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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, an increasing number of Czech voices have suggested that the nation would have been better off in a federalized Austria-Hungary. While the Czechs would have survived and, most likely, prospered in such an arrangement, it was necessary for the Slovak national survival to severe the nation's ties with Hungary. As it happened, the Czechoslovak Republic, proclaimed on October 28, 1918, lasted for merely twenty years — a short span in the life of both nations. The collapse of the Republic has been blamed by various writers on France and England, the national minorities, the rise of Nazism in Germany and others. But, in the last analysis, the responsibility has to be placed on the shoulders of the leaders who did not have the foresight to secure the state externally and internally and/or were unwilling to fight for its territorial integrity in the fall of 1938.
1. There is an extensive literature dealing with the nationality problem in Czechoslovakia. Among the more recent English language books are F. Gregory Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe. Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia. (Chicago: 1975); Wenzel Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam, trans. and ed. Kurt Glaser (New York and London: 1963); Jozef Kirshbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York: 1960); Joseph A. Mikus, Slovakia. A Political History: 1918–1950 (Milwaukee: 1963); Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Wars (Seattle and London: 1974); and many others.Google Scholar
2. Some of the alternative policies will be discussed in this paper later.Google Scholar
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5. For a detailed survey of the attitudes of all Czech and Slovak political parties toward the question of war and independence see Zdeněk Tobolka, Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1948 až do dnešní doby [Political History of the Czechoslovak Nation from 1848 to the Present Time], 4 vols. in 5 (Prague: 1932–1937), vol. IV, 88ff.Google Scholar
6. The map has been reproduced in Perman, D., The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 1914–1920 (Leiden: 1962). This is the most extensive English language treatment of the settlement of Czechoslovak frontiers. It should be noted that in all the documents submitted to the Paris Peace Conference Czechoslovakia's name was hyphenated. After the adoption of the 1920 Czechoslovak Constitution, the hyphen disappeared.Google Scholar
7. The most detailed discussion of the Ruthenian situation is in Stercho, Peter G., Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine 1919–1939 (Carpathian Research Center, Pa.: 1971).Google Scholar
8. Ira Bennett, E., “The Czechs Will Rise Again,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1941; J. B. Kozák, T. G. Masaryk a vznik Washingtonské deklarace v říjnu 1918 [T. G. Masaryk and the Origin of the Washington Declaration in October 1918] (Prague: 1968), p. 40.Google Scholar
9. The complete document is in Karel Kramář, Řeči a projevy [Speeches and Statements], ed. by František Stašek and J. R. Marek (Prague: 1935), pp. 89–92.Google Scholar
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16. At the Paris Peace Conference Benes submitted elaborate materials dealing with the new state. In Aide-Memoire III he declared that Czecho-Slovakia, in its internal structure, would resemble Switzerland. Later, in a memorandum of May 20, 1919, Beneš wrote that the Czechoslovak government intends “to create the organization of the State by accepting as a basis of national rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make the Czechoslovak Republic a sort of Switzerland, taking into consideration, of course, the special conditions in Bohemia.” The memorandum ended with the following sentence: “It will be an extremely liberal regime which will very much resemble that of Switzerland.” See David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference in Paris (New York: 1924–1926, 21 vols.), XIII, pp. 69–70. All the Aide Memoires and other propaganda at the Paris Peace Conference are at The Hoover War Library, Stanford, California.Google Scholar
17. Medvecký, Karol A., Slovenský prevrat [Slovak Revolution], 4 vols. (Trnava: 1930–1931), III, p. 347.Google Scholar
18. Ibid., pp. 364–365.Google Scholar
19. There is a large number of sources dealing with the Slovak issue, including those listed above in note No. 1.Google Scholar
20. Seton-Watson, , p. 4.Google Scholar
21. Masaryk, T. G., Nová Evropa. Stanovisko Slovanské [The New Europe. Slavic Standpoint] (Prague: 1920), p. 161.Google Scholar
22. Before World War I Masaryk's “Realist” political party was called “the Masaryk sect” and its leader “Shepherd.” Originally Masaryk wanted to establish his own church, but founded a political party instead. See Ivan Herben, “Dvakrát 28. říjen” [Twice 28th of October] in Padesát let [Fifty Years], ed. Ivan Herben and František Trešňák (Toronto: 1968); pp. 99–106. The well-known Czech historian, Josef Pekař, was highly critical of Masaryk in his article on Masaryk's Czech philosophy published in Český časopis historický, VI, pp. 142–156, and his Smysl Českých dějin [The Meaning of Czech History] (Prague: 1929).Google Scholar
23. Among the recently published documents from the archive of Jan Papánek, a former Czechoslovak diplomat and ambassador to the United Nations during the February 1948 coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, has been a part of correspondence between Masaryk and Beneš in the 1920s. Papánek received the letters from Beneš. In his letter of August 23, 1926, Masaryk wrote to Beneš about the secretary general of the National Democratic party, the party of Karel Kramář, that he and the whole political party must be “finished off for good” (Studie [Rome], vol. IV, 1980, No. 70, oo, 383-384). In a letter of April 20, 1927 to Beneš, Masaryk, in fact corroborates the claim made by the former leading officer of the Czechoslovak army in Russia and Siberia, General Radola Gajda, that he was framed by “the Castle” (nickname of the group of politicians around Masaryk and Beneš). Gajda was accused of collaborating with the Bolsheviks during the Civil War in Russia on the basis of “telegrams” from the Soviet authorities. These materials were fabricated by the Soviet intelligence service that was eager to punish Gajda, whom it considered Enemy No. One since he was instrumental in bringing about the Czech legion's uprising against the Soviets in May 1918. The “incriminating material” was, allegedly, requested by Beneš. Masaryk knew about it, as evidenced from the letter in which he asks in connection with the Gajda affair: “And what about the Soviets? Don't they want to give material? Germany gave a depository in the case of Dreyfus!” (Studie, I, 1981, No. 73, pp. 84–85). In the same series by Jaroslav Pecháček, “Masaryk, Beneš, Hrad” [Masaryk, Beneš, Castle] is also a letter from Masaryk to Andrej Hlinka from October 1929, parts of which had already been published by Slovak writers (including Joseph Kirchbaum, Slovakia). Here Masaryk asserts that he “liberated Slovakia” and that the Pittsburgh Agreement, drafted, in fact, by him and carrying his signature, “is a forgery and falsum”. (Studie, III, 1981, No. 75, pp. 281–282).Google Scholar
24. Alois Kocman et al., eds., Boj o směr vývoje československého státu [The Struggle for the Direction of the Development of the Czechoslovak State], 2 vols. (Prague: 1965), vol. I, pp. 68–70.Google Scholar
25. The Pittsburgh Agreement stipulated that “Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own Diet, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in government offices, and in public life generally.” Details of the history of the Agreement are in Konštantín Čulen, Pittsburghská dohoda [The Pittsburgh Agreement], (Bratislava: 1937). See also Josef Kalvoda, “Masaryk in America in 1918,” Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, 27 (1979), No. 1, pp. 85–99.Google Scholar
26. Śtefánek, , “Masaryk and Slovakia” in T. G. Masaryk in Perspective.Google Scholar
27. The statistics are from the official publications of the State Statistical Office of the Czechoslovak Republic, quoted in Josef Gruber, ed., Czechoslovakia: A Survey of Economic and Social Conditions (New York: 1924), pp. 9–11. In the years 1920–1921 1,967,970 Slovaks lived in Czechoslovakia of whom 1,941,942 resided in Slovakia. Their number increased to 2,282,277 in 1930 (2,224,983 in Slovakia). See Ceskoslovenská statistika [Czechoslovak Statistics], Census of December 1, 1930, vol. 98, part 1 (Prague: 1934), pp. 46–47.Google Scholar
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29. Ibid. See also Ludvík Němec, Our Lady of Hostýn: Queen of the Marian Garden of the Czech, Moravian, Silesian and Slovak Madonnas (New York: 1981).Google Scholar
30. Gruber, , p. 10.Google Scholar
31. Perman, , p. 97 ff.; Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940-43 (Bloomington: 1956), p. 7ff.; and Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies 1919–1925 (Minneapolis: 1962), p. 21ff.Google Scholar
32. For details see Stercho.Google Scholar
33. A recent publication dealing with the issue is Kiraly, Bela K., Pastor, Peter, and Sanders, Ivan, ecs., Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, A Case Study on Trianon (New York: 1983), especially essay by Josef Kalvoda. “The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Dispute.”Google Scholar
34. Vojtěch Tuka was tried for high treason in 1929. A member of the Slovak People's party, he maintained contacts with some Hungarians and favored the establishment of a Slovak-Hungarian-Croatian federation. The Tuka affair is discussed in Imrich Kružliak, “Tvorcovia nového Slovenska” [Creators of the New Slovakia] in The Shaping of Modern Slovakia: Festschrift to the Seventieth Birthday of Dr. Joseph A. Mikuš, ed. Joseph Staško (Cambridge, Ontario: 1982). pp. 24–26.Google Scholar
35. The first book-length study, followed by several others, was Wheeler-Bennett, John W., Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York: 1984).Google Scholar
36. Mnichov v dokumentech [Munich in Documents] 2 vols. (Prague: 1958), II, pp. 209–210; also J. Pachta and P. Reiman, “O nových dokumentech k otázce Mnichova” [On the New Documents about the Question of Munich], Přípěvky k dějinám KSÇ [Contribution to the History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], vol. I, 1957, pp. 104–133.Google Scholar
37. Mnichov v dokumentech, p. 210.Google Scholar
38. The information was furnished by Mrs. Pavla Osuský, wife of the deceased Dr. Štefan Osuský, when this writer did research in the latter's archive in Washington, D.C.Google Scholar
39. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. New Documents on the History of Munich (Prague: 1958), p. 81.Google Scholar
40. Osuský describes his Munich experience in the fragments of his unpublished and unfinished memoirs. The present account is based on a published source, an article by Štefan Osuský, “Na lži se budoucnost národa budovat nedá!” [The Future of the Nation Cannot be Built on a Lie!], Novina (Chicago), 1957, No. 1. In 1982 the article was reprinted in several Czech ethnic papers published in the United States (Hlasatel, Chicago, April 9, 1982), Australia (Hlasy), and Canada (Naše Hlasy, February 27, 1982).Google Scholar
41. Dokumenty z historie československé politiky 1939–1943 [Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Politics, 1939–1943], eds. Libuše Otáhalová and Milada Červinková, 2 vols. (Prague: 1966), I, pp. 91–92. For a translation of Smutný's characterization of Beneš see Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy (Washington: 1978), pp. 110–112.Google Scholar
42. The foregoing is based on Toman Brod, “Možnosti obrany Československé Republiky roku 1938” [The Possibilities of Defending the Czechoslovak Republic in 1938] in Kdo zavinil Mnichov [Who Was Responsible for Munich], A colloquium from the international conference on the twentieth anniversary of Munich (Prague: 1959), pp. 94–105. Captured papers of the German Ministry of War were studied by Major General C. F. Robinson of the United States Army and analyzed in a report entitled Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods submitted to the U.S. Secretary of War in October 1947. The document shows that the generally accepted estimates of German rearmament in the period 1933–1939 were grossly exaggerated. At the time of the Munich conference, Germany had thirty-five infantry and four motorized divisions, none of them fully equipped or manned. Czechoslovakia had a comparable number of divisions available to resist the German invasion, should it happen. The Czechoslovak army, moreover, was better equipped and trained, had a better morale and better fortifications. For example, the Czechoslovak tanks weighed thirty-eight tons, while the Germans had no tanks over ten tons before 1938. The Germans greatly benefitted from the capture of the Czechoslovak arms in March 1939. They added to their armaments 469 superior Czechoslovak tanks, 1,500 planes of which 500 were first-line, 43,000 machineguns, and over one million rifles. These figures show that in terms of armaments Germany was no stronger than Czechoslovakia at the time of the Munich crisis. See Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden. (NY: Books in Focus, 1981), pp. 286–287.Google Scholar
43. Theodore Kordt, the German chargé d'affaires in London, whose brother was an official in the German Foreign Ministry and one of the conspirators, informed Lord Halifax about the plot to assassinate Hitler on September 5, 1938. The group of conspirators included men of the highest level of government and military officers, including Colonel General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff. The plot was cancelled on September 28, 1938 when the news reached Berlin that Chamberlain was going to Munich. Details are in Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler (Hinsdale, Illinois: 1948; London: 1961), pp. 56–63; and Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance (London: 1958), pp. 80–112.Google Scholar
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45. The saga of the Czechs who fought in Russia and Siberia is told in many Czech and Slovak language sources. Among the English-language works dealing with the subject are Victor M. Fic, The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion: The Origin of Their Armed Conflict, March-May 1918 (New Delhi: 1978), and Josef Kalvoda, “Czech and Slovak Prisoners of War in Russia During the War and Revolution,” in Essays on World War I: Origins and Prisoners of War, ed. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. and Peter Pastor (New York: 1983).Google Scholar
46. Before the Czech surrender was announced, a large rally was held in Prague urging the government to resist pressures from foes and friends alike and to fight. Among the speakers addressing the large crowd were leading politicians representing the whole range of ideological and political spectrum, with the leader of the Communist party, Klement Gottwald, on the extreme left, and General Radola Gajda, the leader of the Czech Fascist party, on the extreme right, and deputies of the National Democratic, Populist, National Socialist and Social Democratic parties in between them. For more details see Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy, pp. 76–91.Google Scholar
47. Edvard Beneš, Mnichovské dny: Paměti. [The Munich Days: Memoirs], (Prague: 1968), pp. 340–341.Google Scholar
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51. Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: 1951), pp. 452–453.Google Scholar
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58. On October 4, 1938, The Times (London) reported consternation among the Sudeten Germans. A special correspondent was told by the later that they “thought of autonomy” and “never expected” their incorporation into Germany.Google Scholar