Social justice is turning into an international concern. This development is a response to the continuous rise of socioeconomic inequality – the gap between the rich and the poor –growing in several OECD member states since the 1970s. International human rights law (IHRL) presently only establishes a weak normative framework regarding social justice. This article argues that the full potential of this framework has still not been activated by international human rights adjudication. There are several reasons for this: a complex history of ideas suggesting little common understanding of the notion of social justice, the focus of international human rights adjudication on individual rather than constitutional justice, and the priority of liberty rights over equality rights. Yet, the domination of the liberal over the social in international human rights adjudication has started to change. The article shows how the social justice concern is beginning to be incorporated into IHRL by judicial interpretation of international equal protection and non-discrimination law (international equal protection law, IEPL). Integrating the social justice concern into IEPL is a legitimate yet transformative step as it increases judicial discretion at the international level. More than many other human rights, socioeconomic equality is highly context-specific and depends on a complex factual assessment of the local circumstances. This exacerbates the institutional legitimacy challenge levelled against international human rights courts. However, the article argues that the legitimacy challenge can be alleviated by focusing more on procedural rather than a substantive international review.

Around a century ago, Zhou Wei became the first Chinese francophone international lawyer. Yet his contributions to international law are often overlooked in academic literature even though he was the first Chinese member of the renowned Institute of International Law, and he had proposed a nascent concept of a ‘League of Nations’ even before Woodrow Wilson did. However, there has been no study on Chinese members of the Institute of International law, and even less research about Zhou. This article aims to piece together his life and work. It begins with a detailed account of Zhou’s education and work from Beijing to Paris, Geneva, and Fribourg. It then uncovers how he managed to shatter the racial ‘glass ceiling’ by being elected to the Institute while China was still a geopolitically weak country, shackled by numerous ‘unequal treaties’. It also recounts his contributions to the study and development of international law. Above all, this article argues that Zhou’s career epitomized the pioneering spirit of his generation of Chinese international lawyers who put their legal and foreign language skills to the benefit of China, and assiduously guarded against any encroachment of Chinese sovereignty. This article will examine and assess Zhou’s two most significant contributions to public international law.

The structure of the global governance system has undergone significant changes in the past few years. From a system governed primarily by global public law institutions established through multilateral treaties, it has metamorphosed into a hybrid field in which a plethora of public, private, and semi-public institutions interact in various ways. The shift to a hybrid global governance architecture presents a complex challenge for legal and political theory, with immense policy implications. In the present article, I respond to this challenge by developing a new model of transnational legal authority, which conceptualizes it as an emergent, network-based phenomenon. According to this model, the emergence of transnational networked authority is dependent on the existence of a multi-layered structure of strongly connected transnational regimes. Key factors in the emergence of networked authority are the normative and compliance synergies that arise through the densification of links across the network. I examine in this context the linkage between the sociological and the jurisprudential aspects of the authority of private transnational regulatory regimes, and develop the idea of ‘network grounding’, which emphasizes the relational structure of private transnational legality. I illustrate the thesis by reviewing findings from a network analysis of transnational corporate social responsibility networks.

The quantity of man-made space objects, ranging from abandoned launch vehicle stages to fragmentation debris, is remarkable. At the time, the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty did not (and perhaps could not) anticipate how great the problem of debris in outer space would one day become. As a result, they only drafted general provisions for the protection of the space environment which are generally deemed insufficient. This article aims to demonstrate that both general rules of international law and the UNCOPUOS Debris Mitigation Guidelines come to the rescue in addressing the space debris issue as they complement and complete the general obligations contained in the Outer Space Treaty. Particular attention is paid to anti-satellite weapon tests, which have catastrophic consequences in terms of creating debris but nonetheless continue to be carried out. Finally, it ascertains whether an obligation on states to actively remove their space debris exists.

This article examines when states are allowed to use force against neutral merchant ships outside territorial waters. This is regulated by both international humanitarian law and the prohibition of the use of force, which apply concurrently to naval warfare. The prohibition of the use of force imposes narrower limits than international humanitarian law, in the sense that certain actions that have traditionally been permitted under international humanitarian law are contrary to the prohibition of the use of force. The prohibition of the use of force exempts uses of force based on UN Security Council resolutions, consent and self-defence. Where there is no UN Security Council resolution or consent, self-defence remains the only option, and self-defence does not give a right to direct the use of force towards third states or their ships. Therefore, the right to self-defence does not permit blockades outside territorial waters or visit and search operations that are not founded on specific suspicions against individual ships, even though such operations may be permitted under international humanitarian law. These conclusions are supported by an examination of state practice and opinio juris, where the few relevant instances that do exist have met with widespread protests from other states.

Current efforts to address the challenges faced by migrants at sea are not effective, as the attention is deflected to security measures for deterring people to leave their countries in the first place, rather than efforts to provide for an adequate search and rescue system which will preserve their rights and lives. This article puts an individual right to be rescued at sea on the legal map mindful of evolving migration challenges and the need to be responsive to human rights crises. By contextualizing philosophical theories that have shaped our understanding of the idea of human rights, it turns to examine the pathways in which rights on the horizon emerge and achieve full recognition. This article contends that irregular migration by sea necessitates normative change and activates an international dialogue on recognizing a right to be rescued at sea that will utmost challenge the boundaries of rights beyond national borders.

This article offers one of the first comprehensive analyses of China’s emerging practice in subsidizing the low carbon energy (LCE) transition by using the new energy vehicles (NEVs) industry as a case study. It puts forward a fresh framework for this analysis by dividing the NEV value chain into three segments: upstream, midstream, and downstream. Based on this framework, it expounds a strategic shift of China’s subsidization strategy across the NEV value chain, that is, from disproportionately subsidizing the midstream segment that produces NEVs and parts to increasingly subsidizing the upstream and downstream segments to promote research and development (R&D) and expansion of NEV infrastructure and consumption throughout the economy. It argues that this shift mainly comes out of the evolution of China’s industrial policies and economic priorities, which will continue to play a decisive role in the future restructuring and transformation of the NEVs sector. This shift may also reflect China’s intention to reduce potential trade conflicts and maximize WTO-compliance but only to the extent that doing so would not unduly constrain its capacity to pursue its economic goals and industrial policies. In addition, while the WTO rules and jurisprudence may accommodate some of these subsidies (e.g., NEV infrastructure subsidies), the relevant rules will need to be further developed to provide more policy space for other types of subsidies used worldwide (e.g., R&D subsidies). Until then, it remains debatable as to whether the WTO provides sufficient room for countries to facilitate a green recovery in the post-pandemic era.

Geographical phenomena impacting the shape of coastlines may have implications for the stability of maritime boundaries delimited by agreement or judicial process. Sea level rise resulting from human-caused climate change has recently arisen as an additional phenomenon compelling the re-assessment of the stability of maritime boundaries over time. In a recent article published in this Journal, Dr. Snjólaug Árnadóttir has argued that a solution to the challenges of coastline change could be for maritime boundaries to fluctuate following the fluctuation of the baselines on which their course depends. By way of reply to Dr. Árnadóttir’s suggestion, this article argues that fluctuating boundaries have no legal basis either in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or in judicial decisions. Moreover, the delimitation process in three stages, commonly applied by international courts and tribunals since the Black Sea judgment, appears to be ill-suited for establishing fluctuating boundaries. There seems to be other solutions to the problem of coastline change, which this article also briefly explores.

This article is a rejoinder to Dr. Massimo Lando’s ‘Stability of maritime boundaries and the challenge of geographical change’ which proposes that positive international law offers no legal basis for the delimitation of fluctuating boundaries and discusses the many complexities involved in the delimitation and management of such boundaries. This rejoinder delves deeper into the main point of contention: the legal basis for fluctuating boundaries. It argues that coastal states have an inherent entitlement to a territorial sea and that Article 15 of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entails a default rule for the establishment of provisional fluctuating boundaries. This limit is not necessarily a strict median line because it may be adjusted by reference to special circumstances. Furthermore, the lack of explicit reference to provisional arrangements in UNCLOS Article 15 should not be read as an indication that there are no provisional boundaries in the absence of boundary agreements.

This article further argues that there are judicial precedents for fluctuating boundary-segments. The Nicaragua v. Honduras decision left a segment of the territorial sea un-delimited, resulting in a partially fluctuating boundary, until otherwise agreed. Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explicitly established a mobile boundary-segment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua but as highlighted by Dr. Lando, this was done with the permission of the parties. Much depends on the claims brought by disputing parties and their stance on fluctuating boundaries but this decision demonstrated the ICJ’s willingness to employ fluctuating boundaries in response to coastal instability.

In discussions of impunity, such as the one surrounding the International Criminal Court, the concept of impunity itself has remained relatively unattended. Examining the concept more closely reveals that we use it in both thin and thick senses, the thin relating to a concern about the values of punishment and the criminal law and the thick to a broader notion of equality, of which crimes being punished (equally) is one aspect, but not the totality of the issue. Only a thick version of impunity captures all that makes it a problem we care greatly about. According to this conception, what makes impunity a problem is primarily a failure to ensure equality before the law. This can show up in two ways. First, when a crime is not prosecuted or punished because the offender belongs to a group of people who are beyond the reach of the law. Second, when a crime is not prosecuted or punished because the victim belongs to a group of people deemed less important in the eyes the law. Institutions and courts of law end impunity, first and foremost, by restoring the experience of equality against privilege and brute power. This sets an important challenge to the International Criminal Court, because while the Court may serve many important values, its current institutional formation and its political context seem to undermine its capacity to contribute to end impunity in the thicker sense.

In March 2011, three defence witnesses, who were in detention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), were transferred to The Hague to testify before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the trial against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Once the witnesses had testified, they were returned to the DRC, even though they feared for their lives, and had lodged an asylum request with the Dutch authorities.

This article argues that the ICC is bound by the principle of non-refoulement: a prohibition on returning or extraditing an individual to a country where there is a real risk, or substantial grounds, they might be subjected to torture or other human rights violations. Like other individuals, ICC witnesses should enjoy protection from refoulement. This conclusion is based on analysis of the relationship between the ICC and international human rights law through two different approaches. The ICC, as an international organization, is obliged to respect the principle of non-refoulement but additional obligations stem from the Rome Statute. Article 21(3) obligates the ICC to interpret and apply the law governing protective measures in conformity with ‘internationally recognized’ human rights. In concluding that the ICC has not fully acknowledged the extent of witnesses’ rights, this article proposes strengthening the role of the witness protection programme to address the evident deficiencies in the ICC’s current practice.