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GEORG JELLINEK ON VALUES AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2015

ANDREW SPADAFORA
ANDREW SPADAFORA*
Affiliation:
Harvard Business School E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Georg Jellinek was one of the legal theorists who brought a new level of methodological sophistication to German public law scholarship at the turn of the twentieth century. Where previous research has called attention to his theory of conceptual “types” and his application of contemporary neo-Kantian epistemology to the law, this article explores his thinking on the nature of values and value judgments, and the possibilities for objectivity in the legal and political sciences. Jellinek sought to open an increasingly calcified legal positivism to the findings of the social sciences and to an inherently pluralistic, changing world of subjective values, but without abandoning the positivist ideals of legal certainty and the exclusion of political and other value judgments. Analyzing his response to this challenge opens a window onto his broader work in public law and political science, illuminating doctrines like the “two-sided” theory of the state and the “normative power of the factual,” which have achieved a lasting place in German legal and political theory. It also shows why Jellinek put aside the traditional ideal of bias-free objectivity for a surprisingly modern vision of a process of intersubjective agreement, driven by the institutions of free and open scholarly debate.

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Modern Intellectual History , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , November 2017 , pp. 747 - 776
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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8 The only short treatment of Jellinek's methodology to take these issues fully into account is the fine work of Wapler, Frederike, Werte und das Recht (Baden-Baden, 2008), 165–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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10 Space considerations make it impossible here to compare Jellinek with Weber's deeper and more elaborate reckoning with “objectivity” and “value-freedom” after 1904.

11 See especially Haferkamp, Hans-Peter, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (Frankfurt am Main, 2004)Google Scholar.

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13 In addition to the accounts in the previous note, see John, Michael, “Constitution, Administration, and the Law,” in Chickering, Roger, ed., Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion (Westport, CT, 1996), 185–214, at 201Google Scholar, and Caldwell, Peter, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law (Durham, NC, 1997)Google Scholar, chap.1, esp. 15–16, 19.

14 This description of constructivism, or “conceptual jurisprudence,” necessarily simplifies a more complex tradition. On its origins in private law through the early Rudolf Jhering, and occasional coexistence with acceptance of historically and socially informed legal scholarship, see Haferkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta; Losano, Mario, Studien zu Jhering und Gerber (Ebelsbach, 1984)Google Scholar; Somek, Alexander, “Legal Formality and Freedom of Choice: A Moral Perspective on Jhering's Constructivism,” Ratio Juris, 15/1 (2002), 52–62 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hofmann, Hasso, “From Jhering to Radbruch: On the Logic of Traditional Legal Concepts to the Social Theories of Law to the Renewal of Legal Idealism,” in Canale, Damiano, Grossi, Paolo, and Hofmann, Hasso, eds., A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600–1900 (Dordrecht, 2009), 301–54Google Scholar; and Oertzen, Die soziale Funktion, 214–38, on Gerber. Kaufmann, Arthur and Hassemer, Winfried, “Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in German Jurisprudential Thought,” University of Toronto Law Journal, 19/4 (1969), 461–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar, remains a useful overview.

15 See his comments in an influential passage in the book that made his reputation: Laband, Paul, Das Budgetrecht (Berlin, 1871), 75–76 Google Scholar.

16 Laband, Paul, Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, 3rd edn (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1895), x–xi Google Scholar.

17 Schönberger, Christoph, Das Parlament im Anstaltsstaat (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), 216–300 Google Scholar, primarily emphasizes political commonalities. Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 50–68, offers an assessment of the importance of Gerber and Laband for Jellinek, esp. 54–55, 63 on the dual view of the state.

18 Jellinek, Georg, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte (Leipzig, 1895)Google Scholar. Jellinek's thesis must also be seen in light of late nineteenth-century German theories of the Rechtsstaat and perceptions of French parliamentarism. See Kelly, Duncan, “Revisiting the Rights of Man: Georg Jellinek on Rights and the State,” Law and History Review, 22/3 (2004), 493–529 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Laband to Jellinek, 21 Oct. 1895 and 6 Jan. 1889, in Nachlass Georg Jellinek, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 1136/15, hereafter NL Jellinek; see also, e.g., 29 June 1892 for their “complete agreement” on the “legal nature of the state” in Laband's eyes.

20 Camilla Jellinek, Georg Jellinek: Ein Lebensbild, repr. in Jellinek, Georg, Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, 2 vols. (Aalen, 1970 Google Scholar; first published 1911) (hereafter ASR), 1: 5*–140*, at 88*.

21 Jellinek to Victor Ehrenberg, 5 Aug. and 25 Sept. 1873, in Keller, Christian, ed., Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek: Briefwechsel 1872–1911 (Frankfurt am Main, 2005)Google Scholar (hereafter Briefwechsel), 197, 201; see also Bleek, Wilhelm, Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland (Munich, 2001), 159–60Google Scholar.

22 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 30 Dec. 1873, in Briefwechsel, 210.

23 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 26 July 1878, in Briefwechsel, 278.

24 Jellinek, , Die sozialethische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht und Strafe (Vienna, 1878), 3–5 Google Scholar; Christian Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” in Briefwechsel, 50; Kempter, Klaus, Die Jellineks, 1820–1955 (Düsseldorf, 1998), 191–5Google Scholar. Jellinek's Sozialethische Bedeutung also took a sociological approach to the validity of law—the criterion being its acceptance as valid by society—and saw that validity as varying with historical and social changes, not owing merely to deductive logic: see, e.g., 32–33, 42.

25 Jellinek, Georg, Gesetz und Verordnung (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1887), hereafter GV, 1–188 Google Scholar; Jellinek, Die Erklärung; Jellinek, , Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn (Berlin, 1914; first published 1900), 9Google Scholar and throughout, esp. chaps. 3, 5–10, 13–15, 17–20. The Allgemeine Staatslehre, hereafter AS, is cited according to the third edition but checked against the 1900 and 1905 editions.

26 Jellinek to Lujo Brentano, 28 May 1889, in Nachlass Brentano, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 1001/29; Jellinek to Ludwig Felix, 20 June 1894, 2 July 1894, 8 Jan. 1895, 15 March 1895, 20 Oct. 1895, 14 May 1896, 16 May 1896, 24 May 1896, in NL Jellinek, 1136/43. During or before these years, Jellinek read the work of such “historical” political economists as Brentano, Heinrich Herkner, Werner Sombart, and Max Weber, and such “theorists” as G. F. Knapp, Albert Schäffle, Adolf Wagner, and Menger, among others, including socialist writers. For a sense of the scope of his reading, compare Weber, Max, Allgemeine (“theoretische”) Nationalökonomie: Vorlesungen 1894–1898 , in Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, ed. Mommsen, Wolfgang, section III, vol. 1 (Tübingen, 2009)Google Scholar.

27 Jellinek, AS, 6–9, 28 ff. “Positivism” here refers to sociological or economistic, rather than legal, positivism.

28 Hofmann, “From Jhering to Radbruch,” 305 ff.

29 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 11 Nov. 1873, 30 Dec. 1873, 26 July 1878, in Briefwechsel, 205, 209, 278.

30 Georg Jellinek, “Die Klassifikation des Unrechts” (1879), in Jellinek, ASR 1: 76–150, at 80–82; Jellinek, GV, 242.

31 Georg Jellinek, “Die deutsche Philosophie in Österreich” (1874), in Jellinek, ASR 1: 55–68. Letters to Ehrenberg attest to Jellinek's intense interest in Windelband's work: e.g. 20 Oct. 1872, 29 April 1873, 9 June 1873, 27 June 1874, in Briefwechsel, 158, 180, 191–2, 222–3. On the question whether Jellinek was himself a neo-Kantian in his methodology see Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,” esp. 331–42; Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 149–51, 165 ff.; Hans Boldt, “Staat, Recht und Politik bei Georg Jellinek,” in Anter, Die normative Kraft, 13–25, at 15 n.12.

32 On Windelband and Rickert see Beiser, Frederick, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford, 2011), 365–441 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bambach, Charles, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, NY, 1995), 57–125 Google Scholar; and Oakes, Guy, Weber and Rickert (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 41–110 Google Scholar.

33 See Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre”; Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 169–73; and for a contrasting view on the question of types see Ghosh, “Max Weber and Georg Jellinek,” 326, 330–31, who emphasizes Jellinek's empiricism and inductive approach in this area.

34 Jellinek, AS, 19–20, 34, 36, 52; Jellinek, , System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 2nd edn (Freiburg, 1905; first published 1892), 17–18 Google Scholar; Jellinek, , Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungswandlung (Berlin, 1906), 71 Google Scholar.

35 Jellinek, System, 16; also Jellinek, AS, 75–82.

36 For his attempts to grapple with Rickert's philosophy see Jellinek to Rickert, 6 June 1901 and 11 March 1905, Nachlass Rickert, Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, Handschriftenabteilung Hs. 2740.

37 Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 175–6, points out that against Gerber and Laband, Jellinek thought such values could not be removed and should be made transparent.

38 Jellinek, AS, 64.

39 Hertogh, Marc, ed., Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Oxford, 2009)Google Scholar.

40 Stammler, Rudolf, Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte (Berlin, 1902)Google Scholar.

41 Jellinek to his parents, 1 Dec. 1871 and 27 June 1872, quoted in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 16*–18*.

42 Jellinek, Georg, “Die Weltanschauungen Leibniz’ und Schopenhauers” (1872), in Jellinek, ASR 1: 3–41 Google Scholar, at 5, 16; also 32, 35, 40. Jellinek returned to the Fichte quotation throughout his life, calling it “Fichte's profound utterance” in Jellinek, System, 13 n. 1, and “Fichte's immortal word” in a 1907 speech: “Grossherzog Friedrich I. von Baden . . . Gedächtnisrede,” in Jellinek, ASR 1: 368–91, at 378.

43 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 4 Jan. 1877, in Briefwechsel, 267.

44 Windelband, Wilhelm, “Zum Geleit,” in Jellinek, ASR 1: v–xii Google Scholar, at vii.

45 Georg Jellinek, notes “Aus einem Notizbuch,” dated to 1871 and 1877 respectively, in Jellinek, ASR 1: 168, 171–2.

46 See e.g. Jellinek, Die sozialethische Bedeutung, 37–42.

47 Jellinek, “Die Klassifikation des Unrechts,” 87. See also Jellinek, AS, 332.

48 Quoted in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild, 10*. Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 166, also observes that his Kantianism did not extend beyond the separation of the worlds of causality and practical moral life to the acceptance of objectively valid norms of any sort.

49 Jellinek, Georg, “Gutachten, betreffend die Stellung der Staatswissenschaften, der Rechtsphilosophie und des Völkerrechts” (1887), in Jellinek, ASR 1: 299–306, at 305Google Scholar.

50 Jellinek, System, 11.

51 I have emphasized his early views to make clear that Jellinek's value relativism did not stem from the Heidelberg milieu of his later work, but his opinions remained consistent; for just a few examples see Jellinek, AS, 21, 35–6, 171.

52 Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 96.

53 Jellinek, Die sozialethische Bedeutung, 13. Italics added.

54 Ibid., 13–14. See also Jellinek, AS, 262.

55 Jellinek, Die sozialethische Bedeutung, 13–14. See also Jellinek, AS, 28–9.

56 Jellinek, Die sozialethische Bedeutung, 14. The source of Jellinek's early (1878–9) usage of the language of values (Werte and Werturtheile) is unclear. It may be owing to Windelband or the philosopher Hermann Lotze, whom Jellinek met in 1874 (Briefwechsel, 158, 223); it does not stem from Friedrich Nietzsche.

57 Jellinek, AS, 13–14.

58 As this section demonstrates, Peter Ghosh's nuanced comparison of the two men errs in portraying Jellinek as seeking eternally valid values and differing from Weber on their infinite variety and “mutability.” Ghosh, “Max Weber and Georg Jellinek,” 328.

59 Perhaps Jellinek's clearest statement of this “antinomian” vision, and of incommensurable world views analogous to Kuhnian paradigms, can be found in Jellinek, Georg, “Der Kampf des alten mit dem neuen Recht” (1907), in Jellinek, ASR 1: 392–427 Google Scholar, esp. 396, 404.

60 Jellinek, AS, 228.

61 Ibid., chap. 8, esp. 239–50. Jellinek's nonnormative analysis of the state's “goals” in terms of non-metaphysical state functions was one of his major contributions to developing an empirical political science. Anter, Andreas, “Georg Jellineks wissenschaftliche Politik: Positionen, Kontexte, Wirkungslinien,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 39/3 (1998), 503–26, at 511Google Scholar. See also Boldt, “Staat, Recht und Politik,” 20–21.

62 Jellinek, AS, 63–4; Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 54–5.

63 Jellinek, Georg, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Berlin, 1882), 7 Google Scholar. For a later statement see Jellinek, AS, 550.

64 Jellinek, System, 13.

65 Ibid., 13, 16.

66 Andreas Anter, “Modernität und Ambivalenz in Georg Jellineks Staatsdenken,” in Anter, Die normative Kraft, 37–59, at 38; Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 91.

67 Jellinek, System, 14, 19.

68 See especially Jellinek, AS, 19–21. Non-Kantian positivists like Laband had, by contrast, preferred to view Rechtswissenschaft on the model of a natural science of causality. Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,” 316; Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 176–7.

69 Jellinek, AS, 51. See also Jellinek, System, 3, for another (implicit) endorsement of constructivist methods within their limited sphere.

70 Jellinek, AS, 138, 17.

71 See esp. Oliver Lepsius, “Die Zwei-Seiten-Lehre des Staates,” in Anter, Die normative Kraft, 63–88; Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,” 329–30; Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 145–69.

72 Jellinek, AS, 7–11, 20–21.

73 Jellinek, System, 18–19.

74 Jellinek, Staatenverbindungen, 9; Jellinek, AS, 12.

75 E.g. Koch, Hans-Joachim, Seminar: Die juristische Methode im Staatsrecht (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 67 Google Scholar; Korioth, Stefan, “The Shattering of Methods in Late Wilhelmine Germany: Introduction,” in Jacobson, Arthur and Schlink, Bernhard, eds., Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley, CA, 2000), 41–50 Google Scholar, at 45. Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 95, rightly notes the strangeness of this conventional wisdom given Jellinek's clear attempts to show connections between the legal and social aspects of the state.

76 An especially clear statement is Jellinek, Staatenverbindungen, 9–11.

77 Jellinek, “Die Klassifikation des Unrechts,” 122–5; Jellinek, System, 18; Jellinek, AS, 12, 122–5; Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung, 31. This meant that state law could not consist of a purely conceptual account of the order of legal norms without input from “outside.” Schönberger, Parlament, 210–11. See also Lepsius, “Zwei-Seiten-Lehre,” 73–5.

78 Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung, v.

79 Here it may be useful to draw an analogy to the widespread model of a “core” of certainty and “penumbra” of uncertainty in the law later evolved by Hart, H. L. A., e.g. in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, 1983), 62–72 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, although Jellinek's and Hart's specific views, of course, differ.

80 Sinzheimer rightly differentiated Jellinek from other positivists on this front. Sinzheimer, Hugo, Jüdische Klassiker der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft (Amsterdam, 1938), 210–11Google Scholar.

81 Jellinek, AS, 353.

82 Jellinek, GV, 297, 300; Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 393–5; Verfassungsänderung, 43 ff.; Jellinek, AS, 353, 359 and chap. 9.

83 Jellinek, AS, 356–8, 619–20: in contrast, judicial lawmaking was not possible in constitutional law for Jellinek because he rejected judicial review of legislation for constitutionality, making constitutional “gaps” even more serious.

84 Jellinek, GV, 300; Jellinek, “Die Politik des Absolutismus und die des Radikalismus,” in Jellinek, ASR 2: 3–22, at 22; Jellinek, AS, chap. 14.

85 Jellinek, AS, 368–9, 475–7, 481.

86 Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, 42, has aptly termed this problem “Jellinek's paradox.”

87 For this argument, first made in 1880, see Jellinek, System, 10; Jellinek, AS, 478; Keller, “Victor Ehrenberg und Georg Jellinek,” 56; Anter, “Modernität und Ambivalenz,” 47–50; and Christoph Schönberger, “Ein Liberaler zwischen Staatswille und Volkswille,” in Paulson and Schulte, Georg Jellinek, 3–32, at 20–21, and the sources cited there.

88 Jellinek, AS, 369–74, 616, with earlier hints in Jellinek, GV, 262–76. See the analysis in Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, 42–3, Kelly, State of the Political, 98–9, and Boldt, “Staat, Recht und Politik,” 23–5. Jellinek was well aware that such circumstances, interests, and powers were constantly changing; see e.g. Jellinek, AS, 257.

89 Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 416–18, 421.

90 Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung, 8–9, 21.

91 Ibid., esp. 8–46. For Max Weber's praise of this work and interest in the problem of connecting the legal and political “sides” see Weber to Jellinek, 27 Aug. 1906, in Briefe 1906–1908, in Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, ed. M. Rainer Lepsius and Wolfgang Mommsen, section II, vol. 5 (Tübingen, 1990), 149. Although he found Jellinek's approach to the study of politics too formalist and legalistic (Weber to Alfred Weber, 22 May 1907, in ibid., 311), Weber was actively interested in Jellinek's attempts in 1909 to gain funding from Andrew Carnegie for a German–American institute for comparative politics in Heidelberg, which would have been devoted to such political foundations of Staatsrecht. Weber was willing to participate provided that the institute emphasized studies of the sociopolitical rather than the legal “side” of the state. See Weber's letters to Jellinek of July, August, and September 1909 in Briefe 1909–1910, in Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, ed. M. Rainer Lepsius and Wolfgang Mommsen, section II, vol. 6 (Tübingen, 1994), 179 ff. Weber was also engaged enough with Jellinek's work to write a review of one of the latter's essays as late as 1909, which appears to have been lost prior to publication (ibid., 225).

92 Korioth, “Shattering of Methods,” 45–6.

93 At a minimum, this would be true of theoretical knowledge of the law, even if application to concrete cases might involve interpretive difficulties or practical considerations going beyond pure science, as noted by Boldt, “Staat, Recht und Politik,” 29.

94 Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,” 319, suggests that Jellinek treats common purposes as the fulcrum of connection between the normative and the factual in the System, and factual agreement among wills in the Allgemeine Staatslehre, but both ideas are present in both works. See e.g. Jellinek, AS, 333; Jellinek, System, 42 ff.

95 Jellinek, AS, 337–8.

96 Ibid., 338–44.

97 Jellinek did not use this label for the doctrine, which appears to have been introduced in the mid-twentieth century, and was later employed by Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 372–5.

98 Jellinek, AS, 344–50.

99 Ibid., 353 ff., on Jellinek's discussion of the tensions between conservative and progressive tendencies in the law, and the constant change it underwent in response to social changes. For an assessment of how well Jellinek actually employed social-scientific and especially sociological theories to these ends, see Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 151–6; the results are mixed, though this has no necessary bearing on his theory.

100 Jellinek, AS, 359.

101 Lepsius, “Georg Jellineks Methodenlehre,” 318.

102 A related criticism is that made by Stefan Korioth, “Shattering of Methods,” 46, who remarks that for Jellinek, “The theory of the law of the state can merely track the success or failure of transformative strivings of political forces,” and must acknowledge irrational political faits accomplis without any normative theory of why it must do so.

103 Breuer, “Fachmenschenfreundschaft,” 314–15; Hübinger, “Staatstheorie und Politik als Wissenschaft,” 147; also see e.g. Jellinek, AS, 74–5.

104 For Kelsen's critique see Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts, 2: 453; Lepsius, “Zwei-Seiten-Lehre,” 81–2; Kersten, Georg Jellinek, 169–77.

105 Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, chaps. 4–5; Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, “Introduction: Constitutional Crisis: The German and American Experience,” in Jacobson and Schlink, Weimar, 1–39, at 16–17.

106 Picardi, Eva, “Sigwart, Husserl, and Frege on Truth and Logic,” European Journal of Philosophy, 5/2 (1997), 162–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; even Carl Schmitt, who ultimately emphasized the “factual,” political side of the state against Kelsen's “normative” side, attempted to employ a dialectical approach. McCormick, John, Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism (Cambridge, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

107 As Wapler, Werte und das Recht, 171–3, observes, noting that neither Windelband nor Rickert joined Kelsen in assuming this.

108 Anter, “Modernität und Ambivalenz,” 42, calls attention to his “Calvinistically stringent ideal of science,” and self-discipline bordering on asceticism, and points to Jellinek's various rejections of political passion in favor of calm scientific analysis from 1885 to his death.

109 Radbruch, Gustav, untitled review essay (1911), reprinted in Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe, ed. Kaufmann, Arthur, vol. 16 (Heidelberg, 1988), 21–4, at 22 Google Scholar.

110 Jellinek, Georg, “Die deutsche Philosophie,” in Jellinek, ASR 1: 55–68 Google Scholar, at 65–6.

111 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 246–53; 324–32.

112 Ibid., 339–48.

113 Jellinek recounted the conversation to Ludwig Felix, 5 June 1893, in NL Jellinek 1136/43 (reprinted with deletions in Camilla Jellinek, Lebensbild).

114 Jellinek to Ehrenberg, 29 Dec. 1901, in Briefwechsel, 419; and Paul Hensel to Jellinek, 20 Dec. 1901, in NL Jellinek 1136/11. See also Kempter, Die Jellineks, 334.

115 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 241, 245.

116 Jellinek, Verfassungsänderung, 44; also vi.

117 Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 423.

118 Jellinek, System, 11–12.

119 Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 424–5.

120 Ibid., 425.

121 Ibid.

122 Sinzheimer, Jüdische Klassiker, 228, points to Jellinek's use of historical appropriateness and “world history as judge” to suggest which self-contained Weltanschauungen might be most appropriate, though he leaves the mistaken impression that Jellinek regarded the judgments of world history as more definitive—oriented toward real, inevitable “progress”—than in fact he did. Other scholars, too, see in Jellinek a vision of “assured evolutionary progress” with little sense of historical contingency (Ghosh, “Max Weber and Georg Jellinek,” 329–30, 334). They are right that Jellinek believed in progress, but as a hope and ideal and not as an inevitability: he was quite clear that any attempts to see change as teleological development were speculative and made no claims to scientific status even if such speculations were difficult to eliminate entirely (Jellinek, AS, 7, 42–3, 262–3).

123 Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 426.

124 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich,” 385–6.

125 Jellinek, AS, 74.

126 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich,” 381.

127 Kempter, Die Jellineks, 325, 330.

128 Jellinek, “Grossherzog Friedrich,” 386.

129 Jellinek, “Ansprache des Prorektors in Frankfurt am Main bei der Eröffnung des Museums der Senckenbergischen Naturforschenden Gesellschaft,” 13 Oct. 1907, in Jellinek, ASR 1: 359–61, at 360. Jellinek always included science alongside the economy as areas that could not be directed by a single, planning will, even though he took note of the ability of the state and other associations to further or hinder it, e.g. in Jellinek, AS, 4.

130 Jellinek, System, vi.

131 Jellinek, AS, xvi.

132 See, e.g., Radbruch, untitled review essay, 22, for this characterization; but see also note 122 above for Jellinek's recognition that “progress” was a speculative ideal.

133 For remarks on his hopes for such conflicts leading to moral development in history, see Jellinek, “Der Kampf des alten,” 427.