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The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Brenda Shaffer
Brenda Shaffer*
Affiliation:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, U.S.A.
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Extract

Iran is a multi-ethnic society in which approximately 50% of its citizens are of non-Persian origin, yet researchers commonly use the terms Persians and Iranians interchangeably, neglecting the supra-ethnic meaning of the term Iranian for many of the non-Persians in Iran. The largest minority ethnic group in Iran is the Azerbaijanis (comprising approximately a third of the population) and other major groups include the Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen. Iran's ethnic groups are particularly susceptible to external manipulation and considerably subject to influence from events taking place outside its borders, since most of the non-Persians are concentrated in the frontier areas and have ties to co-ethnics in adjoining states, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 28 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 449 - 477
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. There is a considerable lack of consensus regarding the number of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Official Iranian sources tend to deflate the number of Azerbaijanis in order to project a clear Persian majority in Iran, whereas Azerbaijani political groups, especially in the Republic of Azerbaijan, tend to inflate the numbers in order to project the image of a large people and reinforce their claims for Azerbaijani rights in Iran. Most mainstream estimates on the number of ethnic minorities in Iran claim that the Persians account for approximately 50% of the country's population. Most conventional estimates on Azerbaijani population range from one-fifth to one-third. Azerbaijani groups in Iran have published higher estimates of the number of Azerbaijanis living in Iran. Azerbaijan student groups in Iran claim that there are 27 million Azerbaijanis residing in Iran. The editor of Varliq, Javad Heyat claims that one-third of Iran's populace is Turkic. Taking into account the significant Azerbaijani population that lives outside the Azerbaijani provinces, especially in Tehran, as well as the tribal Turkic population, it seems that the Azerbaijanis comprise between one-third and one-fourth of the population of Iran, or approximately 20 million. This estimate is reinforced by the fact that most pre-Pahlavi surveys that related to the ethnic makeup of Iran estimated that the Turkic groups comprised at least one-third of Iran's population.Google Scholar

2. In referring to the Azerbaijanis and in self-reference, there is great diversity in the terms used. Among the terms in use are Azerbaijani, Azeri, Turk, and Azerbaijani Turk. The term Azerbaijani has been chosen for use in this article. Azerbaijani is the most widely used name in use by the Azerbaijanis themselves in self-reference, especially in their written sources. When used by them the choice is usually neutral and rarely implies additional meaning as a reflection of an identity choice. Rather, it is generally a result of custom. For instance, many Azerbaijanis in Iran refer to themselves as Turks, but they do not imply in using this term a greater Turkic identity than that of the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan, where the term is in less common use.Google Scholar

3. Patricia J. Higgins, “Minority—State Relations in Contemporary Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 37–71; Hooshang Amirahmadi, “A Theory of Ethnic Collective Movements and its Application to Iran,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 10, 1987, pp. 363–391; Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran (London: British Academic Press, 1993), p. 182.Google Scholar

4. A major source of this article is interviews conducted with Azerbaijanis from Iran. One of the chief methodological problems with interviews is that open field research cannot be conducted in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Interviewees in Iran, when access to them is allowed, cannot be expected to speak freely on opinions that contradict the prevailing ideology of the regime. Moreover, researchers from many countries are not allowed to enter Iran or conduct surveys there. Thus, most interviews connected to attitudes in Iran had to be conducted with Azerbaijanis who are not residents of the country, and all were conducted outside of Iran. Many of the interviewees were students temporarily living outside Iran, who have not made the decision to leave Iran permanently. Many of the students frequently visit Iran and most of them have close family members there. Moreover, the sample of interviewees used in this research is composed of almost 80 subjects and includes members of various age groups and political orientations. In the interviews an attempt was made to concentrate on concrete facts, such as what was written on a banner, what took place at a demonstration, the country of origin of television broadcasts frequently watched, etc., and less on attitudes. Most of the interviewees from Iran specified that their names could not be mentioned in this study, due to fear of reprisals toward them or towards family members in Iran.Google Scholar

5. For a comprehensive review of Soviet attempts to foster Azerbaijani ethnic sentiments in Iran, sec David Nissman, The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Uses of Nationalism for Political Penetration (Boulder: Westview, 1987).Google Scholar

6. On the demands of the Kurds and other ethnic groups in Iran at the time of the Islamic Revolution, see Shahrzad Mojab and Amir Hassanpour, “The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity,” in Saeed Rahnema and Sorab Behdad, eds, Iran after the Revolution: Crises of an Islamic State (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1996), pp. 229–250.Google Scholar

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8. This is equivalent to the 28 of Azar of the Iranian calendar. See Ettela'at, 24 December 1977.Google Scholar

9. Muslims traditionally commemorate mourning on the fortieth day after death.Google Scholar

10. For example, Resalat, 24 January 1990, p. 5 (FBIS-NES-90–050, 14 March 1990).Google Scholar

11. An interviewee who had met Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabeli pointed out his limited ability in Persian.Google Scholar

12. Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 25 March 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79–059). The Azerbaijani language is often referred to in Iran as Turkish.Google Scholar

13. See Hasan Javadi, “Research Note: Azeri Publications in Iran,” Critique, No. 8, Spring 1996, p. 85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Ulduz began publication on 17 January 1979, and included articles in Azerbaijani and in Persian.Google Scholar

15. Babayev, “Iuzhnyi Azerbaidzhan v Iranskoi Revoliutzii 1978–1979 gg,” p. 128.Google Scholar

16. This expectation is reflected as well in the early articles published in the Azerbaijani journals Varliq and Ulker. Google Scholar

17. Editorial in Varliq, Vol. 1, p. 3. English translation found in Ilhan Bashgoz, “Varliq” (Book review), Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 2, September 1979, p. 36.Google Scholar

18. Muhammad Payfun, Farhang-i Azerbayjani (Tehran: Danishneye Publishing, 1983).Google Scholar

19. From an interview with Habib Azarsina, February 1998, Washington, DC.Google Scholar

20. Described in Azäroghlu, “Fäkhr Etmäyä Haglïyïg,” Ädäbiyyat vä Injäsänät, 9 April 1982, p. 6.Google Scholar

21. Based on interviews with former MPRP activists.Google Scholar

22. In addition, the MPRP and Ayatollah Shariatmadari also disagreed over the staging of a demonstration against the government's closing of the newspaper, Ayandegan, in May 1979. Shariatmadari called on the people not to participate in this demonstration, while the MPRP supported the protest.Google Scholar

23. Khalq-e Musulman, 1 September 1979 (15 Mehr 1358), p. 8.Google Scholar

24. Manifesto of Anjuman-i Azarbayjan, Varliq, No. 1, 1979, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

25. Ibid. Google Scholar

26. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Keyhan, 17 November 1979.Google Scholar

27. Tabriz Domestic Service in Azerbaijani, 2 December 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79–234).Google Scholar

28. In June 1979, a number of demonstrations were held in Tabriz, demanding the reinstatement of Moqaddam Maraghe'i as governor general of East Azerbaijan and freedom from censorship in the official media of the province. Maraghe'i was supported by the MPRP and was closely associated with Ayatollah Shariatmadari.Google Scholar

29. Based on an interview with an eyewitness. See also Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 126, 237.Google Scholar

30. Tabriz Domestic Service in Azerbaijani, 7 December 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79–238, Supplement 036).Google Scholar

31. Based on a conversation with an eyewitness to the events.Google Scholar

32. AFP in Spanish, 6 December 1979 (FBIS-MEA-79–237).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. Based on interviews with two participants.Google Scholar

34. Based on a conversation with Ayatollah Shariatmadari's son, Hasan Shariatmadari.Google Scholar

35. This apparently took place on 9 December. Tehran Times, 10 December 1979, and interview with Hasan Shariatmadari.Google Scholar

36. Nicholas M. Nikazmerad. “A Chronological Survey of the Iranian Revolution,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 13, Nos. 1–4, 1980, p. 366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. Tehran Times, 12 December 1979.Google Scholar

38. Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1989), pp. 59–62. Abrahamian cites low Azerbaijani participation in the presidential elections and the elections to the parliament in 1980.Google Scholar

39. Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1987), p. 143.Google Scholar

40. Many of the activists of the Tudeh and other left-wing movements were Azerbaijanis.Google Scholar

41. According to Cottam, in the Pahlavi period most of the Azerbaijanis served in the military in their native provinces under Azerbaijani officers, primarily because of the language difficulties of the recruits and the expense of transport. See, Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Updated Through 1978) (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 130.Google Scholar

42. This assertion is made in H.E. Chehabi, “Ardabil Becomes a Province: Center—Periphery Relations in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, 1997, p. 235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. See, for example, Ädäbiyyat vä Injäsänät, 15 June 1984, p. 4; Sonmaz's letter (dated 25 October 1986) and poem, as published in Ädäbiyyat vä Injäsänät, 12 December 1986, p. 4.Google Scholar

44. “Chand Pishnahad Bara-ye Taqviyat-e Zaban-e Azeri,” Keyhan, 15 June 1988, p. 2.Google Scholar

45. Letter of the Azerbaijani students studying in Tehran Universities to the Azerbaijani Deputies of the Iranian Majles (Persian), June 1994 (unpublished).Google Scholar

46. For instance, 'Abed Alkarim Manzuri Khamena, Mukalemat-e Ruzmarah-e Turki-Farsi (Türkche-Farsche Me'amuli Danishiqlar) (Tehran, 1993).Google Scholar

47. Husein-Quli Salimi, “Tabriz Radiosunun ve Erilishlanishlarineh Bir Bakhish,” Varliq January—April, 1992, pp. 38–48.Google Scholar

48. “Letter to President Khatami of Iran,” 5 May 1998, printed in Qurtulush, spring 1999 (Persian), p. 54.Google Scholar

49. Letter of the Azerbaijani students studying in Tehran Universities to the Azerbaijani Deputies of the Iranian Majles.Google Scholar

50. Salant, 21 May 1995.Google Scholar

51. Ibid. Google Scholar

52. In the 1960s and 1970s, television from Baku was frequently watched in the border towns which had good reception.Google Scholar

53. See Chehabi, “Ardabil Becomes a Province: Center—Periphery Relations in Iran,” pp. 235–253, for an in-depth discussion of the author's views on the motivations for the creation of the new province, and the processes involved.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54. Sabalan and Sahand are two major mountains in the Ardabil area. Azerbaijanis refer to Sabalan as Savalan.Google Scholar

55. Letter from 'Ali-Reza Hamide Khoo about the formation of Ardabil Province (Persian), Varliq, October—December, 1992, pp. 109–110.Google Scholar

56. IRNA in English, 15 October 1992.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. Resalat, 13 January 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

58. Ibid. Google Scholar

59. Resalat, 12 April 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

60. Ibid. Google Scholar

61. Letter of the Azerbaijani Students Studying in Tehran Universities to the Azerbaijani Deputies of the Iranian Majles.Google Scholar

62. Letter of the Meshkinshahr Students Studying in the Universities of the Country to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Varliq, April—June 1994, pp. 93–96 (originally published in the weekly Omid-e Zenjan). Google Scholar

63. The first reference found to this body is from April 1993. See Resalat, 7 April 1993, p. 3.Google Scholar

64. Reuters World Service, 27 July 1993.Google Scholar

65. Turan, 7 April 1995.Google Scholar

66. Muhammad Chehregani's election platform, 1996 (unpublished). It was widely distributed as part of his campaign materials.Google Scholar

67. Letter of the Meshkinshahr Students Studying in the Universities of the Country to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Google Scholar

68. Ibid. Google Scholar

69. Ibid. Google Scholar

70. Ibid. Google Scholar

71. Resalat, 19 April 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

72. IRNA in English, 13 April 1993.Google Scholar

73. Resalat, 14 April 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

74. Salam, quoted by Reuters, 25 May 1992.Google Scholar

75. Javad Heyat, Varliq, April—June 1994, pp. 25–30; “Khujali,” Varliq, April—June 1992, pp. 31–33; “Shahidlar,” Varliq, January—May 1995, pp. 135–136.Google Scholar

76. In some of his Friday sermons in January 1990, at the end of his presentations in Persian, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardabeli stated that instead of giving a sermon in Arabic, he would speak in Azerbaijani. At times during the Azerbaijani sermons, he addressed the Azerbaijanis in Soviet Azerbaijan, expressing sympathy with their plight.Google Scholar

77. See, for instance, IRNA in English, 31 August 1993.Google Scholar

78. For example, Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 144.Google Scholar

79. IRNA in English, 14 January 1990.Google Scholar

80. IRNA in English, 26 February 1993.Google Scholar

81. See, for instance, IRNA in English, 22 February 1993.Google Scholar

82. IRNA in English, 14 February 1996.Google Scholar

83. Resalat, 8 March 1993, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

84. Resalat, 23 December 1992, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

85. This rivalry is common in the relations of many centers with their diasporas. For a discussion of the rivalry between Israel and the Jewish diaspora, and among the Palestinians, see Gabriel Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., Modern Diasporas in International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

86. The relationship between Muslim and Iranian identities is under debate among the general population in Iran, and was especially disputed in the period of the Islamic Revolution.Google Scholar

87. For instance, in April 1979 violence erupted between Kurds and Azerbaijanis in the area of Naqadeh in West Azerbaijan province, evidently over land allocation.Google Scholar