On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed an application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two states relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two states.

On 8 July 1991, Qatar filed an application instituting proceedings against Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two states relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two states.

Libya filed two separate applications on 3 March 1992. In the applications, Libya contended that it had not been possible to settle this dispute by negotiations and that the parties unable to agree on the organization of an arbitration to hear the matter. It accordingly submitted the disputes to the Court on the basis of Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention. Libya refers in the applications to the charging of two Libyan nationals, by the Lord Advocate of Scotland, and by a Grand Jury of the United States, respectively, with having caused a bomb to be placed aboard a Pan-am flight, which bomb subsequently exploded, causing the aeroplane to crash. Libya contends that the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, by rejecting the Libyan efforts to resolve the matter within the framework of international law, including the Montreal Convention, are pressuring it into surrendering the two Libyan nationals for trial. In this connection, Libya refers to Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, according to which the charge constitutes an offence, and to the several other articles of that Convention which are relevant to Libya's alleged right to jurisdiction over the matter and the prosecution thereof. Libya alleges that these obligations are breached by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively.

Indonesia and Malaysia jointly seized the Court on 2 November 1998 of their dispute concerning sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, two islands in the Celebes Sea. They did so by notifying the Court of a Special Agreement, which was signed between them on 31 May 1997 at Kuala Lumpur and entered into force on 14 May 1998. In the Special Agreement, the Parties request the Court “to determine on the basis of the treaties, agreements and any other evidence furnished by [them], whether sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan belongs to the Republic of Indonesia or to Malaysia.” They express the wish to settle their dispute “in the spirit of friendly relations existing between [them] as enunciated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia” and declare in advance that they will “accept the Judgment of the Court given pursuant to [the] Special Agreement as final and binding upon them.”

On 27 February 1998, the International Court of Justice rejected the preliminary objections of the US and of the UK in the cases concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie. The arguments made to the Court, and its decisions on jurisdiction and admissibility, are examined with a view to ascertaining the issues facing the Court, as well as the possible outcomes, if the cases reach the merits stage. The disputes over the Montreal Convention are considered, but particular attention is paid to the legal effects and, more widely, the legality of the relevant Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 748 and 883). The underlying question to be considered is whether there are any indications in the judgments that the Court is moving towards review of those resolutions.

The provisions of the ICJ Rules of Court concerning counter-claims have fallen to be applied in two recent cases, in circumstances such the Court has had to examine the nature of a counter-claim and the conditions for its admission as such, and in particular the nature of the ‘direct connection’ with the subject-matter of the application, required by the Rules. In each case the counter-claim was admitted, over the dissent of some judges: these decisions are probably justified, even though some aspects of the reasoning may be criticised.

Litigation over the right of detained foreign nationals to be notified of their right to seek consular assistance in death penalty cases is important to the more than 80 foreign nationals currently on death row in the United States. It also raises more general questions about the role of international law and of international courts in sensitive criminal cases before national courts. International courts and litigants may enhance the likelihood of compliance in such cases by insisting on fair and deliberate procedures, on transparent and thoroughly articulated reasoning, and on prudent shaping of remedies.

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.

A critical analysis, considering first, the legal competence and propriety of the Court in giving an opinion pursuant to the dispute settlement machinery of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of United Nations, whereby advisory jurisdiction over disputes of the UN is equated to contentious jurisdiction between consenting states; and second, the effect in municipal law of a state's obligation to respect the UN Secretary-General's certificate that a UN expert is entitled to immunity from legal process. The Court preserves resort to local courts but requires communication of the UN certificate and immunity to be dealt with expeditiously as a preliminary issue.

In the Preliminary Objections phase of this case the Court followed its previous jurisprudence based on the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case (1957) concerning the operation of Article 36(2) of its Statute. It is argued here that there were compelling reasons why the Court should have reassessed this jurisprudence. The implications of the Right of Passage doctrine for the operation of Article 36(2) and the role of the Court in international affairs are also discussed.

No single political issue has engaged the ICJ more than that of South West Africa (Namibia). Over a period ranging from 1949 through 1971, recourse was had to the Court, both in its advisory and contentious capacities, on various aspects of the problem. Even today, after Namibia attained independence, the Court's jurisprudence and the saga of UN-Court relations in this matter continue to intrigue. This is because the questions raised have continuing relevance to many issues bearing on international law and international relations.

Much has been, and will be, written on the approach of the Court and of individual judges to a panoply of international legal questions raised in the course of the judicial proceedings. But, in fact, the long tale also offers researchers an enticing fountain of material on the role of law and adjudication in international relations, on the interaction between the UN judicial and political fora and, more broadly, between law and politics. This article focuses mainly on these latter, relatively neglected, aspects because it is with respect to these that the benefit of hindsight offers the ability to reassess and revise some of the earlier assumptions and to note some interesting paradoxes not readily discernible at the time. Perhaps revision of some of the axiomatic propositions long perpetuated in the field will offer better guidance to those seeking to enhance the role of international adjudication in world affairs.

On Monday 24 May 1999, Judge David Hunt confirmed an indictment against, and issued initial arrest warrants for Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Milan Milutinović, the President of Serbia; Nikola šainović, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Dragoljub Ojdanić, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army; and Vlajko Stojiljković, Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia.

On 30 August 1999, by leave of the confirming Judge, the Prosecution filed an amended indictment against Dragan Kolundžija.

By decision of the Judges at the Twentieth plenary session of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) two new rules were adopted, Rule 77 bis and Rule 84 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules). In addition, 13 rules were amended.

The accused is charged with both individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war. All crimes were allegedly committed at the Sušica camp in the municipality of Vlasenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. Given the inability of Bosnia and Herzegovina to execute the arrest warrant and the non-co-operation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, an international arrest warrant was issued to all states, pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The accused remains at large.

By decision of the Judges at the Nineteenth plenary session of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) one new rule was adopted and 16 rules of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were amended. The new rule concerns affidavit evidence. The rule regarding amendments of the rules was changed so that an amendment shall enter into force seven days after the day of issue of an official Tribunal document containing the amendment, instead of immediately after the issuance. The rules on contempt of the Tribunal and false testimony under solemn declaration were made stricter as they were both amended to allow for a Chamber to impose substantially longer terms of imprisonment on persons who have been found guilty of such offences.

On 23 July 1999, an Agreement on the enforcement of sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was concluded between the United Nations and the Federal Government of Austria. The formalization of the Agreement took place during a meeting in Vienna between Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, H.E. Mrs. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, State Secretary, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Austria and H.E. Mr. Nikolaus Michalek, Federal Minister for Justice of Austria. Austria is the fifth state to enter into such an Agreement.

Dražen Erdemović was one of the first people to appear in proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as a potential witness in the Rule 61 proceedings against Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. The proceedings involving his own actions have now been completed. The case of Dražen Erdemović opened a Pandora's box of complex legal and moral issues. In this article, the ground-breaking case is examined in its entirety, with an emphasis on the novel issues that arose at each stage. It provides an overview of the procedural and substantive issues, and considers the implications that the case has had upon the development of international law and the proceedings at the International Tribunal. Finally, this article considers the case of Dražen Erdemović in the context of the International Tribunal's mandate to bring peace and reconciliation to the former Yugoslavia.

Instead of conducting trials in absentia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has an innovative procedure against an accused not in custody. Officially, this ‘Rule 61 procedure’ is only a proceeding for reconfirming an indictment, which does not determine an accused's guilt or innocence. In substance, however, it has functioned as a trial-like procedure to some extent. As a judicial finding on legal issues, the decisions under the procedure have influenced subsequent trials. This article traces the evolution of the procedure and explores its unique character. In particular, by examining essential problems thereof, this article clarifies some points to be considered in establishing a similar mechanism for the International Criminal Court.

On 10 February 1999, H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden visited the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to sign an Agreement with the United Nations on the enforcement of sentences of the ICTY. The Agreement with Sweden differs from the previously concluded agreements with Italy, Finland and Norway in that it is limited to convicted persons with strong ties to Sweden.