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Evidence in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study of American and Dutch Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
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When a court hears a case which has foreign elements, it decides on the basis of foreign law in case it considers the contacts with that law sufficiently strong. Such a decision does not automatically include an application of foreign rules of evidence. Those rules may, however, have just as strong an influence on the rights of the parties as the rules of substantive law.
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- Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1966
References
1. See Part II of this paper.
2. See Part II of this paper.
3. Before proceeding I should indicate in what sense some probative value terms are used throughout this paper.
“Conclusive evidence” is evidence which issufficient and incontrovertible.
“Complete evidence” is a term used in Civil Law systems to indicate evidence which is sufficient and which obliges the court to decide in favor of the party who presents it, but which may be rebutted; see Asser-Anema-Verdam, , 43.Google Scholar
“Free evidence” indicates that the court has the discretion to give the evidence the probative value it thinks appropriate.
4. 1968 B.W.
5. Art. 1978 B.W.; for a description of decisive and supplementary oath, see Part II of this paper.
6. Art. 1978 B.W.
7. Art. 1962 B.W.
8. Art. 1958 B.W.
9. Articles 1907–1909 B.W.
10. In 1922 art. 1933 B.W. which excluded oral testimony with regard to transactions where the value involved was higher than Dfl. 300,—; in 1923 the impeachment provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure; in 1934 art. B.W. which excluded parol evidence against the contents of an instrument.
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35. cf. p. 293, supra.
36. In particular on relevancy, competency of evidence, impeachment, privileges, opinion evidence and hearsay.
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63. See for examples note 53, 295–296, supra.
64. La force probante des écrits en droit international privé français, 50 Revue critique du Droit international privé, 1 (1961).
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67. Which is answered by “yes” if one of the laws considers the form valid; by “no” if neither considers it valid.
68. Cf. Kosters-Dubbink, , 496, 497.Google Scholar
69. See Part II of this paper.
70. Idem.
71. Idem.
72. See writers cited by Rigaux, , op. cit. supra, 15–16.Google Scholar
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75. See, for example, and Schoch, , op. cit. supra, 138–139.Google Scholar
76. See p. 83, nt. 1.
77. See Sedler's use of the Erie outcome as a test for conflicts purposes, p. 306, infra.
78. “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale, L. J., 333 (1933)Google Scholar, republished as chapter 6, of Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942).
79. Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev, 392, 413, 418 (1941).Google Scholar
80. Cook in Yale, L. J., supra 346.Google Scholar
81. Supra, 416.Google Scholar
82. Choice of Law, 154.Google Scholar
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84. Choice of Law, 158.Google Scholar
85. See p. 305. infra.
86. At some exceptional places however Morgan seems to take into consideration the bearing of a foreign rule. At 193 he says for example: “In some instances, however, the rule of the locus is definite and easily ascertainable and its obvious effect on the litigation is very material, if not decisive.”
87. See for an example of this kind of deliberations by Morgan, : Choice of Law, 191.Google Scholar
88. Morgan's article deals with inter-state rather than with international relations. It is undoubtedly true that by their legal education and by regular contact American judges are taking on any concept some notice of the law of the sister-state without explicitly going into it.
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90. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 ALR 1487Google Scholar, it was held that where jurisdiction of a federal court is based on diversity of citizenship (the parties are citizens of different states), the court should apply as to questions of procedure federal law but otherwise the law of the state in which it is sitting.
91. Sedler, , 820Google Scholar. I do not think Sedler is quite right here. Though the contacts with the lex causae are substantial, apparently, the forum is always also concerned in a greater or less degree. See p. 310–311, infra.
92. Whereas, according to Sedler, matters of substance always affect the outcome substantially, with regard to procedural matters a preliminary investigation as to that effect is necessary. (Sedler's distinction between substantive and procedural matters (See Sedler, , 817)Google Scholar is similar to Morgan's (See p. 304, supra)).
93. Sedler, , 880.Google Scholar
94. Sedler, , 823.Google Scholar
95. Sedler distinguishes “strong procedural policy” from “public policy”. (See Sedler, , 824 and 816, nt 15)Google Scholar. He says that “public policy” operates only at the beginning of a case to exclude a claim which would violate a fundamental principle of justice of the forum.
96. Would not a logical consequence of the opposite view be that also substantive rules which are unfair according to the forum's concepts can be excluded even if they do not violate the forum's public policy?
97. See p. 310–311, infra.
98. 293 S. W. 2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
99. 125 F. Supp. 696 ( W.D. Ark. 1954).
100. 281 F. ad 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
101. Interesting as an illustration here are the remarks of a judge noted by Morgan, , Choice of Law, 191Google Scholar. The judge suggested that what really decided many cases was that the court was not convinced by certain witnesses, whereas to avoid to hurt their feelings, it gave as official ground of the decision a burden of proof rule.
102. Sedler, , 858.Google Scholar
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104. Cf. Ailes, , op. cit. supra, 408Google Scholar, referred to at p. 304, supra.
105. Also the Second Restatement on Conflict of Laws applies this test in some instances. See, with regard to the burden of proof, §§ 599c an 599d of Tentative Draft, no. 11.
106. The res ipsa loquitur says that if the damaging object was under the supervision of the defendant or his servants and the accident would, ordinarily, noth ave happened if those who had the supervision had used proper care, proof of the injury only, affords evidence that the accident arose from want of care.
107. It may be that it is mere coincidence which of the parties is defendant and thus gets those favors, for example, where in a collision case both parties have suffered a loss.
108. The Continental writers who follow the decisoria litis-ordinatoria litis distinction. See, for example, Kosters-Dubbink, , 491–493Google Scholar: Perrot, , Le régime des preuves en droit international privé français, 1962 Journal de Tribunaux (Belgium), 273Google Scholar; Smits, , Internationaal Bewijsrecht in Burgerlijke Zaken, 3 (1885).Google Scholar
109. See, for example, also Bellini, Evidence in Comparative Private International Law, 2 U.W. Australia Ann. L. Rev. 330 (1953).Google Scholar
110. Ehrenzweig, , 331.Google Scholar
111. At 354.
112. At 270–273.
113. See §1. and §2.
114. See chapter IV.
115. The harmony of results policy underlies, of course, also the outcome determination tests treated in the preceding chapter, § 2.4.
116. The qualification does not seem much different from Sedler's “efficient operation”, see p. 306, supra; notice however, that in my view application of the lex fori is only justified when the chances are that thereby harmony of results will be furthered more than by application of the lex causae, and not where application of the foreign rule would make the trial improper according to the forum's concepts.
117. Noteworthy in this context is the dissertation of Von Craushaar, Die internationalrechtliche Anwendbarkeit deutscher Prozesznormen (1961).
Craushaar has investigated in how far German procedural law should be applied by German courts in cases where, in accordance with German conflicts rules the Austrian law of succession is applied. He proposes ( at p. 32) to further harmony of results in these cases by leaving aside, in principle, the special procedural rules — Craushaar means by “special” procedural rules those adapted to specific substantive law — of the lex fort (German Law) as well as those of the lex causae (Austrian law). He suggests to apply instead the general principles of German procedure as these have been established or can be gathered from German procedural law, Only in exceptional cases the special procedural rules of the lex fori or the lex causae should be applied. Craushaar concludes (at p.99) that in almost all cases which he studied in his dissertation his test provided adequate procedural rules, well adapted to the specific German-Austrian conflicts situation.
118. Cf. Brainerd Currie's “governmental interest” theory. According to Currie the proper approach in conflicts cases is to look in the first place to the law of the forum. Then, the policy underlying the forum rule should be examined and it should be determined whether in the light of “the relationship of the forum state to the case at bar—that is, to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject matter, to the litigation … the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this instance”. (Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 10 (1958)Google Scholar. The lex fori should always be applied if the forum state has an interest, irrespective of whether a foreign state is interested at the same time, or not. Only where the forum is not and a foreign state interested, the foreign law should be applied. Currie has laid down his theory in the article cited above and many others. The theory has become the subject of extensive discussion in the United States. See the articles cited bij Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and “True Rules”, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 240, 245 nt. 29 (1961).Google Scholar
The predominance of the lex fori is advocated not only by Currie but also by Ehrenzweig, see his article The Lex Fori—Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960)Google Scholar, several other articles and his treatise.
119. See Part II of this paper.