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Roman law and modern capitalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel*
Affiliation:
Bristol Polytechnic
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Extract

The tendency of lawyers these days is to deny much of a place to Roman Law and this is reflected not only in a widely held view that since the eighteenth century legal innovation has been so great as to have left the Corpus Juris Civilis a ‘mere antiquarianism’: it is also reflected in the fact that fewer and fewer law schools in the West insist on Roman law as a compulsory subject. Indeed, the number of law faculties or departments in England offering the subject as even an optional course can probably now be counted on the fingers of, if not one hand, then two.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , July 1984 , pp. 185 - 210
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1984

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References

1. The expression is taken from, Sawer, ‘The Western Conception of Law’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Ch 1, Part II, para 33. However this in no way implies that Sawer himself holds this view of Roman law.

2. For an essay supporting the continued teaching of Roman law, see eg Lawson, Many Laws: Selected Essays, Vol I (North-Holland, 1977) Ch 7. See also, Stein, ‘Fundamental Legal Institutions’ (1982) 2 Legal Studies I; Stein Legal Institutions: The Development of Dispute Settlement (Butterworths, 1984).

3. See, Maitland, Introduction to Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Cambridge, 1900; trans Maitland) p viii; Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (Penguin, 1975); Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1975).

4. See eg Ourliac & De Malafosse, Histoire du Droit Privé (PUF, 3 Vols, 1968–1971); Villey, La formation de la pensée juridique modern (Montchretien, 4th edn, 1975).

5. See, Griffith, ‘The Teaching of Law and Politics’ (1982) 16 The Law Teacher 1.

6. See Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977).

7. See eg Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979).

8. See eg Home Office v Harman [1982] 2 WLR 338 at 341 per Lord Diplock: but cf Lord Scarman at 352–355.

9. See eg the new edition of Smith & Thomas, A Casebook on Contract 7th edn, (Sweet & Maxwell, 1982): there seems to be little account taken of Professor Atiyah's exhaustive researches on contract and the common law (see above n 7), although the editors/authors do claim to have been ‘provoked’ by Grant Gilmore's Death of Contract (Ohio, 1974).

10. D.1.1.1.2 etc.

11. D.1.1.5.

12. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford, 1936), Ch VIII.

13. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (Oxford, 1957) p 51. See also, Szladits, ‘The Civil Law System’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Ch 2, Part II, para 26.

14. Stein (op cit, n 2), p 6.

15. See generally, Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (2nd end, Oxford, 1973; trans Kelly).

16. J.3.13.1.

17. D.1.5.1. It should perhaps be stressed at once that for the present writer ‘actions’ has a wider meaning than just the narrow rules of procedure; it includes the forms and types of remedies: see eg J.4.6.1. But cf. Watson, The Making of the Civil Law (Harvard, 1981), Ch II; ‘The Law of Actions and the Development of Substantive Law in the Early Roman Republic’ (1973) 89 LQR 387.

18. The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), Ch V.

19. Szladits (op cit, n 13), para 27; Ullmann, Law and Politics (op cit, n 3), pp 215 ff; Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law (Oxford, 1940) pp 141, 145.

20. Szladits, para 18; Merryman The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford, 1969), pp 99–102; Eörsi, Comparative Civil (private) Law (Budapest, 1979), para 35.

21. Loi des 16–24 aoǔt 1790 art 13. See generally, Kahn-Freund, Lévy & Rudden, A Source-book on French Law (Oxford, 2nd edn, 1979), pp 204–238.

22. Waline, Droit administratif (1961), para 33, extracted Source-book (n 21. supra), pp 209–211.

23. Brèthe de la Gressaye, ‘Droit Administratif et Droit Privé’ (1950), para 2, extracted Source-book (n 21 supra), p 224; Turpin, ‘Public Contracts’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol VII, Ch 4, para 34.

24. Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827; cf Eorsi (op cit, n 10), para 183 (see also, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol VII, Ch 5, para 3).

25. Weir, ‘The Common Law System’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Ch 2, Part III, para 115.

26. Szladits (op cit, n 13), paras 52–57; Eörsi (op cit, n 20), para 36.

27. Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435 at 481; and see more recently, Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman [1982] 3 WLR 1096 at 1102; but cf Lord Wilberforce in Davy v Spelthorne BC [1983] 3 WLR 742 at 750–751.

28. See eg Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004; Bognor Regis UDC v Campion [1972] 2 QB 169. And see generally, Weir (op cit, n 25), paras 115–124.

29. Barnardo v Ford [1892] AC 326.

30. Willmore v SE Electricity Board [1957] 2 L1 Rep 375.

31. Cinnamond v British Airport Authority [1980] 1 WLR 582; discussed by the present writer, (1981) 97 LQR 19.

32. Op cit, (n 25), para 129.

33. [1971] Ch 734.

34. Bromley LBC v GLC [1982] 2 WLR 62, HL.

35. Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977, s 4.

36. Eörsi (op cit, n 20), para 183; (op cit, n 24), para 3.

37. This question is tackled elsewhere by the present writer: (1983) 46 MLR 558. Accordingly it is only pursued very briefly in this present essay. See also, Weir (op cit, n 25), para 130.

38. Harlow, ‘“Public” and “Private” Law: Definition Without Distinction’ (1980) 43 MLR 421.

39. For a general discussion in the context of comparative law see, Eörsi (op cit, n 20), especially paras 17–33: Renner (and Kahn-Freund). The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions (RKP, 1949: reprint 1976).

40. Eörsi, Ibid. paras 34–35. It may be that the Romans achieved this isolation in a negative (ie by concentrating on the notion of private law) rather than in a positive way: Schulz (op cit, n 12), Ch III.

41. Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford, 4th edn, 1977) pp 11, 489–490; Davy v Spelthorne BC [1983] 3 WLR 712 at 750–751.

42. D.1.5.1.; J.1.2.12.

43. Jolowicz (op cit, n 13), p 62; Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford, 1962) p 60.

44. See eg Jolowicz, ibid, Ch VIII.

45. Pound, ‘Classification of Law’ (1924) 37 Harvard LR 933, 952; Buckland, A Textbook on Roman Law (Cambridge, 3rd edn, 1966, by Stein), p 58; Villey, supra, n 4, p 529.

46. Graveson, Status in the Common Law (Athlone, 1953). pp 36–40: Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract (Oxford, 1975), pp 206–207.

47. Atiyah (op cit, n 7), p 102.

48. Maine, Ancient Law (1861) Ch V. Of course the position was much more complex than just a simple dichotomy between status and contract: feudalism also utilized notions of agreement and property just as modern law still uses status in both contract and tort (see eg Stevenson v Beverley Bentinck Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 606). See generally, Graveson (op cit, n 46), Ch III; Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings (Stevens, 1978), Ch 3 (30 MLR 635); Watson (op cit, n 17), pp 19–22.

49. See Duff, Personality in Roman Private Law (Cambridge, 1938), especially Ch IX.

50. Renner (op cit, n 39); Eörsi (op cit, n 20), para 21.

51. Kahn-Freund, Introduction to Renner (ibid), pp 19, 39; Renner, ibid, pp 115–118.

52. Renner, ibid, pp 122ff.

53. Lawson & Markesinis, Tortious Liability for Unintentional Harm in the Common Lam and the Civil Law (Cambridge, 1982), Vol 1, p 60. For the American debate on this topic see Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (1977); Schwartz, , ‘Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation’ (1981) 80 Google Scholar Yale LJ 1717.

54. Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law, Vol II, Ch IX: Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1979), pp 17–28, 36–37. And see also, Watson (op cit, 17), Ch III.

55. Buckland & McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (Cambridge 2nd edn, 1952), p xvi.

56. Weir, ‘Complex Liabilities’, International Encylopedia of Comparative Law, Vol XI, Ch 12, para 67; and see footnote 17 above.

57. See eg Diplock LJ in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at 242–243.

58. [1966] Ch 538 CA, [1968] AC 58, HL.

59. [1965] 3 All ER 858 at 860–861, per Burgess V-C.

60. G.4.1–3; J.4.6.1.

61. Lawson, Introduction to the Law of Property (Oxford, 1958), pp 1–2; Ourliac & De Malafosse, Histoire du Droit Privé: Vol 2 (PUF, 2nd edn, 1971.), para 20. The main Roman text illustrating the person and person relationship is Justinian's view of an obligation: 5.3.13.1; the idea of a relationship between person and thing is inherent in a range of texts: D.6.1.1.3; D.6.1.2; D.6.1.5.5.; D.6.1.5; D.7.1.2; D.7.1.3.2. There is a discussion by the present author of the jurisprudential model established by the Romans in, ‘Classification of Law- I’ [Spring 1982] City of London Law Review 1.

64. D.44.7.3pr.

63. See eg D.5.1.38; D.6.1.1.3; D.13.6.2.

64. Buckland (op cit, n 45), p 426; J.3.19.19; G.3.100; D.2.14.17.3.

65. Nicholas (op cit, n 43), p 199.

66. Originally the name of the defendant in a real action was omitted as far as possible: Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford, 1951), pp 33–34. However the positive role of the third party is well brought out in the text dealing with pacts in rem: D.2.14.7.8.

67. Rather than concentrating upon the widow's rights an alternative approach might now be to concentrate on the nephew's act in terms of a wrong: could his refusal to pay the annuity be behaviour amounting to a tort? Certainly a contractor who negligently breaks his contract with a testator will be liable to a damages action in tort (Ross v Caunters [1980] Ch 197), and so why should there not be liability for a deliberate breach? No doubt the Roman jurists would have enjoyed this puzzle:.J.4.3.16; D.4.3.7.7; D.4.3.35.

68. D.44.7.3pr.

69. [1968] AC at 87.

70. See in particular Lord Pearce, pp 88–92.

71. D.44.7.3pr; D.41.1.36.

72. G.4.2–9; J.4.6.1; J.4.6.15.

73. Strictly of course an obligatio naturalis could give rise to no action in law; it could only be the basis for the refusal of a condictio indebiti: D.12.6.13pr; D.12.6.26.12; D.12.6.28; D.12.6.32.2; French CC Art 1235 para 2. But given its close relationship with unjust enrichment the next logical step might be to allow an ‘equitables’ debt claim: Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 97 ER 676. Interestingly Lord Upjohn came very close to specifically using this Roman notion when he stipulated that although the widow could gain no rights from the contract between the late Mr Beswick and the nephew, any money actually paid by the nephew coud be kept by the widow: [1968] AC at 96. See generally, Giffard & Villers, Droit Romain et Ancien Droit Francis (Obligations) (Dalloz, 4th edn, 1976), paras 301–304.

74. Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890.

75. Wilson v Lombank Ltd [1963] I WLR 1294: cf D.6.1.66.

76. See also, Sefton v Tophams Ltd [1967] 1 AC 50 at 64, 70–71, 75.

77. Introduction to Renner (op cit, n 39), pp 17–24; see also, Friedmann, Law in v Changing Society (Penguin, 2nd edn, 1972), Ch 3. But cf Kahn-Freund 93 LQR 508.

78. D.9.1.13pr; and see also, D.9.3.1.5; D.9.3.7.

79. Loi 57–298 du 11 mars 1957 art 1. And see generally, Edelman, Ownership of the Image (RKP, 1979, trans Kingdom).

80. Duff (op cit. n 49), pp 48–49. It must be said, however, that the texts dealing with legal personality do not appear under the heading Law of Persons: see, Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law (Cambridge, 1931), pp 86ff.

81. Graveson (op cit. n 46). pp 7–15, 36–40; Simpson (op cit, n 46), pp 106–207; Szladits (op cit, n 13) para 17: Ourliac & De Malafosse (op cit. n 61), paras 75–86. 123–126. 184, 188–189, 237.

82. On which see, Duff (op cit, n 49), especially Ch IX; Jolowicz (op cit. n 13), Ch XI.

83. [1897] AC 22; cf [1895] 2 Ch 323.

84. D.3.4.7.1: see also, D.4.3.15.1.

85. See eg the contract of partnership: D.17.2. However the Romans did not achieve a merging of the two ideas: legal personality and contract are treated separately because the partnership ‘firm’ was not seen as a separate legal entity. All the same, the ideas contained in titles 3.4 and 17.2 provide an excellent foundation for the modern business corporation; and compare also D.17.2.1.1. with D.1.8.6.1.

86. Noxal liability: D.9.4.2pr.

87. [1972] AC 153.

88. Ibid at 192–193; cf Lord Reid, pp 171–172.

89. Ibid at 175.

90. Cf D.9.4.3.

91. See eg Keppel Bus Co Ltd v Sa'ad bin Ahmad [1974] 2 All ER 700.

92. Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co [1957] AC 555.

93. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. ss 1–2; Ronex Properties Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1982] 3 WLR 875 at 882–883.

94. Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] 1 QB 792: Weir, Subrogation and Indemnity (Privately Published Note).

95. [1972] AC 153 at 174; cf D.9.4.3.

96. See eg Lord Wilberforce in Brome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027 at 1114.

97. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (4th edn, Stevens, 1979). pp 17–21.

98. Op cit, n 49, p 80; and see, D.4.3.15.1.

99. See eg D.41.2.1.22; D.41.2.2.

100. Gower (op cit, n 97), pp 397–401.

101. See eg Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1980), Chs I–IX.

102. D.9.2.51.2.

103. See eg Review of the Trade Description Act 1968: A Report by the Director General of Fair Trading (HMSO, 1976, Cmnd 6628). paras 52–63.

104. D.3.4.1pr.

105. [1980] 1 WLR 582.

106. Ward v Tesco Stores [1976] 1 All ER 219.

107. Demichel & Lalumière, Le Droit Public (Que Sais-Je? No 1327, PUF, 3rd edn, 1979), p 14.

108. Jolowicz (op cit, n 13), pp 75–76.

109. Via the office of Praetor: see, Nicholas (op cit, n 43), pp 19–28.

110. The emphasis on actions in the classical period is well brought out by Schulz (op cit, n 66), paras 13ff; and see his examples, D.4.3.35; D.16.3.1.38; D.9.2.41pr. The whole ‘actions’ approach is well illustrated in title 9.2 (unlawful damage): as with the English law of tort, the jurists start with a range of factual situations to see if, when categorised, they give rise to a damages remedy: see eg 18pr; 30.3; 31. And see also titles 41.1 (acquisition of ownership) and 6.1 (specific vindications): these can usefully be compared with the English near equivalents of sale of good/hire-purchase (substantive law) and the property torts (actions).

111. But cf Watson (op cit. n 17), p 15 n 2 who says that ‘this position seems wrong’ and criticises the writers who have made the observation. However it is submitted that Watson misses the point of the observation; the similarity lies in the fact that the Law of Actions encouraged lawyers to approach problems from the position of the remedy rather than the right. Thus title 6.1 compares well with the English forms of action approach to ownership of moveable goods in cases such as Foulds v Willoughby (1841) 8 M & W 540. 151 ER 1153 and Jacobs v Seward (1872) LR 5 App Cas 464: see also, Samuel, ‘Wrongful Interference with Goods’ (1982) 31 ICLQ 357 at 366–369.

112. See, David, , ‘The Different Conceptions of the Law: Introduction’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol II, Ch 1, Part I, paras 14–19 Google Scholar.

113. Kahn-Freund and Friedmann, supra, n 77.

114. On which see, Edelman, supra, n 79.

115. Hirst, Introduction to Edelman (ibid), pp 1–2.

116. Compare French CC Art 544 with Hill v CA Parsons & Co [1972] 1 Ch 305.

117. [1978] Ch 122; although it must now be pointed out that the authority of this decision is in question: Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum [1982] AC 173 at 187; RCA Corpn v Pollard [1982] 3 All ER 771, CA.

118. Ibid at 136 per Lord Denning MR; cf Lonrho and Pollard, supra.

119. Ibid at 144–145 per Waller LJ: cf Pollard, supra, at 782.

120. Another Roman idea: D.4.3.12; D.4.3.13.1; D.47.2.77.1; see also, A-G v Harris [1961] 1 QB 74; but cf Oliver LJ in Pollard, supra, at pp 780–783. In the present writer's opinion the decision in Island Records is justifiable on this well known (Roman) principle: it must surely be sound law that a person ran be prevented from making, or retaining, a profit from a criminal act: Reading v A-G [1951] AC 507: Geismar v Sun Alliance and London Insurance Co [1977] 3 All ER 570; Samuel (1983) 99 LQR 182.

121. French CC Art 544.

122. D.9.2.13pr: Edelman (op cit, n 79), Ch 4.

123. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, (Yale, 1922), pp 42–47. For an interesting Roman attempt to protect an interest, see, D.9.3.1pr-1: cf Denning LJ in Mint v Good [1951] 1 KB 517 at 526. And see also, RCA Corpn v Pollard [1982] 3 All ER 771 at 778.

124. Breach of Confidence is a good example: is this a question of property or obligations? Cf Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 923; and see, Weir (op cit. n 25), para 106.

125. [1979] Ch 344.

126. [1982] 2 WLR 338, HL.

127. Compare eg D.50.17.55 and D.8.2.9 with D.6.1.38.

128. The intermixing in English law of substantive ideas (negligence, contract, bailment) and the law of actions (conversion, detinue, trespass) in the area of moveable property has caused much confusion: see, Samuel (1982) 31 ICLQ 357.

129. Eörsi (op cit, n 10), para 31. Such an approach may of course be just another aspect of abuse of rights: Limpens (below, n 131), para 246.

130. D.6.1.38; D.8.1.9; G.1.53; J.1.8.2.

131. For a discussion of this concept see, Limpens, ‘Liability for One's Own Act’, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol XI, Ch 2, paras 230–255; Ghestin & Goubeaux, Traité de Droit Civil: Introduction Générale (LGDJ, 1977) pp 575–621; Weir (op cit. n 25), paras 93–96; Lawson, The Comparison: Selected Essays. Vol II (North-Holland, 1977, pp 238–243.

132. [1947] 1 KB 130; and see, Weir (op cit. n 25), para 96. The Roman lawyer, however, would probably have taken the common law approach: D.2.14.7.4.

133. D.50.17.55; Bradford Corpn v Pickles [1895] AC 587 at 598.

134. Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 ChD 542 at 552.

135. Lawson (op cit, n 131), p 242.

136. Lawson (op cit, n 2), Ch 8.

137. See eg Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977.

138. See eg Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana, 2nd edn, 1981); Murphy & Rawlings, ‘After the Ancient Regime: The Writing of Judgments in the House of Lords 1979–1980’ (1981) 44 MLR 617; (1982) 45 MLR 34.

139. On which see, Eörsi (op cit, n 20); Zweigert & Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (North-Holland, 1977, trans Weir), Vol I, pp 193–352: David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (Stevens, 2nd edn, 1978), paras 115–265.

140. David & Brierley, supra, para 21.

141. Zweigert, Kotz, Supra, Vol 1, p 274 Google Scholar; David & Brierley, supra, para 20.

142. See eg, Twining & Miers, How To Do Things With Rules (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2nd edn, 1982).

143. See eg, Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (Oxford, 1981) and supra (n 7).

144. See also materials cited above, n 61.

145. See eg D.19.2.22.3. D.4.4.16.4 which certainly represents an attitude inherent in modern contract law. And see generally, See, Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Duckworth, 1981).

146. Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corpn [1976] 1 QB 835 at 847, 849.

147. The privity rule is one the defensive: see, Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpy Construrtion UK Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571 at 591.

148. [1966] 1 QB 716. ‘The plaintiff sent her mink stole, via a contract with a third party, to be cleaned by the defendant firm: but the employee entrusted to clean it stole it instead.

149. See eg D.4.9.1ff.

150. [1966] 1 QB at 731.

151. See eg Vine v NDLB [1957] AC 488 at 507–509.

152. See Kahn-Freund (op cit, n 39), p 6; Watson (op cit, n 17), Ch II. Both of these writers suggest by their metaphors that the influence of Roman law operates at a lower level of abstraction than the basic conceptual model of relationships flowing between the units of persons, things and state- the model envisaged by the present writer. But at least there is general agreement as to the adaptability of Roman law to changing economic, political and social circumstances. But cf Villey, supra, n 4, pp 526 ff.

153. The law of obligations seems ill-suited to deal with the problem of road accidents and loss spreading: see eg Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 3rd edn, 1980); Tune, La Responsabilité Civile (Economica, 1981).

154. Cf Watson (op cit, n 17), Ch III.

* This essay is an expanded version of a paper delivered to the Anglo-American Conference in Law, London, 6July 1982.