Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T03:21:22.577Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Legal and Non-Legal Norms – a meaningful distinction in international relations? *

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Michael Bothe
Get access

Extract

In his final speech at the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) in 1975, Prime Minister Wilson called the Final Act of the Conference a “moral commitment”, not an international treaty. Thus, the Act is not binding as a matter of international law, though it is quite clear from the historical context, and from the wording of the Final Act itself, that the participating states have some sort of obligation (“commitment”) to base their future conduct on the provisions of the Final Act. The Act formulates norms, rules intended to determine state behaviour, but these rules are not of a legal character. This is, apparently, the assumption underlying the Wilson statement, to which many similar statements could be added. As will be shown, a considerable body of state practice based on the same concept has developed, and points to the existence of non-legal (pre-legal, para-legal, moral, political) obligations as distinguished from legal ones. Is it a valid distinction, can a distinction really be made between legal and non-legal norms? If so, what constitutes the difference? What is the basis of obligation in both cases?

Type
Articles
Information
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 11 , December 1980 , pp. 65 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. 30 Europa-Archiv (1975) D 543.

2. 14 ILM (1975) p. 1292. For details see below.

3. Cf., Virally, , “La deuxième décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement, Essai d'interpretation para-juridique”, 16 AFDI (1970) pp. 9–33, at p. 28 et seq.Google Scholar; Schweisfurth, , “Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur, Verbindlichkeit und völkerrechtlichen Relevanz der KSZE-Schlussakte”, 36 ZaöRV (1976) pp. 681–726.Google Scholar

4. McDougal, for example, criticizes the distinction between law and policy as being “unreal” (“International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception”, 82 Hague Recueil (1953 I) pp. 137–259 at p. 144)Google Scholar. On the other hand, Wengler seems to regret the possible erosion of the concept of legal obligation, see Wengler, , “Rechtsvertrag, Konsensus und Absichtserklärung im Völkerrecht”, 31 Juristenzeitung (1976) pp. 193–197 at p. 197.Google Scholar

5. Hart, , Der Begriff des Rechts (1961/1973) p. 17 et seq.Google Scholar; Radbruch, , Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft, 9th ed. (1952) p. 12 et seq.Google Scholar; Kelsen, , Reine Rechtslehre 2nd ed. (1960) p. 60 et seq.Google Scholar; Geiger, , Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts, 2nd ed. (1970) p. 125 et seq.Google Scholar

6. Cf., on this terminology, Schreuer, , “New Haven Approach und Völkerrecht”, in Schreuer, , ed., Autorität und internationale Ordnung (1979) pp. 63–85 at p. 68Google Scholar; Schachter, , “Towards a Theory of International Obligation”, in Schwebel, , ed., The Effectiveness of International Decisions (1971) pp. 9–31 at p. 22 et seq.Google Scholar

7. See, in particular, the literature quoted in n. 5.

8. Kunz, , “Vöolkerrecht, allgemein”, in Strupp, and Schlochauer, , eds., Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, (1960 et seq.) vol. 3 pp. 611–631 at p. 614Google Scholar; Mössner, , Einführung in das Völkerrecht (1977) p. 6 et seq.Google Scholar; Menzel, and Ipsen, , Völkerrecht, 2nd ed. (1979) p. 38 et seq.Google Scholar; Brierly, , The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (1963) p. 68 et seq.Google Scholar, Berber, , Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. 1, 2nd ed (1975) p. 9 et seq.Google Scholar; Hart, op.cit., n. 5 p. 293 et seq.; Blenk-Knocke, , Zu den soziologischen Bedingungen völkerrechtlicher Normenbefolgung (1979) p. 41 et seq.Google Scholar

9. Berber, , Lehrbuch des Völkerrecht, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (1969) p. 67 et seq.Google Scholar; Guggenheim, , Traitée de Droit international public, vol. 2 (1954) p. 305 et seq.Google Scholar; Kalshoven, , The Law of Warfare (1973) p. 24 et seqGoogle Scholar. In the treatises of the last century, a certain number of rules which are now part of the customary law of war were called usages (Kriegssitte), see Heffter, , Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (1844) p. 201 et seq.Google Scholar; Bluntschli, , Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten, 2nd ed. (1872) p. 304 et seq.Google Scholar

10. Blomeyer, , “Courtoisie”, in Strupp, and Schlochauer, , eds., op.cit., in n. 8, vol. 1 p. 301 et seq.Google Scholar

11. See on this interpretation of Art. 2 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, Rotter, , “Die Abgrenzung zwischen völkerrechtlichem Vertrag und ausserrechtlicher zwischenstaatlicher Abmachung”, in Marcic, et al. , eds., Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (1971) pp. 413–433Google Scholar; Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 p. 685 et seq. See also, the literature quoted in n. 13 and 14.

12. Wengler, , “Die Abgrenzung zwischen völkerrechtlichen und nichtvölkerrechtlichen Normen im internationalen Verkehr”, in Legal Essays, A Tribute to Frede Castberg (1963) pp. 332–352Google Scholar; Münch, , “Unverbindliche Abmachungen im zwischenstaatlichen Bereich”, in Mélanges offerts à Juraj Andrassy (1968) pp. 214–224Google Scholar; Fawcett, , “The Legal Character of International Agreements”, 30 BYIL (1953) pp. 381–400.Google Scholar

13. See Schachter, , “The Twilight Existence of Non-binding International Agreements”, 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 296–304Google Scholar; Münch, , “Non-binding Agreements”, 29 ZaöRV (1969) pp. 1–11.Google Scholar

14. Roessler, , “Law, De Facto Agreements and Declaration of Principle in International Economic Relations”, 21 GYIL (1978) pp. 27–59 at p. 41Google Scholar; Delbrück, , “Die völkerrechtliche Bedeutung der Schlussakte der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa”, in Bernhardt, , von Müunch, and Rudolf, , eds., Drittes deutsch-polnisches Juristen-Kolloquium vol. 1, (1977) pp. 31–50 at p. 42Google Scholar; Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 p. 684 et seq.

15. Roessler, loc.cit.

16. Wengler, loc.cit., in n. 15 p. 346 et seq.; Fiedler, , “Zur Verbindlichkeit einseitiger Versprechen im Völkerrecht”, 19 GYIL (1976) pp. 35–72Google Scholar, in particular at p. 68 et seq.

17. Asamoah, , The Legal Significance of Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1966)Google Scholar; Castañeda, , Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (1969)Google Scholar; Suy, , “Innovations in International Law-Making Processes”, in Macdonald, , Johnston, and Morris, , eds., The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare (1978) pp. 187–200Google Scholar; Dupuy, R.-J., “Droit déclaratoire et droit programmatoire: de la coutume sauvage à la ‘soft law’”, in L'élaboration du droit international public, Société française pour le droit international, Colloque de Toulouse (1975) pp. 132–148Google Scholar; “Das Problem der Rechtssetzung durch intenationale Organisationen”, in Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, vol. 10, Report by Golsong, pp. 1–50Google Scholar, Report by Ermacora, pp. 51–95; Miehsler, , “Zür Autorität von Beschlüssen internationaler Organisationen”, in Schreuer, , ed., Autorität und internationale Ordnung (1979) pp. 35–61.Google Scholar

18. This is rightly pointed out by Lagoni, in “Resolution, Erklärung, Beschluss”, in Wolfrum, , Prill, and Brückner, , eds., Handbuch Vereinte Nationen (1977) pp. 358–364 at p. 363Google Scholar. See also, Heidensticker, , “Zur Rechtsverbindlichkeit von Willensakten der Generalversammlung”, Vereinte Nationen (1979) pp. 205–210 at p. 209Google Scholar; Constas, , “The Capacity of International Organizations to Exercise Political ‘Pressure’,” 25 Revue hellénique (1972) pp. 338–360.Google Scholar

19. For details see below, section 3.2.

20. Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 25.

21. Suy, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 194.

22. Castañeda, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 160 et seq.; Dupuy, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 140 et seq.; Ruge, , Der Beitrag von UNCTAD zur Herausbildung des Entwicklungsvölkerrechts (1976) p. 111 et seq.Google Scholar

23. Tomuschat, , “Die Charta der wirtschaftlichen Rechte und Pflichten der Staaten”, 36 ZaöRV (1976) pp. 444–491 at p. 472 et seq.Google Scholar

24. See Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 26; Müller, J.P., Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (1971) p. 251 et seq.Google Scholar

25. For some examples see below, text accompanying n. 36.

26. The so-called economic summits, which have become a regular practice.

27. Conference on International Economic Co-operation, Final Document, 2 June 1977, Archiv der Gegenwart (1977), 21053 B.

28. See, for example, Bonn Summit, Final Declaration, 17 July 1978, para. 28 et seq., 33 Europa-Archiv (1978) D 462 et seq.

29. Declaration of the Tokyo Summit, 29 June 1979, 34 Europa-Archiv (1979) D 354.

30. Bonn Declaration on Hijacking, adopted 17 July 1978, by the heads of government of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. The Declaration provides for certain measures to be taken against states which refuse to extradite or prosecute aerial hijackers and/or fail to return hijacked aircraft. Text: 73 AJIL (1979) p. 133 et seq.

31. Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 420 et seq.

32. Münch, loc.cit., in n. 13 at p. 4.

33. Münch, loc.cit., in n. 13 at p. 5; Lauterpacht, E., “Gentleman's Agreements”, in Flume, et al. , eds., Internationales Recht und Wirtschaftsordnung, Festschrift für F.A. Mann zum 70. Geburtstag (1977) pp. 381–398 at p. 381 et seq.Google Scholar

34. Münch, loc.cit., in n. 13 at p. 5; Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 13 at p. 297 et seq.; Schlochauer, “Atlantik-Chaiter” in Strupp and Schlochauer, op.cit., in n. 8, vol. 1 p. 95; Schlochauer, “Jalta-Konferenz von 1945”, ibid., vol. 2 pp. 162–165; von der Heydte, “Potsdamer Abkommen von 1945”, ibid., vol. 2 pp. 786–790; Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 414 et seq.

35. Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 416 et seq.; Verdross, , Die immerwährende Neutralität Osterreichs (1978) p. 31.Google Scholar

36. Bothe, , “Zur Dogmatik eines völkerrechtlichen Kriegsverhütungsrechts, Verfahren und Inhalt des Recht der Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung”, in Delbrück, , ed., Völkerrecht und Kriegsverhütung (1979) pp. 213–233 at p. 227 et seqGoogle Scholar. See also Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 6 at p. 14 et seq.

37. 71 Department of State Bulletin (1974) p. 510.

38. See Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3; Delbrück, loc. cit., in n. 14; Skubiszewski, , “Der Rechtscharakter der KSZE-Schlussakte”, in Bernhardt, , von Müunch, and Rudolf, , eds., op.cit., in n. 14 at pp. 13–30Google Scholar; Kühne, , “Die Schlussakte der KSZE: Zur Bedeutung, Auslegung und Anwendung von Verhaltensregeln in den Ost-West-Beziehungen”, in Delbrück, , Ropers, and Zellentin, , eds., Grüinbuch zu den Folgewirkungen der KSZE (1977) pp. 137–154Google Scholar; Schütz, , “Probleme der Anwendung der KSZE-Schlussakte aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht”Google Scholar, ibid. pp. 155–175; Fawcett, , “The Helsinki Act and International Law”, 13 Revue belge (1977) pp. 5–9Google Scholar; Blech, , “Die KSZE im Entspannungsprozess”, 30 Europa-Archiv (1975) pp. 681–692 at p. 686 et seq.Google Scholar

39. For the text, see 17 ILM (1978) p. 1466 et seq.

40. For the text, see 18 ILM (1979) p. 382.

41. On the difficulty in distinguishing between a political agreement to conclude a treaty and a legal pactum de contrahendo, see also Wengler, loc.cit., in n. 12 at p. 334.

42. See, Management of international water resources: institutional and legal aspect, UN Doc. ST/ESA/5, p. 30 et seq.

43. See, Oellers-Frahm, , “Die Fntscheidung des Internationalen Gerichtshofes im griechisch-türkischen Streit um den Festlandsockel in der Aegaeis”, 18 Arch VR (1978/1980) pp. 375–392 at p. 385 et seq.Google Scholar

44. ICJ Reports 1978, p. 39 et seq., para. 94 et seq. of the Judgment.

45. Ibid., p. 51.

46. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17 passim; Castañeda, op.cit., in n. 17 passim.

47. Resolution 2625 (XXV).

48. Resolution 2734 (XXV).

49. Resolution 2603 (XXIV)A.

50. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17, at p. 46 et seq., p. 116 et seq., and p. 124 et seq.

51. Resolution 1653 (XVI).

52. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17, at p. 116.

53. Resolution 1962 (XVIII).

54. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 157 et seq.

55. Simma, , “Methodik und Bedeutung der Arbeit der Veieinten Nationen für die Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts”, in Kewenig, , ed., Die Vereinten Nationen im Wandel (1975) pp. 79–102 at p. 97 et seqGoogle Scholar. Frowein, , “Der Beitrag dei internationalen Organisational zur Entwicklung des Vöolkerrechts”, 36 ZaöRV (1976) pp. 147–167 at p. 152.Google Scholar

56. Resolution 2749 (XXV).

57. Resolution 2574 (XXIV).

58. Anand, , Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and the Developing Countries (1976) p. 193 et seq.Google Scholar

59. Gündling, , “Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1977”, 39 ZaöRV (1979) pp. 555–624 at p. 570Google Scholar; Saffo, , “The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a Law to Govern Seabed Mining?” 53 Tulane Law Review (1979) pp. 492–520 at p. 512Google Scholar; Skubiszewski, , “La nature juridique de la ‘Declaration des principes’ sur les fonds marins”, 4 Annales d'études internationales (1973) pp. 237–248Google Scholar. See also, Graf, Vitzthum, “Die Bemühungen um ein Régime des Tiefseebodens”, 38 ZaöRV (1978) pp. 745–800 at p. 787 et seq.Google Scholar; idem, Der Rechtsstatus des Meeresbodens (1972) p. 277.Google Scholar

60. Resolution 217 (III).

61. Resolution 1514 (XV).

62. Verdross, and Simma, , Universelles Völkerrecht (1976), p. 599 et seq.Google Scholar

63. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 191.

64. On this notion of “programme”, see R.-J. Dupuy, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 144 et seq.

65. Asamoah, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 177 et seq.

66. Sloan, , “The Binding Force of a ‘Recommendation’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations”, 25 BYIL (1948) pp. 1–33 at p. 30.Google Scholar

67. Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 24.

68. Higgins, , “Compliance with United Nations Decisions on Peace and Security and Human Rights Questions”, in Schwebel, , ed., op.cit., in n. 6 pp. 32–50 at p. 37 et seq.Google Scholar

69. Higgins, loc.cit.; Miehsler, loc.cit., in n. 17 p. 44 et seq.; see also, Golsong, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 35 et seq.

70. See, Khol, , “Berichtssystem”, in Wolfram, , Prill, and Brückner, , eds., op.cit., in n. 18 pp. 48–58 at p. 53 et seq.Google Scholar; United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, UN Doc. ST/HR/2, p. 169 et seq.

71. Virally, , “Droit international et décolonisation devant les Nations Unies”, AFDI (1963) pp. 508–541 at p. 528 et seq.Google Scholar

72. Sohn, , “Procedures Developed by International Organizations for Checking Compliance”, in Schwebel, , ed., op.cit., in n. 6 pp. 51–56Google Scholar; United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, op.cit, in n. 70, at p. 169 et seq.

73. See Cadoux, , “L'organisation des Nations Unies et le problème de l'Afrique australe, L'evolution de la strategie des pressions internationales”, 23 AFDI (1977) pp. 127–174.Google Scholar

74. Castañeda, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 176.

75. Dupuy, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 144 et seq. See also, Virally, , “La notion de programme, Un instrument de la coopération technique multilatérale”, AFDI (1968) pp. 530–553 at p. 532 et seq.Google Scholar

76. See above, text accompanying n. 9 and 10.

77. SirBailey, Kenneth, “Making International Law at the United Nations”, ASIL Proceedings (1967) pp. 233–239 at p. 239Google Scholar; see also, Golsong, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 12 et seq.

78. Schachter, , “The Evolving Law of International Development”, 15 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1976) pp. 1–16 at p. 3 et seq.Google Scholar; Virally, loc.cit., in n. 74 at p. 531; see also, Ruge, op.cit., in n. 22 at p. 116 et seq.

79. Sloan, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 32.

80. Resolution 2626 (XXV).

81. In particular, Resolutions 1803 (XVII), 2158 (XXI), 3171 (XXVIII).

82. See Tomuschat, loc.cit., in n. 23; Petersmann, , “The New International Economic Order: Principles, Politics and International Law”, in Macdonald, , Johnston, and Morris, , eds., op.cit., in n. 17 pp. 449–469.Google Scholar

83. For a summary of the views expressed, see 1974 UN Monthly Chronicle no. 5 p. 45 et seq.

84. Resolution 3281 (XXIX).

85. See the detailed analysis by Petersmann, , “Internationales Recht und Neue Internationale Wirtschaftsordnung”, 18 ArchVR (1978/1980) pp. 17–44 at p. 34 et seq.Google Scholar, who rightly points out that a distinction has to be made between the various provisions of the Charter. See also Tomuschat, loc.cit., in n. 23.

86. See, inter alia, Petersmann, loc.cit., in n. 85; Prill, , “Weltwirtschaftsordnung”, in Wolfram, , Prill, and Brückner, , eds., op.cit., in n. 18 pp. 524–536, in particular, p. 526 et seq.Google Scholar

87. See the different formulations used in this context in Resolutions 1803 (XVII) and 3171 (XXVIII). See also, Meessen, , “Völkerrechtliches Enteignungsrecht im Nord-Süd-Konflikt”, in Kewenig, , ed., Völkerrecht und international wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (1978) pp. 11–34.Google Scholar

88. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 29; Graham, , “The US Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: International Innovation and the Art of Possible”, 72 AJIL (1978) pp. 513–541 at p. 519.Google Scholar

89. 12 ILM (1973) p. 1533.

90. Swiss Federal Council, Botschaft über die in den Multilateralen Handelsvereinbarungen unter der Ägide des GATT (Tokio-Runde) erzielten Ergebnisse, 24 September 1979, BB1. 1979 III pp. 1–581, in particular, at p. 90. See also, Graham, , “Results of the Tokyo Round”, 9 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1979) pp. 153–175.Google Scholar

91. Jackson, John H., World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969) p. 755 et seq.Google Scholar

92. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 pp. 46, 54, with further references at p. 52 n. 90. See also, Roessler, , “GATT and Access to Supplies”, 9 Journal of World Trade Law (1975) pp. 25–40 at p. 39 et seq.Google Scholar

93. Basic Documents, suppl. 15 p. 64.

94. Francioni, , “International Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises: an Alternative Approach”, 3 IYIL (1977) pp. 143–170Google Scholar; Studier, , “Verhaltenskodizes für multinationale Konzerne und die Interessenposition der Entwicklungsländer”, 11 VRÜ (1978) pp. 411–431Google Scholar; Nelli, Feroci, “Società multinazionali: verso un codice di condotta”, 33 La Comunità Internazionale (1978) pp. 356–374Google Scholar; UN Docs. E/5655 paras. 41 et seq., E/C. 10/9, paras. 37–44, 57–61, 71–88, E/C. 10/17, paras. 152–170. See also, Schwartz, R., “Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding?”, 11 International Lawyer (1977) pp. 529–536.Google Scholar

95. Kewenig, , “Technologietransfer aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht”, in Kewenig, , ed., Völkerrecht und Internationale wirtschaftlkhe Zusammenarbeit (1978) pp. 71–96, in particular, p. 78 et seq.Google Scholar; Rubin, , “International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology”, 73 AJIL (1979) pp. 519–520Google Scholar; Cousin, , “Le Project de la C.N.U.C.E.D. de Code international de Conduite pour le Transfert de techniques”, 19 GYIL (1976) pp. 199–222 at p. 204 et seqGoogle Scholar. Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, UN DOC. TD/CODE TOT/25 = 19 ILM (1980) pp. 773 etseq.

96. Davidow, and Chiles, , “The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices”, 72 AJIL (1978) pp. 247–276.Google Scholar

97. 15 ILM (1976) p. 967 et seq. The Decision was revised in 1979, 18 ILM (1979) p. 1171.

98. On the legal effect and practical effectivity of the OECD Guidelines, see Baade, , “The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises”, 22 GYIL (1979) pp. 11–52, at 29 et seq.Google Scholar

99. See Kewenig, loc.cit., in n. 95.

100. See Grewlich, , “Die UN-Konvention über einen Verhaltenskodex für Linienkonferenzen”, 35 ZaöRV (1975) pp. 742–758.Google Scholar

101. A similar split can be seen between observations submitted by employers' organizations and those made by trades unions, see UN Doc. E/C. 10/20 para. 29 et seq.

101a. UN Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10 = 19 ILM (1980) pp. 813 et seq.

102. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 42 et seq.; Petersmann, , “Völkerrechtliche Fragen der Weltwährungsiefoim”, 34 ZaöRV (1974) pp. 452–502Google Scholar; Pöhl, , “Von Bretton Woods nach Jamaika, Bilanz dei Reformarbeiten für die künftige Weltwährungsordnung”, 31 Europa-Archiv (1976) pp. 139–146Google Scholar; Hahn, , “Elemente einer neuen Weltwährungsordnung”, in Kewenig, , ed., op.cit., in n. 87 pp. 215–242.Google Scholar

103. Art. IV, as amended.

104. Roessler, loc.cit. in n. 14 at p. 44; E. Lauterpacht, loc.cit., in n. 33 at p. 382.

105. An example of a provision, where this distinction is clearly made is Art. 67 para. 1 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (text in 38 ZaöRV (1978) p. 86 et seq.), which defines the protection of military elements of civil defence. While non-compliance with the conditions of protection normally only results in loss of protection, without being unlawful, one particular case of non-compliance is expressly stated to be an unlawful act.

106. See above, section 3.1.

107. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 52 et seq.; for the text of the 1978 version, see 33 Europa-Archiv (1978) D 455.

108. Courteix, , “Les accords de Londres entre pays exportateurs d'équipements et de matières nucléaires”, 22 AFDI (1976) pp. 27–50.Google Scholar

109. 17 ILM (1978) p. 220.

110. Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, see Gündling, loc.cit., in n. 59 at p. 609.

111. Meyer-Wöbse, , Rechtsfragen des Exports von Kernanlagen in Nichtkernwaffenstaaten (1979) p. 61 et seq.Google Scholar; Courteix, , Exportations nucléaires et non-prolifération (1978) p. 63Google Scholar (in spite of characterizing the guidelines as a gentlemen's agreement, she appears to construe them as a bundle of unilateral (legally?) binding declarations).

112. Franko, , “US Regulation of the Spread of Nuclear Technology Through Suppliers Power: Lever or Boomerang”, 10 Law and Policy in International Business (1978) pp. 1181, 1194Google Scholar. See also Goldschmidt, and Kratzer, , Peaceful Nuclear Relations (1978) p. 43.Google Scholar

113. See above, n. 62.

114. Dupuy, loc.cit., in n. 17 at p. 140; Virally, loc.cit., in n. 31 at p. 21 et seq.; UN Doc. E/C. 10/17 para. 159.

115. Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 421.

116. Loc.cit., in n. 31 and 29.

117. See above, text accompanying n. 97 and 98.

118. See the implementation procedures for the Generalized System of Preferences, UN Doc. TD/B/331, no. VIII. As to the reasons for the relative lack of precision of these provision, see ibid. p. 12.

119. Schweisfutth, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 711 et seq.

120. 18 ILM (1979) p. 49.

121. On the question of extended coastal state jurisdiction, national practice seems to be grosso modo in conformity with the Negotiating Texts of the Law of the Sea Conference, see Moore, , “National Legislation for the Management of Fisheries Under Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction”, 11 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (1980) pp. 153–182.Google Scholar

122. Delbrüuck, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 45; Wengler, loc.cit., in n. 12 at p. 335.

123. Wengler, loc.cit., in n. 12 at p. 343 et seq.; Castañeda, op.cit., in n. 17 at p. 176 et seq.; ICJ Advisory Opinion, Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South–West Africa, Seperate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, ICJ Reports (1955) p. 120.

124. Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 30.

125. To choose a non-legal form of obligation in order to avoid adverse effects in case of non-performance is, thus, not very realistic. See, however, the American attitude with respect to the Generalized System of Preferences, as quoted by Graham, loc.cit., in n. 88 at p. 519.

126. See Delbrück, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 46.

127. Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 29.

128. Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 710 et seq.

129. UN Doc. TD/B 331, p. 6.

130. On the history of implementation by the United States, see Graham, loc.cit., in n. 88 at p. 526 et seq.

131. Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 691.

132. This is often used as an argument for or against the legal character of a specific obligation. See Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 415; Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 691. A rare example of a non-legal agreement published in the same way as an international treaty is the “Statement of Intent” between the US Department of Energy and the Ministry for Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany on co-operation in coal technology, dated 7 October 1977, published Bundesgesetzblatt (1977) II, 1239. This statement is clearly not legally binding. Both parties intended to participate in a certain project: “Such intent … is signified by the signatures…” (final paragraph of the Statement).

133. Schweisfurth, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 713 et seq.

134. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 41.

135. Delbrück, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 36 et seq.; Schweisfurth, loc.cit, in n. 3 at p. 713 et seq.

136. See above, section 3.3.4.

137. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14.

138. Roessler, loc.cit., in n. 14 at p. 47 et seq. On the relations between US Senate and President in the field of disarmament, see Bothe, loc.cit., in n. 36 at p. 232.

139. See Bothe, , “Rechtsprobleme grenzüberschreitender Planung”; 102 Archiv dés öoffentlichen Rechts (1977) pp. 68–89 at p. 72 et seq.Google Scholar

140. See Tomuschat, , “Der Verfassungsstaat im Geflecht der internationalen Beziehungen”, 36 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1977) pp. 7–63 at pp. 26–37.Google Scholar

141. Rotter, loc.cit., in n. 11 at p. 420 et seq.

142. Baum, , “Die soziologische Begründung des Völkerrechts als Problem der Rechtssoziologie”, 1 Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie (1970) pp. 257–274 at p. 259.Google Scholar

143. Contra, Schachter, loc.cit., in n. 6 at p. 30 et seq.

144. See above.

145. Cf., Schachter, loc.cit., in a 6 at p. 11.

146. Virally, loc.cit., in n. 3 at p. 29.

147. Menzel, , “Estoppel-Prinzip”, in Strupp, and Schlochauer, , eds., op.cit., in n. 8, vol. 1, p. 441 et seq.Google Scholar

148. Müller, op.cit., in n. 24 at p. 5 et seq.

149. Radbruch, op.cit., in n. 5 at p. 16; cf., on the other hand, Kelsen, op.cit., in n. 5 at p. 61 et seq.; see also Geiger, op.cit., in n. 5 at p. 293 et seq.; Green, “Law and Morality in a Changing Society”, in Green, , Law and Society (1975) pp. 1–60.Google Scholar

150. Kelsen, op.cit., at p. 60.