International law, both conventional and customary law, has been subject to rapid transformation and crystallization in the last few decades. This is especially the case in the field of international environmental law. Conduct that was not prohibited under international law at the time of initiation can now be characterized as contravening a number of newly and widely recognized principles and norms of international environmental law. Principles that may be said to have gained such wide recognition in international law as well as domestic law, albeit to varying degrees, include the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle and the sic utere tuo principle described below. Such principles have been invoked in a wide variety of international disputes with the aim of halting activities undertaken within one state having environmentally injurious transboundary consequences in other states or territories beyond the jurisdiction of any state (e.g., the High Seas).

This is the national report for the Netherlands on the above-named topic for the VIIth International Congress on Procedural Law, Würzburg September 1983. General reporters for this subject are Prof. Dr. Mauro Cappelletti (European University Institute, Florence) and Prof. Dr. Bryant Garth (Indiana University, Bloomington). In their introductory note to the national reporters they focus their attention on “how the legal system is or is not adapting to the problem of the representation of diffuse interests and more generally (on) the problem of the vindication of these rights”.

During the last few years, constitutional democracy has again become a hotly debated issue among constitutional scholars, political scientists and philosophers in Europe and the United States. Several scholars have written profound comments on the ideals of constitutionalism and democracy, and their place in contemporary political systems. While many proclaim the enduring validity of constitutional democracy, others make a plea for a radical redefinition of the concept.

The Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as the Brussels I Regulation) establishes a judicial area in Europe with uniform rules on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments. The Brussels I Regulation is now in force in all EU Member States, including Denmark. On 1 July 2007 a separate Agreement between the European Union and Denmark came into force, in which the Brussels I Regulation is declared applicable in the relationship between Denmark and the other Member States. Bulgaria and Rumania joined the European Union on 1 January 2007 and became bound by the Brussels I Regulation as part of the acquis communautaire.

After decades of virtual inactivity, the PCA's workload has significantly increased since the early eighties. In particular, the last view years have seen significant development. The nature of the PCA's work is diverse. In its capacity as designating authority under the UNCITRAL Rules, it deals with cases of a commercial and sometimes of a mixed state/non-state nature. Where it acts as Registry, the PCA's cases are usually of a mixed nature, and include several investment arbitrations. For the future, additional responsibilities on the basis of the revised UNCITRAL Rules would be a welcome development. A focus on specific niches, such as mass claims, would set the PCA apart from alternative institutes, which would further ensure a continuing role over the next decades.

Aux termes de l'article premier de la Convention sur la haute mer conclue à Genève le 29 avril 1958, «on entend par «haute mer» toutes les parties de la mer n'appartenant pas à la mer territoriale ou aux eaux intérieures d'un Etat ».

Ce qui frappe à la lecture de cet article, c'est le caractère négatif de la définition qu'elle contient: la haute mer y est décrite comme ce qui reste de « la mer », déduction faite de « la mer territoriale » et des « eaux intérieures ».

Il est difficile d'être complètement satisfait des résultats de la onzième session de la Commission du Droit International. La cause en doit être imputée notamment aux circonstances spéciales qui rendaient impossible la discussion des points à l'ordre du jour selon le plan établi par la Commission l'année passée. En effet, la Commission s'était proposée d'en terminer avec le projet sur les relations et immunités consulaires en première lecture. Elle aurait attaché du prix à pouvoir soumettre justement ce projet à l'Assemblée générale dans un délai relativement court car il avait apparu qu'il y avait une tendance à joindre la discussion sur le projet déjà soumis relatif aux immunités diplomatiques à celui relatif au droit consulaire. Ainsi, retarder la remise du projet sur le droit consulaire pourrait avoir comme conséquence de remettre également la mise-sur-pied d'une convention sur les immunités diplomatiques. La Commission n'a pu suivre ce plan parce que le rapporteur de ce sujet, le professeur žourek (Tchécoslovaquie) était absent pendant toute la première moitié de la session. Le Gouvernement de Bulgarie l'avait désigné juge ad hoc dans l'affaire de l'incident aérien entre Israël et la Bulgarie portée devant la Cour internationale de Justice à La Haye et les délibérations en cette affaire s'étaient prolongées au delà de toute attente. La Commission se trouvait donc obligée de remettre la discussion de ce sujet jusqu'à la venue de M. Žourek, et le temps qui restait était insuffisant pour en terminer la première lecture. Vu cette situation, la Commission a commencé ses travaux par l'étude du rapport de Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (Grande-Bretagne), qui avait été élu président de la Commission, et les interrompit au moment de là venue de M. Žourek pour aborder le sujet du droit consulaire.

Since 1 March 2001, family courts in the European Union (except Denmark) have been obliged to follow the rules of EC Regulation No. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses. The Regulation was meant to complement the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968, and that is why it has come to be known as the ‘Brussels II Regulation’. The Convention covers, roughly speaking, patrimonial matters – such as property, contracts and torts – while the Regulation deals with divorce and child custody. On 1 March 2002, another Regulation entered into force, replacing the Brussels Convention and therefore aptly called the ‘Brussels I Regulation’. However, ‘Brussels I’ does not apply in Denmark, and that means that the Brussels Convention is still in force as between Denmark and the other EU member states. To complicate matters further, another Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters continues to apply in all EU member states, as well as in Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Poland: the Lugano Convention of 1988. Its text is virtually identical to that of the Brussels Convention, but there are major differences between the Lugano Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. As far as patrimonial matters are concerned, the courts in Europe now have to juggle with three different sets of rules: the Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention.