Today, the original indigenous peoples of Australia comprise but one percent of the total population, numbering less than a quarter million. Living in rural communities, religious reserves and shanty towns, the greatest number are found in Queensland. However, in the Northern Territory, the subject of The Yolngu and their Land, the Aborigines make up twenty-five percent of the population.

The impact of what judges decide is a crucial part of what is studied by those sharing a political rather than only a legal perspective on the United States Supreme Court. It has become important as we have shifted our attention from “output, which is the decision of the Court including its orders and statement of policy” to consideration of “outcome, which is the final results or impact of output” (Barth, 1968: 315, note). This development is much more recent than the beginnings of the political perspective on the courts. Explicit attention to impact, backed by studies of impacts of particular decisions, is less than twenty years old, dating from the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which made political scientists aware that compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court was neither automatic, immediate, nor uniform. As Krislov (1963: 7) has remarked, from the standpoint of Court process, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education has had its greatest effect in educating “students as to the limits and operations of the court system generally.”

San Francisco's ethnic minorities tend to be clumped in relatively small areas, with the Negro population being concentrated in three main districts. This concentration of ethnic groups leads, of course, to racial imbalance in the schools, a problem which is most serious in the elementary schools. If one considers the four main groups of the city to be Negro, Oriental (which includes the city's small Japanese and Filipino population as well as the Chinese), Spanish white, and non-Spanish white, in 1964, 36 of the 96 elementary schools contained 90% or more of one group. Of these, nine were Negro, five Oriental, nineteen Spanish white, and three non-Spanish white. In the junior high schools there is less racial imbalance, but still some: in 1964 two schools were 80% and 61% Oriental; two were 86 and 83% Negro; and two were 85 and 72% white.

Schlegel is right. It is difficult to swallow the notion that twentieth century history began twenty years late. I agree that the central issue for legal historians is the growth of the nation state's apparatus. We should indeed be concerned with the regulation and direction of an economy. Yet my own preferred date for the beginning of twentieth century legal history is 1901. More precisely, I would pinpoint 2:15 A.M. on September 14, 1901, the morning Theodore Roosevelt became President (Pringle, 1956: 163).

Professor Allan Shapiro's article, “Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal” raises several questions about my 1954 article, “Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements.” I shall formulate the major questions, as I understand them, and suggest the answers as well as I can.

Pasadena, California, located roughly ten miles northeast of downtown Los Angeles, had a public school enrollment of slightly more than 31,000 during the 1964–65 school year. The racial distribution was 68.9% Caucasian, 21.1% Negro, and 9.9% Mexican-American and Japanese. The surrounding communities have essentially no minority group population and it is expected that migration of minority group members will continue to be concentrated in Pasadena. The residentially segregated pattern of the typical Northern city is conspicuous in Pasadena. The all-Negro neighborhood is present as is the totally white neighborhood. The intermediate areas contain various degrees of segregation.

The first difficulty in Eder is that the experience of academics working in the common law tradition renders us skeptical about the possibility that there could be something like an overall sociological theory of “the law.” What those in the Weberian tradition, including for these purposes Habermas, see as the law appears to us as quite a jumble of relatively discrete topics, such that the law of torts which looks different from the law of criminal procedure and, what is worse, the law of the sixth amendment's requirements with respect to counsel which looks different from the law of the sixth amendment's requirement with respect to confrontation of adverse witnesses. Nor does it seem to us that there are any readily available generalizations concerning long-term trends, as distinct from short-term variations attributable to differences among judges in their political preferences.