This article develops a linguistic injustice test. Language policy measures passing the test conflict with the normative ideal of equal language recognition. The first part of the test checks for external restrictions - language policies that grant more recognition to one language group than to another. The second part of the test checks for internal restrictions - language policies that grant more recognition to some members of a language group than to other members of the same group. The article then applies the linguistic injustice test to two models of linguistic justice: linguistic territoriality and linguistic pluralism. It is argued that real-life cases of linguistic territoriality tend to pass the test. It is argued that instantiations of linguistic pluralism tend to fail the test.

The emergence of a strong Cossack movement has great implications for the future of Russia and the post-Soviet space. It is at once the glorification of a mythical past and a powerful alternate vision of the future. Old questions of Cossack identity are once again being debated and a Cossack presence is strongly felt in the cities of southern Russia. In the volatile North Caucasus region the Cossack revival has increasingly assumed many of the features of national movements in other areas of the former Soviet Union.

The leaked email accounts of Putin’s aide on Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, are vast primary source collections that shed light on the backstage happenings of the Kremlin’s politics in the Donbas war. Surkov is an excellent dramaturg; he writes scripts, casts actors, analyzes their performance and narratives, runs promotions, and puts the repertoire into motion to achieve intended reactions of the target audience. Methods and resources employed against Ukraine have much in common with political technology that helps the Kremlin to manipulate public opinion as well as election systems using pseudo-experts, technical parties, fake civic organizations and youth movement such as Nashi, and covert media techniques. Moscow tactically promoted the myth of “Novorossiya”—later the circumstances forced Surkov to replace it with “Donbas.” These tactics gave false credibility to “separatists” who would voice Moscow’s objections to any attempts of Ukraine to drift westward, creating an illusion in the domestic and international audience: the separatists are not puppets of Moscow but desperately fight against Kyiv junta for their localized identity, and Russia is just there to offer them a helping hand. The Russian policy toward Ukraine after the 2013 fall is an extension of its “virtual” domestic politics, but not traditional diplomacy at all.

The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe promised bold opportunities for the various ethnic groups populating that vast, diverse region. Yet if history had any lessons to teach these groups it was that democracy, or at least the political systems that emerged in the midst of the rubble of the Berlin Wall between 1989 and 1991, was no guarantor of whatever idealized rights the region's ethnic groups hoped would come in the wake of the collapse of the communist dictatorships that had dominated these parts of Europe for decades. Communism, had, in many instances, done nothing more than stifle the festering ethnic tensions that had exploded in the nineteenth century and short-circuited the complex, lengthy process of resolving these conflicts. Consequently, for those knowledgeable about the essence of these conflicts, it should have come as no surprise that Yugoslavia, for example, was torn asunder by ethnic violence so terrifying that it took the intervention of the Western world's great powers to end the most violent aspects of these wars of ethnicity.

The need to handle ethnocultural diversity and the external pressures of Euro-Atlantic integration have led to the development of complex minority rights regimes in Central and Southeast European states. The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the political representation dimension of these regimes, and to investigate how the regulations in this domain are related to the more general attitude of states toward diversity recognition and registration. For this purpose, we classify the states according to a series of variables concerning the manner in which ethnocultural diversity is recognized and portrayed, as well as the regulations concerning the representation of minorities, and identify patterns of their incidence. The formal-legal analysis of the constitutions, minority protection laws and of the electoral legislation of the included countries reveals a clear connection between the general attitude of the state toward diversity and the incidence of autonomies, and a less unequivocal, yet strong relationship in the case of minority representation in the national polity.

Providing support to “civil society” in the form of funding to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) became a central aspect of development engagement in Kyrgyzstan and other post-socialist countries in the 1990s, seen as a means of ensuring “good governance,” promoting participation, and providing a safety net of sorts to those who were left vulnerable by the market reforms that followed the collapse of Communism. Since then, donor engagement in Kyrgyzstan has led to the development of a thriving NGO sector, taken to embody “civil society” and to be a sign of the country's democratization, in comparison to its neighbors. However, this sector is dependent on support from international donors, and faces increasing hostility for supposedly representing outside interests, rather than effectively addressing the needs of the Kyrgyzstani population. This is particularly the case in regard to work on women's rights and gender equality. Based on interviews with 16 self-described activists working on gender issues, this paper explores what it is like to “do” gender activism in this practical and discursive environment. For my respondents, activity in the NGO sector emerges as not only a process that goes far beyond the straightforward implementation of donor agendas, but also one that does not necessarily “fit” with dominant understandings of what constitutes civil society activism.

The South-eastern enlargement currently suffers from defections, compliance problems and blockades; the results of the European Union's policy since 1999 can be called mixed at best. The “Serbian question” – for instance – remains unsolved since Serbia still means a “problem child” of the international community. The thesis generated in this paper is that all of these problems are indicators of a basic identity conflict. This conflict stems from entirely different identities, i.e. world views, perception of the state, political cultures and the meaning of international politics. The EU's enlargement policy – in its ideal type – is precisely meant to overcome this conflict by “Europeanizing” the acceding states. Yet the argument here is that the EU also pursues goals beyond Europeanization – for instance “stabilization” – hence the EU might be interested in accessions despite the fact that the Copenhagen criteria have not been fulfilled. Such “strategic accessions”, as experienced with Romania, Greece and Cyprus, tend to hinder the EU's external governance and foster enlargement fatigue in the long run. The case of Serbia serves as an example for demonstrating that Serbia is not complying with the basic standards of EU integration and that the EU is not really enforcing compliance. As a result, we are heading towards a “strategic accession” in the Serbian case.

The study of nationalism encompasses so many themes that scholarly communication between different subfields has become difficult. Scholars might facilitate comparison by acknowledging different types of nationalism, but an overview of various taxonomies of nationalism shows that binary taxonomies have a problematic normative subtext, while most non-binary taxonomies have failed to reach a broad audience. Miroslav Hroch, who intended his A-B-C phases to schematize non-state national awakening, also devised a taxonomy of nationalism. Hroch's work has influenced nationalism scholars mostly through its phase theory of how individual national movements develop over time. While other phase theorists have proposed similar schema, Hroch's work has attracted such a wide audience that it provides scholars with a solution to the problem of inter-disciplinary communication: it offers a useful terminology for classifying and describing various sorts of nationalism.

The number of internally forcibly displaced persons is growing every year across the globe and exceeds the number of refugees. To date, Ukraine has the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Europe, with about 1.4 million people forced to flee from the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Employing Massey’s concept of ‘power geometry’, the modalities of borders, and taking an intersectional approach, this article theorizes how IDPs are situated politically within a protracted conflict. Such an approach offers the chance to see how the reaction to the war brings authorities to see displaced people as a static category and reproduces a war-lexicon in policies, which fractures the space of everyday life. Drawing upon qualitative research on IDPs, the civil society, international organizations, and public officials in Ukraine, the article concludes that intersections of gender and older age with displacement, and the lack of state recognition of these differing groups of IDPs, together with the lack of the economic resources for social policy, produces multiple forms of social exclusion.

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the collapse of communism has led to an unleashing of ethnic strife and a worsening of the economic conditions of the Roma, who by any measurement occupy the lowest rung of the social ladder. In the former Yugoslavia, the situation has been aggravated enormously by war, rampant nationalism, forced emigration, ethnic cleansing, and economic sanctions. The nearly four-year war in the region took a heavy toll on all the successor states except Slovenia.

The Setus are an ethnic group, small in numbers, in the southeastern part of the Republic of Estonia and the Russian territories bordering on Estonia (Petseri raion of the Pskov oblast). The Setus can be seen as ethnographic raw material that both Estonian and Russian nationalists have attempted to claim. Generally, the Setus has been viewed as an ethnographic subgroup of Estonians and their language as part of the South Estonian dialect. Unlike the Estonians, who are predominantly Lutheran by tradition, the Setus are Orthodox. The specific characteristics of the Setus have emerged as a result of the combined influence of religious and linguistic peculiarities and a historic fate that is different from the Estonian. Because of the fact that they were considered Estonians when the censuses took place, the exact number of the Setus is unknown; however, I estimate the number of the Setus living in Setumaa and in Estonian towns to be about 5,000–6,000.

Nineteen eighty-nine appeared to be an annus mirabilis in Soviet language policy; during that year, nine of fifteen Soviet republics adopted laws that championed the language of the titular nationality. Among these was Kyrgyzstan, a small Central Asian republic where Russian had increasingly marginalized the language of the Kyrgyz.

One of the most important characteristics of the newly independent republic of Kazakstan is the multinational nature of its population. In addition to the members of the titular Kazak nationality, numerous Slavic, Turkic, and other peoples have made, or have been forced to make, Kazakstan their home. Most of these peoples, with the exception of the Kazaks, could be characterized as diasporas. However, the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim people living in Kazakstan, are not a standard example of a diaspora. Unlike many of Kazakstan's diasporic communities, such as the Russians, Koreans, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Germans, who can rely on outside support from recognized nation states to protect their rights, the Uighurs are a stateless people whose claims to sovereignty are not internationally recognized. Furthermore, unlike other stateless diasporas in Kazakstan, such as the Tatars, the Chechens, and the Mesketian TurksM whose homelands are clearly located outside of Kazakstan, the Uighurs’ “homeland” in China's Xinjiang province borders on the former Soviet republic, which raises the question of whether or not many Uighurs are indigenous to the territory of Kazakstan.

The Moscow Teatr “Romen,” dating back to 1931, is famous throughout the Soviet Union, and its performers have been some of the country's best-known. The Teatr “Romen” connects Roma from all over the country, and many who work there are related; three generations of a family may appear on the stage at one time. These families, along with Roma working as professionals, make up an lite within the Romani community in Moscow. They are the most outwardly assimilated (wearing European dress, etc.), most fluent and literate in Russian as well as Romani. These families usually move in different spheres than do Roma who live in villages around Moscow and work in cooperatives or as independent merchants, although extended family networks may include Roma of all spheres. Most studies of Gypsies (including those of non-Roma, such as Irish Travellers in the United Kingdom) assume a certain homogeneity of culture and of class:

The Teatr “Romen” is a case that demands such acknowledgment. Yet, in a sense, these élite performers are doubly marginal, both as performers and as ethnic outsiders who “threaten the rhetoric and narratives of nationalism.” Currently in the USSR, such narratives are in flux, as many national minorities demand greater cultural and political autonomy. Roma, however, are not demanding their own republic, and requests for schools and radio shows are often tempered by the assertion that, “this country has been kind to Gypsies.” Roma élites are also in a peculiar position: charged with representing Roma to outsiders, they are also concerned about maintaining the integrity of the urban community as Roma. Because of this, they must negotiate the interstitial area between cultures.

This article examines the reverberations in Russia of the Euromaidan protests and the fall of the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. It shows how the events in Kyiv provoked a major crisis in the Russian nationalist movement, which was riven by vituperative denunciations, the ostracism of prominent activists, the breakdown of friendships, the rupture of alliances, and schisms within organizations. Focusing on pro-Kremlin nationalists and several tendencies of opposition nationalists, it argues that this turmoil was shaped by three factors. First, the Euromaidan provoked clashes between pro-Kremlin nationalists, who became standard-bearers of official anti-Euromaidan propaganda, and anti-Putin nationalists, who extolled the Euromaidan as a model for a revolution in Russia itself. Second, the events in Ukraine provoked ideological contention around issues of particular sensitivity to Russian nationalists, such as the competing claims of imperialism and ethnic homogeneity, and of Soviet nationalism and Russian traditionalism. And third, many nationalists were unprepared for the pace of events, which shifted rapidly from an anti-oligarchic uprising in Kyiv to a push for the self-determination of ethnic Russians in Crimean and southeast Ukraine. As a result, they were left in the uncomfortable position of appearing to collaborate with the oppressors of their compatriots.

In 1991 the ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking communities, who had migrated to and been resident in the non-Russian regions of both the tsarist empire and Soviet Union, found themselves located beyond the borders of the newly independent Russian Federation. Despite an absence of actual, physical movement, the communities experienced a form of stationary or figurative displacement as the Soviet Union broke up and political borders demarcating their homelands moved over them. This displacement was furthered in subsequent years due to the nature and security of the environment where they lived and their often secure sense of ethnocultural and socio-economic identity being challenged through processes of political and economic transformation and increased levels of instability and uncertainty. This article focuses on members of those Russian communities who are living in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Through an analysis of narratives of their everyday lives it explores how they perceive and understand the “displacement” which has occurred, and how they are responding and actively renegotiating relationships with both their physical homeland—Uzbekistan—and their “historical” homeland—Russia. Furthermore, the article assesses how through these processes of displacement and renegotiation they are reshaping their own identities in the post-Soviet period.

Politics in Hungary since 1989 has been focusing on nation-building. Each government has had a license to articulate what it is to be Hungarian, in the public realm with public funds. While current political debates are heated and focus yet again on defining Hungarian national identity, this article takes a distance from contemporary politics. It studies a situation ten years earlier, when the current government party Fidesz -which took a landslide victory in the 2010 general elections after eight years of socialist-liberal government - was in office for the first time from 1998 to 2002. Exploring the debate from the perspective of architecture, it reveals how Fidesz sought to mark their space and express their sense of nationhood in Budapest around the millennium. Beside publicly sponsored institutions and commemoration, architectural forms became contested as they were used to express nationality. The National Theatre, Millennium Park and House of Terror Museum, each broke with the urban flow in the left-leaning metropolis while representing the Fidesz discourse on Hungary. The article, besides analyzing postcommunist nation-building, reflects on the interconnection between architecture, politics and memory in an urban symbolic landscape. It discusses how myths of nationhood can be represented in the cityscape.

The year 1995 was momentous for the Gagauz people located primarily in the towns and villages of southern Moldova in the area known as Gagauzia. The Gagauz leadership in Comrat and the Moldovan government in Chişinău reached agreement in December 1994 on autonomy for Gagauzia, ending a five-year secessionist movement involving both a war of words and sporadic conflict. For Chişinău, this agreement settled the lesser, but nonetheless important, of two secessionist movements that threatened the Moldovan state's viability. For Gagauzia, the agreement set the terms for extensive cultural, political, and social autonomy within Moldova. For Europe, this agreement broke new ground in granting a small nation control of its affairs within a larger state.

The Belgrade-based activist group Women in Black has been for twenty years now articulating a feminist anti-war stance in an inimical socio-political climate. The operation of this anti-patriarchal and anti-militarist organization, which has resisted numerous instances of repression, has not been until now systematically approached from a social movement perspective. This paper draws upon a range of empirical methods, comprising life-story interviews, documentary analysis and participant observation, to address the question as to how it was possible for this small circle of activists to remain on the Serbian/post-Yugoslav civic scene for the last two decades. My central argument is that a consistent collective identity, which informs the group's resource mobilization and strategic options, holds the key to the surprising survival of this activist organization. I apply recent theoretical advances on collective identity to the case of the Belgrade Women in Black with the view of promoting a potentially fruitful cross-fertilization between non-Western activism and the Western conceptual apparatus for studying civic engagement.

The drastic changes in the Balkans in the 1990s and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in particular have resulted in a large number of publications attempting to explain the break-up of this country and the political developments in the Balkans. Some of these publications deal partly with the local Muslims who were engaged in the Balkan conflicts but, with some exceptions, they are focused mainly on recent developments, with less attention paid to the historical contexts in which the Muslim nationalist movements were shaped.