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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 April 2024
In recent years, the variation in firms' tax-avoidance behavior has attracted a lot of attention, both theoretically and empirically. This study investigates the governance role of multiple large shareholders in firms' tax-avoidance behavior, using a sample of Chinese state-controlled listed firms over the period 2004–2016. We find that the ownership stake of a firm's largest shareholder is negatively associated with tax avoidance among state-controlled firms. Second, other large non-state shareholders negatively affect tax avoidance of state-controlled firms. The former effect is particularly strong when the local government is the controlling shareholder. Finally, differences in institutional quality influence the largest shareholder's tendency to engage in tax avoidance in state-controlled firms. For state-controlled firms, a better institutional environment elicits more tax avoidance and thus curtails minority-investor expropriation.
近年来,企业税收筹划行为的演变吸引了理论研究和实证研究的广泛关注。本文选取 2004 年至 2016 年中国国有控股上市公司为研究对象,深入分析了多个大股东在企业税务筹划中的治理作用。研究发现,国有控股企业第一大股东的持股比例与税收筹划行为呈显著的负相关关系。其次,其他非国有性质的大股东对国有控股企业的税收筹划行为也有抑制作用,特别是当控股股东为地方政府时,该效应更为突出。研究还发现,不同的制度环境质量对国有控股企业第一大股东实施税务筹划的倾向产生影响,良好的制度环境促进了国有企业的税收筹划行为,从而降低了对中小投资者权益的侵占。