Article 8(2)(b)(iv), second alternative, of the Statute of the International Criminal Court lists as a war crime the launching of an attack that may cause excessive damage to the natural environment. The incorporation of this offence into the ICC Statute appears to be a great achievement, as it is the first time that such conduct has expressly been declared to entail individual criminal responsibility under an international treaty. It is, however, submitted that Article 8(2)(b)(iv), second alternative, of the ICC Statute, suffers from a serious lack of definition. In addition, the provision depends on an extremely high damage threshold which further complicates its application in practice.

This article illustrates how the ECCC is struggling to combine successfully two distinct institutional responses to crimes, by being both a criminal tribunal, with its formal rules of procedure and focus on retributive justice, and a quasi-truth and reconciliation commission, with its more flexible approach to participatory rights for victims and focus on reconciliation. The article highlights the advantages and challenges of adopting a ‘two for the price of one’ model within the Cambodian context and uses the experiences of the ECCC to underscore important lessons for future ad hoc and hybrid courts.

It can be shown that – as with the tie between crimes against humanity and the perpetration of other international crimes in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg – the context element of the crimes against humanity as set out in the Rome Statute is based on the international law principle of non-interference in the affairs of a foreign country, and only serves to justify ‘international’ jurisdiction in respect of crimes which are typically already punishable pursuant to the lex loci commissii. As a consequence, the feature of a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population’ is not an aggravating circumstance in respect of the material facts of the case that define the wrong of the act (Unrecht) or the offender's blameworthiness (Schuld), but a jurisdictional element which is a mere precondition for prosecution only.

This article considers the application of international human rights treaties or conventions to domestic law in common law countries and the historical differences in approach between some jurisdictions. It promotes the view that the judiciary of a country which has signed an international human rights treaty or convention may refer to such a treaty when interpreting domestic law, notwithstanding the fact that the treaty or convention has not been incorporated into domestic legislation. The article also suggests that international human rights treaties and conventions have a role in developing international criminal law and international humanitarian law. It cites the example of the decision that forced marriage is an inhumane act, a crime against humanity, by the Special Court of Sierra Leone, and gives the factual and jurisprudential background to that decision.

Sierra Leone experienced particularly heinous and widespread crimes against humanity and war crimes during its eleven years of civil war from 1991 to 2002. During the war, the civilian population was targeted by all the fighting factions. Civilians were captured, abducted, and held as slaves used for forced labour. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations in 2002, through Security Council Resolution 1315. It is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. The aim of this paper is to sketch out the extent to which the jurisprudence of the Special Court can serve as a model for efficient and effective administration of criminal justice nationally through the preservation of its legacy.

The Rwandan genocide remains one of the most horrific atrocities of the twentieth century, resulting in the death of an estimated 500–800,000 human beings, massacred over a 100-day period. In the fourteen years since the genocide, attempts at justice and reconciliation in Rwanda have involved a delicate interplay between national legal systems and the international legal order. This article examines three fora in which Rwandans have been tried for involvement in the genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rwandan courts including Gacaca tribunals, and French attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction. Using Rwanda as a case study, the article illustrates the issues, concerns, and difficulties that arise when multiple jurisdictions assert a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of serious atrocity crimes. Beginning with a discussion of the political context, this article considers what the competing narratives and litigation in various fora have meant for the project of international and transnational criminal justice. Cases involving the commission of atrocities pose unique challenges for the international legal order. As the normative structure of international criminal law has arguably been strengthened, political constraints increasingly come to the fore. As illustrated by Rwanda, universal jurisdiction or other bases of jurisdiction may remain necessary vehicles for justice and reconciliation, or, at the very least, they may serve as a catalyst for change in Rwanda itself.

The US Supreme Court case of José Ernesto Medellín, Petitioner v. Texas, decided on 25 March 2008, has generally been seen as a US refusal to follow unambiguous treaty provisions. There has not been such a strong reaction to US behaviour relative to specific treaty obligations since the 1992 Alvarez-Machain case. The Supreme Court majority (six votes to three) held that ‘neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law’. The uncomfortable – and to many illogical – conclusion reached by the Court was that even though Avena is an ‘international law obligation on the part of the United States’, it is not binding law within the United States even in the light of an explicit presidential order. While the result may be disappointing, the case should be understood in the context of a legal system that (i) makes treaties part of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’; (ii) has developed a complicated concept of self-executing treaties; and (iii) can be hesitant to direct states (sub-national units) to follow presidential directives even on matters of foreign policy.

This article examines the existence, nature, and content of the non-intervention principle in contemporary international law, concentrating on the application of the principle to areas other than the use of force. It looks at the historical development of the principle and the sources and evidence of the law, in particular resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the decisions of the International Court of Justice, and the practice of states. The article then considers some specific treaty-based applications of the principle, and explores how far the principle may apply to non-treaty, non-forcible situations. It next considers a number of circumstances that may preclude the wrongfulness of intervention (Security Council authorization, consent, and countermeasures), before drawing some tentative conclusions.

The first Telders Competition was organized in 1977 on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Telders International Law Students Debating Society. Due to its success the Competition has been held annually ever since at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Nowadays it is considered to be the most prestigious and important international moot court in Europe. Teams from over forty European universities compete in national rounds, with the successful teams participating in the international rounds held in April in The Hague.

The international legal entitlement by which a state constitutionally designates its name, or a province therein, involves a unilateral act. Where, however, another state wishes to choose the same appellation, as is the case with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the matter can only be resolved by reference to the first user and the maxim prior in tempore potior in jure. The first user must provide evidence of continuous use and of protest in those cases where the same appellation was appropriated by a third state. Under such circumstances the entitlement becomes exclusive, rather than concurrent, because the prior user may be said to possess a sound historic title, such that has been recognized by international judicial bodies to determine acquisition of territory, effective administration, historic bays, and so on. The exclusivity of the entitlement is further reinforced by analogy with general principles derived from the law of trademarks. At a practical level, the application of the international law of geographical indications clearly demonstrates that the designation ‘Macedonia’ cannot be used for a significant number of products originating in FYROM, since the Greek province of Macedonia has for a long time branded and registered such products. This will create insurmountable problems for producers in FYROM when they try to brand their goods under the country's constitutional name. A change of name, particularly through the compromisory use of a compound, would alleviate legal, political, and financial concerns.

Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.

This case concerns a claim for damages by the State of Rosmarus following an accidental explosion and leak at an offshore oil rig operated by the State of Urusus and the seizure of an Urusus-flagged fishing vessel by the State of Rosmarus. It involves issues of public international law, including the law of the sea, the law of treaties, and international environmental law.

In recent times the human rights discourse has become increasingly concerned with the relationship between domestic and international (UN and regional) human rights law. In 2007, two significant additions to this body of scholarship appeared. Although the authors of these texts are based in Canada and the United Kingdom respectively, their contributions explore the domestic–international relationship from a particularly African angle. While both works are concerned with the national arena (local activist forces and national human rights institutions respectively), the one investigates the domestic impact of international law and institutions, while the other explores the increased international impact of a particular domestic institution.

According to well-established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the prohibition on expulsion resulting in ill-treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is ‘absolute’: it does not allow for balancing of interests. Analysis of the Court's case law, however, shows that the application of the provision involves various forms of balancing, for example when delimiting the burden of proof or qualifying an act as ill-treatment. The absolute character expresses a value judgement about the importance of the prohibition, and it serves as an argumentative tool applied to sustain wide or inclusive readings of Article 3 ECHR.

On 11 December 2008 the UN General Assembly adopted a set of draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers which had been prepared by the International Law Commission (ILC) between 2002 and August 2008. These draft articles are the first official instrument that lays down rules of international law for the management and protection of groundwater, which makes up 97 per cent of the Earth's freshwater resources, excluding the resources locked in polar ice. This article discusses the contribution of the draft articles to the development of international water law. It first provides some background on the importance of shared groundwater resources, then describes the ILC's work on transboundary aquifers, and finally assesses in detail the draft articles and the way ahead.

Despite its not being an entirely new debate in international law and international relations, the nexus between human rights and non-state actors has become a highly relevant topic of scholarly research, as witnessed by the three works under review, published in 2005 and 2006. When Andrew Clapham published in 1993 Human Rights in the Private Sphere, in which he already questioned the public/private divide of human rights law, the book was then categorized as both ‘adventuresome and timely’. Some fifteen years later, an analysis of this topic can no longer be called ‘adventuresome’, but the timeliness remains beyond doubt.

The awards on liability and damages for violations of international humanitarian law of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission uncover both the extent of state responsibility for unlawful displacement and deportation of civilian population resulting from wrongful actions of belligerents under international law and the availability of remedies for victims of such violations. The Commission reached a number of important decisions based on government-to-government claims brought by Ethiopia and Eritrea for injuries, losses, and damage suffered by individuals and groups uprooted by the war. While these decisions bring to light the potential of international humanitarian law in addressing the plight of the displaced, they also expose the limitations of the tribunal's mandate and its interpretation of existing law. The aim of this essay is to analyse the case law of the Commission in the light of international law applicable to situations of displacement of civilians triggered by international armed conflicts, and evaluate the relevance of the Commission's jurisprudence for the development of the law in the field.