Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
The Eurasianist ideology is coming back on the Russian political and intellectual scene but also among the Turkic and Muslim elites in the Russian Federation and in Kazakhstan. The political, economic, social and identity difficulties of the transition invite Russians and other post-Soviet citizens to think about their relations with Europe and about the relevance of taking the West as a model. In this context of destabilization, Eurasianism proposes a geopolitical solution for the post-Soviet space. It presupposes the existence of a third continent between East and West, called “Eurasia,” and supports the idea of an organic unity of cultures born in this zone of symbiosis between Russian, Turkic, Muslim and even Chinese worlds. Neo-Eurasianism is the main ideology born among the different Russian conservative movements in the 1990s. Its theories are very little known, but the idea of an entity called Eurasia, regrouping the center of the old continent in which Russia would be “at home,” is more and more rife. It attracted many intellectuals and politicians in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Eurasianism was a way to explain the “disaster.”
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63. The first Eurasianist theoreticians believed in the Jews’ Eurasian nature. According to them, the Jews were not a European or Middle-Eastern people but a Eurasian one. The history of the Khazar khanate, based in the steppe in the eighth-tenth centuries symbolized the Eurasian destiny of the Jews. The Eurasianist movement stressed the Jews’ religious nature and the Russians’ and expected a fusion of Judaism into Orthodoxy.Google Scholar
64. All the Eurasianists who returned to the Soviet Union died during the massive purges at the end of the 1930s; P. N. Savicky, who stayed in Prague, was sent to the Stalinian Gulag from 1945 to 1956 and then to Czechoslovakian Communist prisons; the philosopher L. P. Karsavin, professor in Kaunas, was arrested during the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states; Prince N. S. Troubetzkoy was affected by Nazi pressures on Vienna University and died in 1938 after a Gestapo search in his flat.Google Scholar