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The “Mortar Massacres”: A Controversy Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Benjamin Rusek  and
Charles Ingrao
Benjamin Rusek
Affiliation:
U.S. National Academy of Sciences with CISAC, The Committee on International Security and Arms Control, [email protected]
Charles Ingrao
Affiliation:
Department of History, Purdue University, [email protected]
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Extract

One of the many controversies that survived the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerns the responsibility for several of the most deadly artillery attacks against civilians during the three-year siege of Sarajevo. Although indiscriminate artillery fire accounted for a small fraction of the total civilian deaths during the war, graphic video footage of the mass slaughter exercised a disproportionate effect on world public opinion and, therefore, on Western policymakers who felt constrained to “do something.” On at least three occasions, individual artillery explosions in the Bosnian capital prompted immediate international intervention that substantially determined the course and resolution of the conflict. The persistence of controversy is informed by a combination of factors, including the substantial consequences of the Western response, the inconclusiveness of some of the forensic data, and the conflicting statements of civilian survivors, journalists, spokesmen for the belligerents, and U.N. officials—all of whom have been accused of some degree of bias by one side or another. Nearly a decade later, testimony and forensic evidence presented at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has shed new light on these incidents, presenting a more comprehensive and authoritative historical baseline account of the “mortar massacres,” much as it has for a plethora of criminal acts committed by all sides during the wars of Yugoslav succession. The Tribunal recently released documentation detailing some of the mortar attacks that occurred in the city of Sarajevo, including forensic reports compiled by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which had not been previously made public. The bulk of this information is contained in the Tribunal Judgment and corresponding Dissenting Opinion of the former commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK), Major General Stanislav Galić. Although the reliability of judicial testimony and other evidence is invariably limited by the abilities and resources of both the prosecution and defense, the trial transcript has cleared away at least some of the fog of war, making it somewhat less difficult to apportion responsibility for the disputed attacks. This article integrates the Galić transcript with earlier, wartime U.N. documentation, press releases, and media reports, supplemented by interviews conducted by the authors with military experts familiar with the characteristics of the weaponry employed by the besiegers. It also endeavors to place the most notorious incidents in the broader context presented by the multiplicity of artillery attacks that took place in urban areas across Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 2004 , pp. 827 - 852
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe 

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References

Notes

1. Case No. IT-98-29-T, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion.” In Trial Chamber I, Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Judge Amin El Mahdi, Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia. Released 5 December 2003.Google Scholar

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10. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 376. “81 mm” refers to the diameter of the mortar shell and barrel. This paper discusses 82- and 120-mm mortar shells, and 130-mm artillery shells. For additional information, see Figures 2 and 3.Google Scholar

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13. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 382.Google Scholar

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26. Ibid., paragraph 345.Google Scholar

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28. Ibid., note 1351.Google Scholar

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31. Ibid., paragraph 404.Google Scholar

32. Ibid., paragraph 406.Google Scholar

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42. Ibid.Google Scholar

43. Gjelten, Professionalism in War Reporting , p. 17.Google Scholar

44. Keith Doubt, Sociology after Bosnia and Kosovo: Recovering Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

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49. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 445–447.Google Scholar

50. This team comprised Major Sahaisar Khan, Commandant John Hamill, and Captain Jose Grande.Google Scholar

51. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 446–449.Google Scholar

52. P2261 (U.N. report).Google Scholar

53. With an absolute minimal angle of 49.15 degrees due to structures blocking lower flight paths.Google Scholar

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55. David Binder, “Anatomy of a Massacre,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 97, 1994–1995, pp. 70–78.Google Scholar

56. Interview with British UNPROFOR Captain Ken Lindsay.Google Scholar

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58. Binder, “Anatomy of a Massacre,” pp. 77–78.Google Scholar

59. In addition, the ongoing Slobodan Milosevic Hague trial is re-examining this incident.Google Scholar

60. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” note 1560.Google Scholar

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62. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 443.Google Scholar

63. Ibid., paragraph 444.Google Scholar

64. Reported by multiple sources to be between 200 and 250 mmGoogle Scholar

65. The fact that the tailfin was present in the crater proves that the shell was moving at a velocity greater than 150 meters per second. See Figure 3.Google Scholar

66. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 481.Google Scholar

67. Ibid., paragraph 459.Google Scholar

68. Ibid., paragraph 454–460.Google Scholar

69. Ibid., paragraph 453.Google Scholar

70. Ibid., paragraph 449.Google Scholar

71. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia,” paragraph 73.Google Scholar

72. Case No. IT-98-29-T. “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia.” In Trial Chamber I, Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Judge Amin El Mahdi, Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia. Released 5 December 2003. Paragraphs 92, 94, 98–101, 488, 493, 495–496.Google Scholar

73. The U.S. Army field manual for artillery states, “It is possible to do the following: verify as confined locations, suspected locations that have been obtained by other means. Confirm the presence of enemy artillery and obtain an approximate direction to it. Detect the presence of new types of enemy weapons, new calibers, or new ammunition manufacturing methods.” This manual ignores the possibility of determining range estimates through post-impact analysis. Although it does state, “often, tail fins are found in the fuze tunnel of the crater,” it does not elaborate on a method for extrapolating range from the tailfin. U.S. Military Field Manual FM 6-50, Appendix J “Crater Analysis and Reporting,” Section J–4.Google Scholar

74. Interview with Bill Stuebner, former advisor to the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and a senior staff member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation, working in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12 December 2003. See Figure 3.Google Scholar

75. Chuck Sudetic, “Bosnia Army Said to Shell Its Own Area,” New York Times , 11 November 1994, p. 10.Google Scholar

76. Mike O'Connor, “Investigation Concludes Bosnian Government Snipers Shot at Civilians,” New York Times , 1 August 1995, p. 6.Google Scholar

77. Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), pp. 377–378.Google Scholar

78. The forensic report has never been released, even at the Galić trial. According to Burg and Shoup, who interviewed a source close to the investigation, the shell was one of five salvoes, the other four had definitely originated from VRS positions, but the origin of the all-important fifth shell that inflicted the casualties could not be ascertained, probably because it had been deflected just before impact. War in Bosnia-Herzegivina , p. 168.Google Scholar

79. Andrei Naryshkin, “Russian Commander Question UN Probe into Sarajevo Attack,” Tass, 3 September 1995.Google Scholar

80. Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), p. 417.Google Scholar

81. Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Munich, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna and London: Lit Verlag, 2003), p. 68; 5 October 2004 interview with the author.Google Scholar

82. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 342.Google Scholar

83. Interview with UNPROFOR Captain Ken Lindsay, who employed parallel logic in giving responsibility for the 5 February 1994 Markale salvo, which he recounted as one of an estimated 600 that fell on Sarajevo that day.Google Scholar