience. He writes:<sup>18</sup>

"Without reflection he accepts God when he freely accepts himself in his own unlimited transcendence. He does this when he genuinely follows his conscience with free consent, because by such an action he affirms as well the condition of possibility of such a radical option which is implicitly bound up with this decision, i.e. he affirms God.... He cannot avoid this reference to God since it stems from the necessity of transcendence."

What's more, the atheist can legitimately be called an "anonymous theist when he recognises in his positive moral decision the unconditional call of conscience, for which the ultimate condition of possibility is the reference to what we call God." It is this fundamental role of conscience that leads Rahner to state that atheism "is either culpable", because it does not follow the strictures of conscience or "involves an implicitly affirmed theism", because it does.<sup>19</sup>

As Rahner recognises, there is no generic way of addressing the individual's experience.<sup>20</sup> The traditional proofs can only be employed successfully in a dialogue, in which "the atheist has been made aware of his own transcendental knowledge of God" by means of mystagogy.<sup>21</sup> This involves a move from the categorical realm of personal experience to the

transcendental realm of experience of God, which is required in order that the proofs may function in the categorical realm. However, it is only in so far as the atheist is obedient to his or her conscience that such a mystagogy becomes a practical reality.<sup>22</sup> How does this compare with Newman's view?

At the end of his outline of the proof from conscience in the 'Proof of Theism', Newman notes that the 'main point' is "the implication of certain mental acts with the act of existence."<sup>23</sup> They are given prior to experience and are constitutive for human experience. Newman includes conscience, with its "inchoate recognition of a Divine Being", under this category. Conscience "is bound up in the very idea or fact of my existence".<sup>24</sup> From the experience of conscience as constitutive for existence follows the recognition of God. And the more one follows conscience the more this inchoate recognition, this awareness, becomes an expectation of revelation.<sup>25</sup>

It is here that we can see that Newman's proof is intended to operate in the same way as Rahner's mystagogy—as a move from the categorical (my experience) to the transcendental (the God who "dwells intelligibly, prior to argument, in the heart & conscience"<sup>26</sup>) to the categorical (real assent to the God who is the fulfilment of "what was thus begun ... by nature"<sup>27</sup>). And like Rahner, Newman is aware that mystagogy requires obedience to conscience, that arguments are ineffective when God's voice is not recognised.<sup>28</sup>

The exposition of conscience functions as a proof of God in Newman, in precisely the sense that the exposition of transcendental experience does in Rahner. Both seek to show that in our fundamental experience of self acting in the world we encounter God. This experience makes the proof of God a possibility for us. And at the same time, it can be articulated as a proof of God, which is more effective than proofs that operate as if external to our experience. This similarity is not only one of function, but also one of content. The proof of God from conscience is a reflection on transcendental experience.<sup>29</sup>

The question remains as to the effectiveness of such an argument; in particular, what we might call its pastoral effectiveness. For Rahner, all his philosophical and theological work serves a 'direct pastoral and spiritual interest'.<sup>30</sup> Heinrich Fries has shown that Newman shares such an interest, and that for both it is characteristic of their theological method.<sup>31</sup> It is here that Rahner can help us develop our understanding of how Newman can, at the same time, state (i) that rational arguments cannot convert, and (ii) that it is a "wild notion" that no proof "may be exacted for the profession of Christianity".<sup>32</sup> For Newman, there is such an argument, the proof from conscience, of which he writes:<sup>33</sup>

“It is a proof common to all, to high and low, from earliest infancy. It is carried about in a compact form in every soul. It is ever available it requires no learning it is possessed by pagans as well as Christians.”

This proof possesses the possibility of being pastorally effective, because it is common to all, because it is given to all with their existence. It arises from their knowledge of their existence. It is not an external proof, but is given with thought as a condition of one's knowledge of one's existence, bringing with it “an inchoate recognition” of God.<sup>34</sup>

This recognition is not a direct knowledge of God. It is of “a voice within us, which assures us that there is something higher than earth. We cannot analyze, define, contemplate what it is that thus whispers to us. It has no shape or material form. There is that in our hearts which prompts us to religion, and which condemns and chastises sin. And this yearning of our nature is met and sustained, it finds an object to rest upon, when it hears of the existence of an All-powerful, All-gracious Creator.”<sup>35</sup> The point then is to populate transcendental experience categorically. The argument is effective only in so far as this is possible, in so far as transcendental experience rests on a categorical object. Unless this happens, the inchoate recognition will remain just that.

Are we not claiming too much for the effectiveness of mystagogy? It appears to be based on a questionable and even discredited Cartesian idea of the self. And even if it is possible to answer such an objection satisfactorily, surely there is an unacceptable presumptuousness involved in claiming to describe someone else's experience more accurately than they can.

We shall approach the first objection, concerning the Cartesian nature of Rahner's position, from the perspective of the criticisms made by Fergus Kerr in his *Theology after Wittgenstein*. The second objection we take to be implied in D. Z. Phillips' critique of Reformed epistemology from the position of the later Wittgenstein. Newman and Rahner would be seen as making ‘totalitarian epistemic claims’ as soon as they are conceived to be describing the experience of another in terms which refuse to take seriously the other's description of that experience. We shall deal with these objections in turn.

### **Mystagogy after Wittgenstein**

(i) In his *Theology after Wittgenstein*, Fergus Kerr refers to Rahner's “extremely mentalist-individualist epistemology of unmistakably Cartesian provenance”. This means that Rahner's theology presents an individual with “a standpoint beyond his immersion in the bodily, the historical and the institutional”.<sup>36</sup> Central to the Wittgensteinian objection to Rahner is the notion that he attempts to describe something behind or beyond our experience. Certainly such a view of Rahner is

understandable, if one does not acknowledge his success in integrating apparently diverse standpoints into one coherent position.<sup>37</sup> When Rahner states that philosophy and theology “cannot and must not return to the stage before modern philosophy’s transcendental anthropological change of direction since Descartes, Kant, German Idealism (including its opponents), up to modern Phenomenology, Existentialism and Fundamental Ontology”,<sup>38</sup> we might regard this as an endorsement of Cartesianism. It is not. For Rahner, following Maréchal, Descartes’ philosophy represents a key moment in the history of transcendental philosophy.<sup>39</sup> Descartes had, as it were, a “premonition” of the importance of the knowing subject for critical philosophy, but never “suspected the critical notion of a ‘transcendental subject’.”<sup>40</sup>

In so far as philosophy is transcendental in this sense, Rahner does not seek to describe something apart from experience, but rather what is given to us in experience as that which makes experience possible. Furthermore, since all knowing and experience involves the ‘conversion to the phantasm’,<sup>41</sup> there is a moment in Rahner’s transcendental turn, which renders a Cartesian interpretation of his philosophy impossible. Rahner’s subject is immersed in the world. Rahner’s transcendental turn is not a turn away from the world, not the peeling away of the world to reveal “a more or less deficient angel”.<sup>42</sup> For Rahner, the turn to the subject is the turn to the world. Similarly for Newman, conscience, which bears witness to this transcendence, is encountered in, and as directing, my dealings with the world.<sup>43</sup> For both, transcendence emerges out of experience of the world.

Russell Reno in responding to Kerr’s criticisms of Rahner points out the significance of the Kantian’s transcendental method for Rahner, saying that “the point of departure for [Rahner’s] transcendental deductions will always be ordinary life”. Consequently, we should not understand Rahner as making “the characteristic Cartesian move”.<sup>44</sup> However, Reno seeks to minimise the role of transcendental philosophy in Rahner’s thought, “to show that the ‘transcendental’ vocabulary is not decisive”.<sup>45</sup> Such a move is not necessary. In fact, for Rahner, transcendental philosophy *is* decisive, not because it is the only possible philosophy, but because all philosophy after it is changed by it. Thus, he says that we *cannot* return to the situation that existed before it. Rahner is aware that transcendental anthropology may pass away with the demise of the modern period. But it cannot be bypassed or gone back on.<sup>46</sup>

Interestingly, Kerr suggests that Rahner will never be a popular writer.<sup>47</sup> Yet during his lifetime Rahner was a best-selling author. And it was precisely those works, which were mystagogical in temper that were popular. Works such as *Encounters with Silence*, *Everyday Things*, *Faith Today*, *On Prayer* (also known as *Happiness through Prayer*), and

*Experience of the Spirit* reached a wide audience both in the Germany speaking world and internationally, because they describe common experiences and open our eyes to the transcendental experience embedded in them, not 'behind' or 'underneath', as if separate, from them.<sup>48</sup> In *Encounters with Silence*, Rahner writes: "if there is any path at all on which I can approach [God], it must lead through the very middle of my ordinary daily life"<sup>49</sup> This is the "mysticism of everyday life",<sup>50</sup> which it is the purpose of mystagogy to draw out and make explicit.

(ii) The question still remains whether the mystagogy of Newman and Rahner can actually achieve its goal of initiating the unbeliever into the faith. Surely we must take seriously those who would claim that they have no transcendental experience, no experience of conscience as described by Newman. After all, Newman himself held that in "religious enquiry each of us can speak only for himself".<sup>51</sup> When unbelievers describe their experience of unbelief must we not take seriously the idea that "the real reasons are the reasons given"?<sup>52</sup> It may be objected that Newman and Rahner are open to the criticisms that D.Z. Phillips has made of the "totalitarian epistemic claims"<sup>53</sup> of Reformed epistemology. According to Phillips, Reformed epistemology claims that the believer is right to place belief in God among his foundational propositions. However, just as the foundationalist is unable to demonstrate his right to his foundational propositions, so the believer is unable to demonstrate his right to belief in God as foundational.<sup>54</sup> Phillips criticises Alvin Plantinga in particular for espousing a negative apologetics,<sup>55</sup> which makes claims on the basis that it is not possible for those who would deny them to demonstrate that they are false. This sounds like a philosophical stand-off, which undermines the process of mystagogical initiation or therapy. I can only help you see what is involved in your experience if we already share the same understanding of our experience. I can only uncover the transcendental experience embedded in your experience if you already accept that it is embedded there. And, of course, the unbeliever does not accept that it is.

In an exposition of some passages of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, Phillips himself indicates how we might meet this objection. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of persuasion, which involves us giving the other our picture of the world.<sup>56</sup> Phillips interprets<sup>57</sup> this as an "imaginative elucidation, something which will bring about the dawning of an aspect not previously appreciated". This persuasion happens, if at all, "in the context of trying to make all that surrounds what is basic come alive". It is not "a matter of grounding from without", but "of elucidating from within". What is basic is "swallowed down" with its surroundings.<sup>58</sup> We can see then that even from this Wittgensteinian

position mystagogy may be a possibility. In detailing all that holds our basic (or hinge<sup>59</sup>) propositions in place the way is opened up to showing the other an alternative picture of the world, making acceptance of these propositions a possibility for him or her.

Phillips criticises the notion of “a regulative idea beyond our epistemic practices” and goes on to say that this “transcendental Foundationalism is foreign to the whole tenor of Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*”.<sup>60</sup> We have already seen that Rahner’s transcendental philosophy is not to be understood as pointing at a regulative idea beyond our experience, but as uncovering what is embedded in it. Transcendence arises out of and never leaves behind the immanent world. And this on our interpretation is true for Newman too. Mystagogy is then a persuasion, an imaginative elucidation, opening up the possibility of belief for the unbeliever.

### **Concluding remarks**

Is it possible then to help someone to realise categorically his or her orientation to transcendence? For Rahner, the possibility of opening up to the individual his or her experience of transcendence can only be realised “in individual conversation and in individual logotherapy”.<sup>61</sup> Even then it is not possible to solve the problem of the particular person who desires not to believe, which desire may inform all his or her thinking about God, religion, and morality. For, as both Newman and Rahner agree, people are not converted by the strongest arguments, even if these arguments are addressed to their particular situation. To attempt an explicit account of what they experience is to provide their “captious reason”<sup>62</sup> with the opportunity to reject it.

Does this mean then that Newman’s proof from conscience cannot do what he hoped it would at the outset? Doesn’t it suffer from the same weakness as the traditional proofs? After all, Newman did admit that the assumption on which it was based, the universality of the awareness of conscience, was rejected by contemporary society.<sup>63</sup> As Basil Mitchell asks:<sup>64</sup> “Of what use is it to claim that God has instilled in us a natural tendency to hear his voice in the dictates of conscience, if we do not believe in God and if our conscience, formed by a different cultural tradition, does not issue categorical commands which inspire in us the emotions of fear and reverence?”

In the ‘Proof of Theism’ Newman did not overcome the difficulty posed by the fact that, although God’s existence can be proved from conscience, “it is a ‘personal’ proof, peculiar to each individual”.<sup>65</sup> He was after all attempting to propose a proof, which was universal in its application. As a consequence, he was not able to advance it with

sufficient confidence to publish it.<sup>66</sup> Newman is aware that the atheist can still reject the argument, since, as we saw above, in religious enquiry we can only speak for ourselves. We do not share the other's experience, and consequently cannot speak for them. Logic will not do, because it "cannot grasp matters so real and recondite".<sup>67</sup> And it is precisely here, where logic fails, that men become personal, that they appeal "to their own primary elements of thought, and their own illative sense, against the principles and the judgement of another",<sup>68</sup> and possibly even against conscience, "the illative sense of faith".<sup>69</sup>

Newman attempts to develop an argument, which is rooted in experience of the world. In doing so, he demonstrates that the difficulty faced by the traditional proofs lies not so much in their logical form, as in the depths and particularity of human experience and in the refusal to recognise or accept the experience of God. For Newman, such arguments are ineffective when God's voice is not recognised. The point of his proof is to make this voice heard. Although Newman's 'chosen proof' was left incomplete, we are able with Rahner's help to understand how it could operate effectively in the context of a way to faith, a mystagogy, which addresses the particularity of the individual's personal history and the antecedent presuppositions that they carry around with them. This way to faith is persuasive in Wittgenstein's sense. It does not provide an alternative, failsafe method for convincing the unbeliever. What may at first sight seem such an alternative is, in fact, the attempt to bring out the undeniability of God in the unbeliever's experience, which will be accepted by him or her only in a process which would be "too deep, subtle, complex, indirect, delicate and spiritual"<sup>70</sup> to anticipate.

- 1 This paper was originally presented at the Third International Newman Conference, Keble College, Oxford, 12 August 2001. It has been further developed in response to questions raised by Professor D.Z. Phillips.
- 2 'Newman and Kierkegaard on the Act of Faith' in I. Ker (ed.), *Newman and Conversion*, Edinburgh 1997, pp. 86f.
- 3 See also H. Fries, *Fundamental Theology*, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 227f: "[Newman] calls conscience a primordial human experience. He speaks of conscience as a moral instinct. Conscience is a moral sense and a sense of obligation, a judgement of reason and an authoritative command. Conscience does not rest in/on itself but touches on a reality beyond itself and recognizes an approval of its actions that is higher than itself. This becomes knowable in the consciousness of unconditional obligation and responsibility."
- 4 J.H. Newman, 'The Proof of Theism', p. 12, in E. Sillem, *The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman*, 2, Louvain 1970, p.53. The text of the Proof of Theism is also to be found in A. Boekraad and H. Tristram, *The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God According to J.H.*

- Newman, Louvain 1961. See also J.H. Newman, *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, 1857, pp. 64f.
- 5 J.H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 1906, p. 107.
  - 6 See F. Kerr, 'Newman and Oxford Philosophy' in T. Merrigan and I. Ker, edd., *Newman and the Word*, Louvain 2000, p. 171. See also J. Cameron, 'Newman and Empiricism' in *The Night Battle: Essays*, 1962, pp. 219-236.
  - 7 J. Artz, 'Preface' in T.J. Norris, *Newman and His Theological Method: A Guide for the Theologian Today*, Leiden 1977, p. xiii: "The anthropological starting-point which Karl Rahner uses in his theology, as well as his rather Kantian-flavoured transcendental method, are already present in Newman."
  - 8 K. Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, 1978, p. 10. We can see Newman's influence on Rahner elsewhere, particularly with reference to the argument of convergence. See 'Argument of Convergence' in K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimler, edd., *Concise Theological Dictionary*, 2nd edition, 1983 26-27.
  - 9 For the definitive account see K. Rahner, 'Faith: I. Way to Faith' in *Sacramentum Mundi*, 2, pp. 310-313.
  - 10 *ibid*, p. 311.
  - 11 *Concise Theological Dictionary*, pp. 416-418. Although I have no direct evidence that Rahner wrote this particular article, one of his pupils implies this is the case, cf. K.-H. Weger, *Karl Rahner: Eine Einführung in sein theologisches Denken*, Freiburg 1978, p. 56. It is also repeated almost verbatim in Rahner's *Foundations*, pp. 68-71.
  - 12 K. Rahner, 'Atheism and Implicit Christianity' in *Theological Investigations*, 9, 1972, p.160.
  - 13 Mystagogy can be described in various ways. In anthropological terms, it is an initiation in to the mystery of man's self-experience, see K. Fischer, *Der Mensch als Geheimnis: Die Anthropologie Karl Rahners mit einem Brief von Karl Rahner*, 2nd edition, Freiburg 1974, p.410; in theological terms, the initiation into the mystery of the self-communication of God, see K. Rahner, 'Ein Brief von P. Karl Rahner' in Fischer, p. 407; in theological anthropology, the initiation into the mystery of man's original experience of God, see Weger, p. 56.
  - 14 'Obedience to God the Way to Faith in Christ' in *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 8, 1901.
  - 15 *ibid*, p. 202. He goes on to say: "It is One God, and none other but He, who speaks first in our consciences, then in His Holy Word."
  - 16 J.H. Newman, *University Sermons*, 3rd edition, 1871, pp. 248f.
  - 17 *Grammar*, pp. 397f.
  - 18 K. Rahner, 'Anonymous and Explicit Faith' in *Theological Investigations*, 16, 1979, pp. 55f.
  - 19 *Ibid*, p. 56
  - 20 See *Foundations*, p. 59
  - 21 'Atheism and Implicit Christianity', p.159.
  - 22 *ibid*: "If he is really acquainted with unconditional faithfulness, absolute honesty, selfless surrender to the good of others and other fundamental human dispositions, then he knows something of God, even if this knowledge is not present to his conscious reflection."

- 23 'Proof of Theism'; p. 19, Sillem, p. 69.
- 24 'Proof of Theism'; p. 10, Sillem, p. 49.
- 25 See H. Fries, *Die Religionsphilosophie Newmans*, Stuttgart 1948, p. 138.
- 26 'Proof of Theism', p. 16; Sillem, p. 65
- 27 *University Sermons*, p. 248.
- 28 See *ibid*, p. 70.
- 29 Of course, Newman does not use the Kantian term 'transcendental' in relation to the experience of conscience. He shows little interest in Kant in his writings. However, for evidence of similarity of thought with regard to conscience see I. Kant, *The Metaphysic of Morals*, New York 1991, p. 233: "All human beings have a conscience and find themselves watched over by an inner judge, threatened, and kept in line; and this power watching over the laws within them is not something that they themselves arbitrarily make, but is embodied in their being."
- 30 K. Rahner, *Herausforderung des Christen*, p. 125: "ein sehr unmittelbares seelsorgliches und spirituelles Interesse".
- 31 H. Fries, 'Theologische Methode bei John Henry Newman und Karl Rahner' in H. Fries, W. Becker, G. Biemer, edd., *Newman Studien: Elfte Folge*, Heroldsberg 1980, pp. 195-197
- 32 *University Sermons*, p. 199. See also *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 6, p. 340: "Religious convictions cannot be forced." See also *Grammar*, p. 90: "Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot found corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism."
- 33 'Proof of Theism', p. 18; Sillem, p. 67.
- 34 'Proof of Theism', p. 15; Sillem, p. 63.
- 35 *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 6, pp. 339f.
- 36 F. Kerr, *Theology after Wittgenstein*, 1997, p. 14. Note that Kerr subsequently modified his views in the light of some recent readings of Rahner—see F. Kerr, *Immortal Longings*, 1997, p. ix.
- 37 This is not to deny the call for an unsystematic reading of Rahner. See Kerr, *Immortal*, p. 178. There is fundamental coherence in Rahner's thought even where it is unsystematic, which arises out of his transcendental anthropology.
- 38 K. Rahner, 'Theology and Anthropology' in *Theological Investigations*, 9, 1972 28-45, p. 38.
- 39 See J. Maréchal, *A Maréchal Reader*, New York 1970, p. 27: "the originality of Cartesian philosophy consisted less in the theses which it professed than in the spirit which animated it and in the point of view which it opened up."
- 40 *ibid*, p. 28.
- 41 See K. Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, 1968, p. 48: "There is no actual intellectual knowledge which is not already a conversion to the phantasm." This is the position out of which Rahner develops his metaphysics of knowledge in response to the Kantian critique. Even the title of Rahner's work is instructive here.
- 42 C. Ernst, 'Introduction' in K. Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, 1, 1961, p. xiii.
- 43 This world is not so much that of sense experience, of which Newman wrote suspiciously on many occasions (see, for example, *The Arians of the Fourth*

- Century, 6th edition, 1890, p. 272: “the tyranny of the visible world”), but that of moral action and decision.
- 44 R. Reno, *The Ordinary Transformed: Karl Rahner and the Christian Vision of Transcendence*, Cambridge 1995, p. 188.
- 45 *ibid*, p. 197.
- 46 See K. Rahner, ‘Theology and Anthropology’ in *Theological Investigations*, 9, 1972, pp. 39f.
- 47 Kerr, *Theology*, p. 14.
- 48 The importance of these popular works for the understanding of Rahner’s thought has not been properly appreciated, although as early as 1963, Herbert Vorgrimler classed *Encounters with Silence (Worte ins Schweigen)* as “the best and most influential” of Rahner’s works alongside his 1946 Lenten Sermons. See H. Vorgrimler, *Karl Rahner: His Life, Thought and Works*, 1965, p. 43. The relation between *Worte ins Schweigen* (1938) and Rahner’s major philosophical works *Geist in Welt* (1939) and *Hörer des Wortes* (1941) would be worthy of investigation..
- 49 K. Rahner, *Encounters with Silence*, 1975, p. 48.
- 50 K. Rahner, ‘Experience of the Holy Spirit’ in *Theological Investigations*, 18, 1984, p. 203.
- 51 *Grammar*, p. 385.
- 52 Quote from Rush Rhees in D.Z. Phillips, *Faith after Foundationalism*, 1989, p. 107.
- 53 *ibid*, p. xiv.
- 54 *ibid*, p. xiii. Proponents of Reformed epistemology would undoubtedly prefer the term, ‘basic propositions’, but we are not concerned with the details of that debate here.
- 55 *ibid*, p. 113.
- 56 L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 1969, §262.
- 57 Phillips, *Faith*, p. 89.
- 58 Wittgenstein, §143.
- 59 See *ibid*, §§341-343.
- 60 Phillips, p. 92.
- 61 *Foundations*, p. 59.
- 62 See *University Sermons*, p. 55.
- 63 See J.H. Newman, *A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr Gladstone’s Recent Expostulation*, 1875, p. 56.
- 64 B. Mitchell, ‘Newman as a Philosopher’ in I. Ker and A. Hill, ed., *Newman after a Hundred Years*, Oxford 1990, p. 243.
- 65 Quoted from J.H. Newman, ‘Opus Magnum’ ms, ‘In festo S. Gregorii, 1857, in D. A. Pailin, *The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman’s Grammar of Assent as a Response to the Search for Certainty in Faith*, London 1969, p. 82.
- 66 See Sillem, p.6 — Note of Newman, dated 22 September: “What I write, I do not state dogmatically, nor have I confidence enough in what I have advanced to warrant publication.”
- 67 *Grammar*, p. 315f.
- 68 *Grammar*, p. 369.
- 69 H. Fries, *Die Religionsphilosophie*, p. 89.
- 70 *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, 6, p. 339.