“Normalization of relations” is a phrase of recent origin, widely used by scholars, politicians, and journalists. Defining normalization, however, is remarkably difficult. While we know a great deal about specific instances of normalization, we lack a sustained study of normalization itself, a gap this article begins to address. Using case studies of U.S. relations with China, Vietnam, and Cuba, this article examines the idea of normalization, its history, and its consequences. Focusing on pivotal moments in which “normalization” was at stake, we argue that in the American rendering, normalization was a process that unfolded in three phases. In turn, normalizing relations became a key nonmilitary means through which U.S. officials escalated and then deescalated the Cold War. Like other facets of U.S. diplomacy of the postwar period, normalization policies were premised on many of the assumptions and institutions of the “liberal international order” and have endured into the twenty-first century.

This article examines how and why many prominent white supporters of the civil rights movement either ignored or condemned the model of the Reconstruction era. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, for example, did not publicly mention Reconstruction as part of their efforts to promote civil rights, and in 1957, Hubert Humphrey, the pro–civil rights senator from Minnesota, spoke of “the dark and sad days of Reconstruction.” In contrast, as the article shows, most Black civil rights activists embraced the memory of Reconstruction. At the same time, segregationists frequently referred to and commemorated, albeit negatively, Reconstruction. Indeed, they popularized the idea that the modern civil rights movement was a “Second Reconstruction.” Through an examination of political statements, government documents, opinion columnists, historians, letters to the editor, and other sources, the article traces both the silence and condemnation of Reconstruction on the part of many civil rights supporters.

Amid the inflation crisis of the 1970s, the Austrian School economist F. A. Hayek presented a radical proposal to solve inflation: the denationalization of currency and the introduction of competing currencies into the monetary system. While Hayek's proposal proved too radical for mainstream economists, Hayek found support within the American libertarian movement. Libertarians realized that Hayek's radical proposal would limit state control over the monetary system and allow for the free exchange of gold. Even though libertarians were not immediately successful in bringing Hayek's plan to fruition, their continued activism paved the way for the creation of cryptocurrency in 2009. This article demonstrates how Hayek and his libertarian supporters opened a new chapter in the history of the “money question” in the United States by advocating for the elimination of the government monopoly over money and the abolition of monetary politics itself.