The second generation of constitutional elites who adopted the fundamental law of the Philippine Republic had hoped that through legislative discretion local governments would develop into strong and effective agents of the national government. This hope was dashed by the unwillingness of the legislative branch to make the local units less dependent on the central government and the meticulous way in which the President of the nation tried to control local officials instead of merely supervising them as the constitution provided. Against this background, the third generation of constitutional elites in the seventies felt that the constitutional compromise in the thirties between the historical view of localism and the legal theory of centralism in the form os presidential supervision over local governments was counter-productive. Accordingly, they considered a number of choices by which local autonomy could be clothed with constitutional protection. And so they wrote in the new Philippine constitution a mandate to the legislative branch to institutionalize the concept of local autonomy not only in form but in substance as well. They also modified Dillon's Rule, which used to govern national—local relations, by subjecting the legislative power to create or abolish local units to popular approval by placing a shotgun behind the door—the referendum. Elite decision to opt for this type of mandatory autonomy was not in response to mass demands, since the masses were uninformed about the local autonomy issue. Rather, it was due to elite perception of what they considered to be the public good which motivated them to take this bold and forward step towards local political development during the nation's crucial period of its existence.

The publisher is the bride's parents, the readers are the bridegroom, and the kashihonya is the go-between.

Japanese interest in Hainan stemmed from the desire to emulate the success which they had achieved in Taiwan in an area further south which could offer a full range of tropical products for theuse of the Japanese economy. The naval importance of Hainan was also recognized, because it could dominate the South China Sea from the excellent harbour of San-ya ( Samah) Bay, and there were indications that the island was rich in minerals. The development of official Japanese interest in the island was largely the work of the governor-general's office in Taiwan. Thus in 1918 and 1919 an official from Taiwan called Kaku () was sent to Hainan to observe conditions under the title of special sales office head. In the 1920's the Taiwan government sponsored conferences o the South China Japanese consuls to discuss plans for the area, and in 1935 a conference was held production in the tropics, to coordinate research on the economy, production possibilities and culture of the tropical part of China.Meanwhile Chinese government interest in Hainan began to be aroused in the 1930's, culminating in the visit of T.V. Soong, one of the highest ministers of e Kuintang government, in 1936. Thereafter a rail route a west of the island was surveyed but no furthe progress was made. Private businessmen in the 1930's began to develop rubber plantations to join those set up with overseas Chinese capital in the 1910's,and there was a sharp rise in the area planted to sugar in 1936 as the price of sugar rose. Hence when war broke out between China and Japa,the possibilities for the development were just beginning to be explored.1

While the developments leading up to the signature of the Soviet—Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941 have received considerable attention from scholars, the antecedents of this pact, the discussions between Japan and Soviet Russia over non-aggression or neutrality agreements from the mid-1920s onwards, are less widely known. The most significant of the earlier initiatives came in December 1931, when Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, proposed a pact of non-aggression to the Japanese Foreign Minister designate, Yoshizawa Kenkichi. Subsequently, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, a Soviet legal expert was to argue that the Japanese refusal to accept this proposal was proof of their aggressive plans for war on the Soviet Union.

In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in Europe in early September 1939 Japan had been busy tackling the commitments she had made in North China at first and then in the whole of China. Although war was not declared, Japan had been at war with China since July 1937. It was a war of attrition; both Japan and China claimed to be winning, yet neither could, on any occasion, see any prospect of a final and definite victory. So long as Japan's military operations were confined to the area of North China, the war was named the ‘North China Incident.’ It was called the ‘China Incident’ after her successive and more or less successful operations had spread to Central and South China. And when a war broke out in the Pacific in December 1941 the Sino-Japanese war became an inseparable part of the ‘Greater East Asia War’ (Dai-tōa sensō), a name rarely heard by now, since it soon gave way to the ‘Pacific War’ (Taiheiyō sensō) in the sense of Japan waging the war of the Ocean, or to the ‘Second World War’ in the global sense.

While China's response to Western imperialism during the closing years of the Ch'ing dynasty has been the subject of thoughtful and imaginative research, the history of China's frontiers during that period, by contrast, has received relatively little attention. This article attempts to survey briefly the impact which the transformation of Chinese politics, economics and society had on the frontier, Outer Mongolia in particular, and to examine the changes wrought by foreign imperialism and Chinese nationalism on the frontier policies of the Ch'ing government.

Until the evolution of paper, which is dated traditionally in A.D. 105, the majority of Chinese documents were probably written on boards or narrow strips of wood or bamboo; the use of silk was reserved for the preparation of de luxe copies of certain works, either for sacred or for profane purposes. However, it was only quite recently that actual examples of wooden documents from China were first brought to the attention of the scholastic world, as a result of two series of expedit ions to central Asia and northwestern China. First, Sir Aurel Stein's expeditions, at the be ginning of the century, brought back fragments of inscribed wood from the sites of Tun-huang; thi s was subsequently examined and the results published, by Chinese scholars such as Wang Kuo-wei, an European scholars such as Chavannes and Maspero. Secondly, the expeditions led by Sven Hedin s ome thirty years later found similar material in larger quantities, from the more easterly sites of Chü-yen (Edsen-gol). These texts were published by a number of scholars, beginning with L ao Kan,who was working in China in the extremely difficult conditions of the 1940s.1940s.Shortly afterwards, Japanese scholars were able to turn their attention to this material whose content, l ike thatof the strips from Tun-huang, was almost exclusively concerned with the civil and militar y administration of Han imperial officials, between about 100 B.C.and A.D. 100. In the early 1960 s Professor Mori Shikazo led a series of seminar meetings to study the material from Chii-yen, wh ich the present writer was fortunate and privileged to attend. The results of such meetings were published atthe time in a number of Japanese periodicals, and constituted a valuable contribution to the studyof the wooden material from China known to exist at that time.