This article focuses on the issue of domestic violence in Muslim societies in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The analytical framework is comparative, emphasizing four factors and the interplay among them: shari'a (Islamic law), state power, intrafamily violence, and struggles over women's rights. The comparative approach historicizes the problem of domestic violence and impunity to consider the impact of transnational legal discourses (Islamism and human rights) on “local” struggles over rights and law. The use of shari'a creates some commonalities in gender and family relations in Muslim societies, notably the sanctioning and maintenance of male authority over female relatives. However, the most important issue for understanding domestic violence and impunity is the relationship between religion and state power. This relationship takes three forms: communalization, in which religious law is separate from the national legal regime; nationalization, in which the state incorporates religious law into the national legal regime; and theocratization, in which the national legal regime is based on religious law.

Although the United States is often criticized for its lack of historical consciousness, historicity provides a compelling rhetorical trump in constitutional argument, particularly according to advocates of original understanding jurisprudence or “originalism.” Originalism has also proven to be quite popular as a constitutional position, especially in public discourse outside academe and the courts. I argue that originalism's appeal derives from Americans' interest in heritage. Using the literature on public history, memory, and cultural studies to distinguish the cultural phenomenon of heritage from history proper, I argue that originalism, like heritage, offers the possibility of an immediate and authentic encounter with the past tied to a critique of modernism as both antidemocratic and inauthentic. Originalism portrays the federal period as a special moment of civic unity, whose virtues have been preserved by the larger public, but have been eroded among elites by modernity.

Through theoretically informed inquiry into congressional attitudes toward the Constitution and the courts as well as survey research of two modem Congresses, this study considers the prospects and implications of a more salient legislative role in constitutional affairs. By analyzing survey responses from the 86th (1959–61) and 106th (1999–2001) Congresses, and the political context in which these views were formed, this essay explores the legislature's evolving conception of its role and capacities as a constitutional interpreter. Among other findings, Congress demonstrates a persistent and somewhat surprising interest in asserting an independent, distinctive constitutional voice, although it has somewhat conflicted and underdeveloped views about how to achieve this objective. While this essay points to significant barriers to fostering a coherent and forceful congressional presence in constitutional decision making, it also suggests institutional organizations and strategies that may be promising bases for promoting this goal.