Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T14:07:59.315Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Yugoslavs into Serbs: Serbian National Identity, 1961–1971*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Audrey Helfant Budding
Audrey Helfant Budding*
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In an essay published in September 1962, poet Pavle Stefanovic announced that in the next census he would identify himself as a Yugoslav rather than a Serb. Writing down “Serb” on official forms, Stefanovic said, had always made the sweat break out on his forehead, plunging him into “the nightmarish vision of an individual identity imposed upon me rather than chosen by my own will, one which fills me with polar opposites: pride and shame … a feeling of innocence and of culpability.” Mixed with his pride in parts of his Serbian heritage, he explained, was horror at the atrocities committed in the name of Serbdom by the Chetniks, the Serbian monarchist forces of the Second World War. Stefanovic emphasized that he was not rejecting Serbian identity because he thought the Serbian past was worse than others. Rather, he wished to throw off the symbolic weight attached to all national pasts. By declaring himself a Yugoslav, he thought, he could show that he considered nationality merely “a sort of historic-genetic address, a fact about one's origin,” and not a primary or sacred identity. In his eyes, choosing the Yugoslav identity meant asserting his own free will against the unchosen national collective, expressing his commitment to internationalism, and separating the future from a nightmare-ridden past.

Type
Part I: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavism
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 25 , Issue 3: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Inevitable or Avoidable? , September 1997 , pp. 407 - 426
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Pavle Stefanovic, “Narodnost i nacionalizam,” Književne novine, 1 September 1962, pp. 1–2. Stefanović (b. 1901) had joined Književne novine's editorial board in 1961. In his attempt to make Yugoslavism a wall against the past, Stefanovic was drawing on an important current in Yugoslav thought. Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919–1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 181–187, offers a persuasive interpretation of Yugoslavism as a failed attempt to ignore the past, an Enlightenment-grounded denial of the force of history.Google Scholar

2. Cf. Janko Pleterski, Nacije—Jugoslavija—revolucija (Belgrade: Komunist, 1985), pp. 506–508.Google Scholar

3. Late- and post-Yugoslav patterns are examined in Aleksandar Pavkovic, “The Serb National Idea: a Revival 1986–92,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 440–455.Google Scholar

4. See Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 211, for the constitutional debate and its place in the broader debate over “Yugoslavism.”Google Scholar

5. For the history of the Yugoslav idea, see Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Wolf Dietrich Behschnitt, Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1980); and Djilas, Contested Country, Chapter 1. For the development of “socialist Yugoslavism,” see Shoup's Communism, pp. 184–205; and Djilas, Contested Country, pp. 177–180.Google Scholar

6. From Chapter Eight of the Program, in Manifest Komunisticke Partije i Program Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (Split: Vojna Stamparija, n.d.), pp. 256–257. The Program here echoed the doctrine set out one year earlier by Yugoslavia's leading ideologist, the Slovene Edvard Kardelj, in the introduction to the revised edition of his Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprasanja (Ljubljana: Drzavna zalozba Slovenije, 1957), pp. lxiv–lxv.Google Scholar

7. For interwar unitarism see Banac, National Question, especially pp. 202–214; and Djilas, Contested Country, Chapters 2 and 3. It should be noted that, although centralist rule prevailed from the early 1920s, the doctrine of a Yugoslav nation was not officially adopted until 1929 (Djilas, Contested Country, p. 61).Google Scholar

8. Drago Roksandić, “Nationale Konflikte in Titos Jugoslawien—ein Tabu?” in Peter Bettelheim and Robert Streiberl, eds, Tabu und Geschichte: zur Kultur des kollektiven Erinnerns (Vienna: Picus, 1994), p. 116.Google Scholar

9. The polemic, which began with an interview Ćosić gave to the Zagreb Telegram on 20 January 1961, was conducted through the pages of Nasa sodobnost [Ljubljana] and Delo [Belgrade] between March 1961 and May 1962. (Pirjevec's texts appeared in Slovene in Nasa sodobnost and in translation in Delo, which also published Cosic's texts. When quoting Pirjevec I have cited the Delo articles, to which Ćosić always made reference.) For the polemic and its political context see Shoup, Communism, pp. 196–198; Dimitrij Rupel, Slovenski intelektualci: od vojaške do civilne družbe (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1989), Chapter 3; and Ratko Pekovic, Ni rat ni mir: panorama književnih polemika 1945–1965 (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1986), pp. 301–303. Ćosić's own later account of the polemic appears in Slavoljub Dukic, Covek u svom vremenu: razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosićem (Belgrade: Filip Visnjic, 1989), pp. 122–137.Google Scholar

10. Pirjevec's claim—in “Odgovori Dobrici Ćosiću,” Delo, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1962, pp. 544–545—that his and Ćosić's definitions of “socialist integration” were almost identical is more convincing than Ćosić's denial (in “Čitaocima,” Delo, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 1962, pp. 645–648). The phrase “a social and not a national category” occurs in Cosic, “O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu” [originally published in Delo, Vol. 7, No. 12, December 1961] reprinted in Akcija (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1964), p. 231. See also p. 224 of that text.Google Scholar

11. Pirjevec, “Slovenstvo, jugoslovenstvo i socijalizam,” Delo, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1962, p. 28. For Ćosić's phrase, see “O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu,” p. 225.Google Scholar

12. Pirjevec, “Slovenstvo, jugoslovenstvo i socijalizam,” p. 27.Google Scholar

13. See Pirjevec, “Oprostite, kako ste rekli?,” Nasa sodobnost, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1961, p. 287; and Cosic, “O savremenom nesavremenom nacionalizmu,” passim. Google Scholar

14. To some extent, Cosic and Pirjevec served as proxies for Party leaders, whose disputes were at this time conducted less publicly. Cosic has asserted that he took up the cudgels against Pirjevec only at the request of leading figures in the Serbian Party, and even Tito himself (Dukic, Covek, pp. 125–126). And, some of Pirjevec's contemporaries reported that his texts bore corrections by a top Slovene official, Boris Kraigher (Rupel, Slovenski intelektualci, p. 103).Google Scholar

15. See Dusan Bilandzic, Historija Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Glavni procesi 1918–1985 (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1985), pp. 260–265; and Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948–1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), Chapters 3 and 4, passim. Google Scholar

16. While a definitive evaluation must wait until all the relevant archives are open, it should be noted that serious doubt has been cast on some of these charges, particularly the claim that Rankovic acted in opposition to Tito (and bugged his residence). When the taboo on discussing the Brioni Plenum crumbled in the late 1980s, politicians who had known Rankovic portrayed him as an old-style Communist, deeply suspicious of decentralisation and democratisation, but also unswervingly loyal to Tito—essentially, a powerful apparatchik. (Cf. Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 156–158.) For instance, Latinka Perovic has stated that Rankovic had “no independent [political] role” (Latinka Perovic, Interview with the author, Belgrade, 2 June 1994). For a spectrum of views on Rankovic by participants at Brioni, see Aleksandar Nenadovic, Razgovori s Kocem, 3rd expanded edition (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), pp. 140–142 (for Koca Popovic); Jovan Kesar and Pero Simic, Oproštaj bez milosti (Belgrade: Akvarijus, 1990), pp. 178–185 (for Krste Crvenkovski); and Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljece (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), pp. 69–81. See also memoirs by some of the security officials purged along with Rankovic, e.g., Vojin Lukic, Brionski plenum: obracun sa Aleksandrom Rankovićem—sećanje i saznanja (Belgrade: Strucna knjiga, 1990).Google Scholar

17. Šesta sednica CK SK Srbije: Septembar, 1966 (Belgrade: Sedma sila, 1966), pp. 63 and 322.Google Scholar

18. Stipe Šuvar, “Unitarizam i nacionalizam u suvremenoj jugoslavenskoj stvarnosti [first published 1972],” in Nacionalno: nacionalisticko: eseji i polemicki prilozi (Split: Marksisticki centar, 1974), p. 160. Cf. Jovan Raicevic, “O centralizmu i decentralizmu, jugoslovenstvu i nacionalizmu,” Socijalizam, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1966, pp. 450–453. For the usage of “integral Yugoslavism,” see Kardelj, Razvoj, lxiv; and Raicevic, “O centralizmu,” p. 451.Google Scholar

19. In addition to Suvar's “Unitarizam,” see his Nacije i medunacionalni odnosi u socijalistickoj Jugoslaviji (Zagreb: Nase teme, 1970), pp. 97–107.Google Scholar

20. For an opposing view, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 50–54.Google Scholar

21. Cf. Paul Shoup's argument that the political constellation of the 1960s forced the Party into “sacrificing the Yugoslav idea for the sake of maintaining its multinational character… [against] real and imagined threats of Serbian dominance” (Shoup, Communism, p. 263).Google Scholar

22. For democratization, see April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

23. In the early 1960s Party practice was ambiguous, especially because Tito sometimes encouraged the Yugoslav choice. See Shoup, Communism, p. 224.Google Scholar

24. NIN 20 July-7 September 1969. Cf. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, p. 52.Google Scholar

25. Vukać, “Informacija o anketi NIN-a: Jugosloven—ko je to?—objavljenoj u 1969. godini [Belgrade, November 1970],” p. 14. This report (one of a set of documents prepared for a commission of the LCY Presidency) is held at the Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, in the file, “Analize nekih istraživanja i pisanja štampe o mežunacionalnom odnosima (B II 5/f, 1971).”Google Scholar

26. One extreme example was a Montenegrin high school student whose views NIN printed under the disclaimer “Confusion of a student” (NIN, 20 July 1969). See also various responses in the issue of 10 August.Google Scholar

27. NIN, 20 and 27 July 1969.Google Scholar

28. NIN, 27 July 1969.Google Scholar

29. NIN, 27 July 1969, cited in Stambolic, “Informacija o anketi NIN-a,” p. 3.Google Scholar

30. Stambolic, “Informacija o anketi NIN-a,” p. 12.Google Scholar

31. NIN, 2 November 1969. See also “Jugoslovenstvo ili antijugoslovenstvo,” in NIN, 7 September 1969.Google Scholar

32. For a similar controversy involving the League of Youth of Yugoslavia, see Delo [Ljubljana], 16 May 1967.Google Scholar

33. Dennison Rusinow, “Yugoslavia's Muslim Nation,” American Universities Field Staff International Reports, No. 8, 1982, p. 5.Google Scholar

34. For the liberals’ rise and fall, see Slavoljub Dukic, Slom srpskih liberala: tehnologija politickih obracuna Josipa Broza (Belgrade: Filip Visnjic, 1990); and Latinka Perovic, Zatvaranje kruga: ishod politickog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972 (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991).Google Scholar

35. For statements of the liberal position on this issue, see Nikezic, “Srbija v socialisticni skupnosti jugoslovanskih narodov in narodnosti,” Teorija in praksa, Vol. 7, No. 12, 1970, pp. 1694–1696; and Perovic, “Medunacionalni odnosi u Srbiji i idejnopoliticka uloga Saveza komunista,” in Medunacionalni odnosi i Savez komunista Srbije (Belgrade: Institut za politicke studije FPN, 1969). See also the brief but valuable discussion of Serbian liberalism in Bozo Repe, “‘Liberalizem’ v Sloveniji,” Borec, Vol. 44, 1992, pp. 920–925; and (for the “ballast of Yugoslavism”) Slavoljub Dukic, Slom srpskih liberala, p. 25.Google Scholar

36. The liberals’ faith in economic modernisation as a solution to national problems was particularly evident in their approach to Kosovo. See Perovic, “Medunacionalni odnosi,” p. 127; Nikezic in Politika, 8 February 1969; and Dukic, Slom srpskih liberala, pp. 131–132.Google Scholar

37. Perovic in Politika, 30 October 1971.Google Scholar

38. Politika, 5 October 1969. Compare the language of a resolution adopted by the LCY Presidency in April 1970, which called the federation a mere “institutionalized agreement … among the republics.” Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, p. 279.Google Scholar

39. Perovic in Politika, 6 December 1971 (just after the Karadordevo meeting where Tito brought down the Croatian leaders).Google Scholar

40. See statements by Nikezić (Borba, 12 March 1971) and Perovic (Borba, 11 September 1969). See also Perovic, Zatvaranje, p. 65 and 110, and Dukic, Slom srpskih liberala, pp. 212 and 240–245. For the economic effects of centralism, see Perovic, “Medunacionalni odnosi u Srbiji,” p. 126.Google Scholar

41. According to Bilandžić (Historija, p. 426), the Serbian leadership accepted decentralizing proposals in 1970, and radicalized them in 1971. The liberals’ most important speeches in support of the amendments of 1971 are collected in Ustavne promene (Belgrade: Republicki sekretarijat za informacije, 1971).Google Scholar

42. Nikezić in Politika, 13 December 1970.Google Scholar

43. The liberals frequently invoked the legacy of nineteenth-century Serbian socialist Svetozar Markovic, who had insisted that Serbs could benefit only from the creation of a democratic socialist society, and not from expansion of the Serbian state. See Nikezic in Politika, 16 May 1971; Perović in Politika, 30 October 1971; and Perovic, “Medunacionalni odnosi,” p. 125.Google Scholar

44. Nikezić, “Srbija v socialistični skupnosti,” p. 1695. The thesis that Serbs’ dispersal gave them a special interest in national equality was widespread. Cf. Pleterski, Nacije—Jugoslavija—revolucija, Conclusion.Google Scholar

45. For the Declaration and its context, see Ante Cuvalo, The Croatian National Movement 1966–1972 (New York: East European Monographs, 1990), pp. 59–64.Google Scholar

46. See “Rodu o jeziku,” (Književne novine, 1 April 1967, pp. 10–11 and 15 April 1967, pp. 11 and 14); Borba, 22 April 1967; and (for the Proposal's text) Borba, 2 April 1967. English translations of the full texts of both the Declaration and the Proposal appear in Christopher Spalatin, “Serbo-Croatian or Serbian and Croatian? Considerations on the Croatian Declaration and the Serbian Proposal of March 1967,” Journal of Croatian Studies, vol. 7–8, 1966–1967, pp. 3–13.Google Scholar

47. Književne novine, 15 April 1967 and Borba, 2 April 1967.Google Scholar

48. Borba, 2 April 1967. Cf. Paul Shoup, who calls the Proposal's renunciation of Novi Sad “heavy irony” (Shoup, Communism, p. 215). Although most of the Proposal's signers undoubtedly supported the Novi Sad settlement, the available evidence suggests that the Proposal was not an attempt to ridicule the Declaration, but rather a serious response to the mistaken assumption that the Declaration's appearance meant the Party had given up on Novi Sad. Isakovic's and Mihiz's speeches revealed no ironical intention and another signer, poet Aleksandar Petrov, would later say that the Proposal represented “not sarcasm, but a response to pressure” (Petrov, Interview with the Author, Belgrade, 23 June 1994).Google Scholar

49. Isaković, “Zašto sam potpisao Predlog za razmišljanje [a speech delivered on 31 March 1967]” in Antonije Isaković, Govori i razgovori (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1990), p. 18.Google Scholar

50. Zoran Gavrilović's speech of 2 April, printed in “Rodu o jeziku,” Književne novine, 15 April 1967, p. 11.Google Scholar

51. “Čitaocima i prijateljima “Književnih novina,”’ Književne novine, 21 December 1968, p. 1.Google Scholar

52. The letter, published in Književne novine, 4 January 1969, p. 2, was signed by Jovan Aranđelović, Veljko Korać, Aleksandar Kron, Aleksandra Marjanovic, Mihailo Markovic, Vojin Milić, Dragoljub Mičunović, Zagorka Pešić-Golubović, Nikola Potkonjak, Svetozar Stojanović, Ljubomir Tadić and Miladin Životić. (Tadić's name was inadvertantly omitted, but the mistake was corrected in Književne novine, 18 January 1969.) Historian Milorad Ekmečić sent a similar letter (Književne novine, 18 January 1969).Google Scholar

53. “Šta se dešava u Književnim novinama,” Književne novine, 13 September 1969, pp. 13–15. Literary critic Jovan Skerlic, one of the most influential figures in Serbian intellectual life of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had suggested that Serbs and Croats should compromise their linguistic differences by adopting the ekavian dialect written in Latin script. In the 1960s, this practice was, in fact, widespread in federal documents and in Belgrade publishing generally. See Ivo Banac, “Main trends in the Croat language question,” in Aspects of the Slavic Language Question (New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 1984), pp. I: 241–248.Google Scholar

54. After Književne novine changed its alphabet, Latinka Perovic stated that while no one would have objected if the journal had appeared in Cyrillic all along, the timing of the decision was suspicious: “in such an atmosphere, every gesture has political meaning.” Perovic, “Medunacionalni odnosi,” p. 126.Google Scholar

55. Đukić, Slom srpskih liberala, pp. 133–147, describes the liberals’ uneasy relation with opposition intellectuals.Google Scholar

56. 14. sednica CK SK Srbije. Maj 1968. Savez komunista u borbi za nacionalnu ravnopravnost (Belgrade: Komunist, 1968), pp. 100–116 and 297–300. Cf. Othmar Haberl, Parteiorganisation und Nationale Frage in Jugoslawien (Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1976), pp. 62–65.Google Scholar

57. Much later, Ćosić would assert that the Albanian question was “particular and incidental” to his speech. His basic message, he said, was “If the national question becomes a state question, if national ideology is regarded as identical with state ideology, that will be the end of Yugoslavia” (Dobrica Cosic, Interview with the Author, Belgrade, 5 July 1994).Google Scholar

58. 14. sednica, pp. 108–109.Google Scholar

59. 14. sednica, p. 111.Google Scholar

60. 14. sednica, pp. 314–315. The Central Committee statement also condemned the speech of historian Jovan Marjanovic, which was a striking example of what one might call “persistent Yugoslavism” among Serbs. Marjanovic contended that as the Party federalised it was losing its internationalist stance and, most provocatively, attacked as “senseless” the recent proclamation of a Muslim nation (14. sednica, pp. 89–100 and 226–231).Google Scholar

In a 1989 interview, Cosic stated that he resigned from the Party soon after the Plenum because he found listening devices in his home. Đukić, Ćovek, pp. 196–197.Google Scholar

61. For Ćosić's election (as a member of the single slate nominated by the outgoing board), see Srpska knjizevna zadruga Archives, Folder: Skupstine, 1966–1969, “Stenografske beleske sezdeset i druge redovne godisnje skupstine Srpske knjizevne zadruge, odrzane 31. marta 1969. godine u Beogradu,” pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

62. The Zadruga's history from 1892 to 1992 is the subject of an excellent monograph: Ljubinka Trgovčević, Istorija Srpske književne zadruge (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1992). The pre-Yugoslav period is covered in pp. 7–46.Google Scholar

63. Ćosić called the Zadruga the “first pluralist forum in Serbian society after the war.” Đukić, Čovek, p. 211.Google Scholar

64. Economist Kosta Mihailović, historian Radovan Samardžić, linguist Pavle Ivić, and philosopher Mihailo Marković—all members of the commission that drafted the Memorandum—came onto the Zadruga board in May of 1971. “64. godisnja skupstina Srpske knjizevne zadruge,” Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge, Vol. 26, No. 5, 20 June 1971, p. 31.Google Scholar

65. For these attacks, and the complicated relations between the liberals and the Zadruga, see Đukić, Čovek, pp. 212–222; and Slom srpskih liberala, pp. 97–98, 140–141, and 191–199. Cf. Trgovčević, Istorija Srpske književne zadruge, pp. 274–279.Google Scholar

66. Minutes of the 3rd Extraordinary Parliament, in SKZ Archives, Folder: Skupstine, “Stenografske beleske III vanredne skupstine Srpske književne zadruge, održane 11.1.1973. godine,” p. 12. These figures refer to “regular” or voting members, who had a voice in the Zadruga's cooperative governance.Google Scholar

67. For the banning of Praxis philosopher Mihailo Markovic's Preispitivanja, see Gerson S. Sher, Praxis: Marxist criticism and dissent in socialist Yugoslavia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 227. For the controversy over linguist Pavle Ivic's Srpski narod i njegov jezik, see Vjesnik, 23 June and 1 July 1972.Google Scholar

68. See especially Ćosić's speech at the Zadruga's 64th Annual Convention in May of 1971 (Glasnik Srpske književne zadruge, Vol. 26, No. 5, 20 June 1971, pp. 4–9), reprinted as “Porazi i ciljevi” in Cosic, Stvarno i moguce (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva zalozba, 1988), pp. 85–95.Google Scholar

69. Speech of Milos Vujakovic (Kosovska Mitrovica) at the 41st Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Aktivnost Saveza komunista Srbije u borbi protiv nacionalizma i šovinizma u SR Srbiji (Belgrade: Komunist, 1972), pp. 37–41.Google Scholar

70. Cf. Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 209–211; and Haberl, Parteiorganisation, pp. 139–142.Google Scholar

71. The Law Faculty discussion was printed in Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, Vol. 19, No. 3, May-June 1971, pp. 207–359. (This issue was banned, but later reissued in facsimile.) The words cited are those of Mihailo Đurić (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 232) and Radoslav Stojanovic (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 263).Google Scholar

72. Đurić's speech appears in Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 230–233, and his rejoinder to his critics in Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 344–345.Google Scholar

73. Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 232.Google Scholar

74. Đurić was sentenced to two years in prison, a sentence reduced on appeal to nine months. Rajko Danilovic, Upotreba neprijatelja: politicka sudenja 1945–1991 u Jugoslaviji (Valjevo: Agencija Valjevac, 1993), pp. 182–184.Google Scholar

75. Budimir Kosutic, Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 301–302. Similarly, during the Law Faculty debates over the 1968 amendments, Stevan Dordevic had argued that the territorial structure of the Council of Nations belied its national premise: in the interests of accuracy, it ought to be renamed the “Council of Republics and Provinces” (Anali, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 493).Google Scholar

76. See the speeches of Pavle Ristic (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 219); Andrija Gams (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 239); and Zivomir Dordevic (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 249–251).Google Scholar

77. Ustavne promene: sestnaesta sednica Predsedništva SKJ (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971), p. 29.Google Scholar

78. The word odnosno indicates that the objects mentioned are (in the present context) equivalent. For instance, Amendment 35 of the 1971 package stated: “The President and Vice-President of the Presidency cannot be from the same republic or [odnosno] the same autonomous province,” Ustavne promene: sestnaesta sednica, p. 254. (If Kardelj had used the word odnosno in its other sense, to correct a misstatement, it would presumably have been edited out before his speech was published.)Google Scholar

79. Stipe Suvar, explaining why in 1964 the term “nationality” (narodnost) replaced “national minority” as the official designation for those inhabitants of Yugoslavia whose matrix-states lay elsewhere (Suvar, Nacije i medunacionalni odnosi, p. 120). Cf. Sabrina Ramet's persuasive argument that the Titoist refusal to acknowledge the existence of minorities laid the basis for the theoretically limitless secessionist movements of the post-Yugoslav era. Ramet, “Introduction: the Roots of Discord and the Language of War,” in Ramet and Ljubisa Adamovich, eds, Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

80. These citations are from the speeches of Pavle Ristic (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 220); Radovan Pavičević (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 282); Budimir Košutić (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 300); and Stevan Vrazar (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 334). See also the speeches of Andrija Gams (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 234); and Aleksandar Ivić (Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, p. 287).Google Scholar

81. Đorđević had played an important role in drafting the amendments: see Burg, Conflict and Cohesion, pp. 211–214.Google Scholar

82. Anali, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 210–211.Google Scholar

83. Cf. Dennison Rusinow's compelling argument in “The Avoidable Catastrophe,” in Ramet and Adamovich, eds, Beyond Yugoslavia, pp. 13–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84. The phrase is Benedict Anderson's description of “official nationalisms” such as Tsarist Russification. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism [revised edition] (London and New York: Verso Press, 1991), p. 86.Google Scholar

85. Cf. Ivo Banac's assertion that “… postwar Yugoslavia is itself the product of Communist rule. In Yugoslavia, post-Communism also means post-Yugoslavism,” in “Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of 1989–1990,” in Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 186.Google Scholar

86. This Realpolitik argument is essentially the same one that Slobodan Jovanovic offered in his 1939 speech “Jugoslovenska misao u sadasnjosti i buducnosti” as a substitute for the failed Yugoslav national idea. Aleksandar Pavkovic, Slobodan Jovanovic: an Unsentimental Approach to Politics (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1993), pp. 201–204, analyses this speech from a post-Yugoslav perspective. An interesting development of the same idea in the Communist period is seen in the thesis that the formation of the Yugoslav state was not a late example of national unification, but rather an early example of anti-colonialism (Raicevic, “O centralizmu,” p. 451).Google Scholar

87. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1.Google Scholar

88. For an analysis of the Milosevic phenomenon informed by the liberals’ concept of Serbian modernization, see Latinka Perovic, “Beg od modernizacije,” Republika, Vol. 7, No. 112, 16–31 March 1995, pp. I-XVI.Google Scholar