In his acclaimed synthesis of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Alan Knight observed that “the social bandit's career in Academe has somewhat paralleled his life under the greenwood tree. Introduced by Professor Hobsbawm, he was initially welcomed, even feted, and he put in many appearances in academic company; but then (inevitably, after such uncritical acceptance) some academics grew leery, and the recent trend-especially among experts—has been to qualify, de-emphasise and even deny his role.”

Throughout the 1980s one of the Reagan administration's most contested foreign policy initiatives was that toward Central America, where it attempted to defeat the Salvadoran guerrillas and overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Reagan's policy was challenged by civil society organizations, whose efforts to undermine support for Reagan's policy came to be known as the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM). What were the origins of this movement? I argue that previous explorations of the CAPSM's emergence are inadequate because they neglect the role played by Central Americans as purposive actors in the movement's rise and development. This article documents the ways in which Nicaraguans and Salvadorans, both in Central America and in the United States, played crucial roles in this transnational movement's creation and growth.

The purpose of this article is to review recent trends in the process of urbanization in major Latin American cities. Abundant literature on Third World urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s painted a fairly coherent picture of the process during these decades. That image, which has been generally accepted in both academic and policy circles, serves as the backdrop against which contemporary trends will be evaluated here. The population in Latin America was becoming rapidly urbanized, but the process has been frequently described as “distorted” in a number of ways by the common condition of underdevelopment in which these countries found themselves.

The relative success of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) is a puzzle for most theories of regional integration. This is due to its having achieved remarkable progress in spite of lacking features such as significant levels of previous interdependence (demand factor) or major regional institutions (supply factor). To account for this puzzle, it has been claimed that the operation of MERCOSUR rests on presidential diplomacy. Such a mechanism is understood as the resort to direct negotiations between the national presidents whenever a crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved. This article argues that presidential diplomacy—understood as political, summit diplomacy as opposed to institutionalized, professional diplomacy—is insufficient to account for the performance of MERCOSUR. Through the empirical analysis of three critical episodes, the article shows how institutional structures, shaped by the system of government of the member countries, have sustained presidential intervention and, hence, the process of regional integration.

Despite a growing literature on the left in Latin America, few studies have considered the fate of the right. This article examines a highly successful conservative party, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), which held power for close to two decades in El Salvador. The ARENA party used mano dura policies—defined by the introduction of discretionary crimes, diluted due process guarantees, and military participation in policing—to boost its support among constituencies plagued by crime. Two key factors prompted ARENA party strategists to emphasize security. First, a credible electoral threat existed from a leftist party hesitant to resort to harsh security measures. Second, factional divisions drove party strategy. Business elites who formed the core of the ARENA party refused to abandon unpopular economic reforms. Mano dura policies allowed the party to maintain support from traditional elites and their rural bases without reversals to its economic program. Party centralization facilitated the programmatic shift.

Muchos ven el gobierno de Evo Morales y el Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) como la vanguardia del “giro a la izquierda” en América Latina. Este artículo argumenta que hay una tension profunda dentro de la administración del MAS: un empuje para la justicia social, por un lado, y un abrazo a las instituciones liberales democráticas (sean elecciones, asambleas constituyentes y referenda directas públicas), por el otro. Una mirada de algunos de los conflictos producidos mientras el gobierno intenta poner en equilibrio estos dos marcos puede iluminar algunas tensiones subyacentes en la democracia realmente existiendo tanto como el liberalismo mismo. Sugiero que cuando Morales y compañía empujen su agenda, no solo están tratando de pasar más allá del neoliberalismo, sino también tratan de perfeccionar o “vernacularizar” el liberalismo para hacerlo más democrático y más relevante a los pueblos indígenas bolivianas. Entonces, en vez de pos-neoliberalismo, tal vez vemos esfuerzos de la transformación del liberalismo por medio de interacciones con culturas y demandas indígenas, con la meta de profundizar la democracia.

Although the 1970s witnessed a convergence of neoliberal economic policies and authoritarianism in the Southern Cone countries of Latin America, the 1980s gave way to a new combination of economic orthodoxy and democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Neoliberal economic projects emerged in these central Andean countries as they confronted broadly similar economic problems. Plummeting prices in the international market for key exports, decreased investment, and growing financial burdens imposed by the international debt created the parameters of la crisis—the topic that became a central focus of political discourse in these new democracies. At different points in time, each of the three countries responded to the crisis with neoliberal economic experiments. In Peru a turn toward neoliberalism occurred under the administration of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985), only to be completely reversed by the heterodox policies of Alan García (1985–). In Ecuador basic stabilization measures had already been undertaken by the government of Osvaldo Hurtado (1981-1984). León Febres Cordero (1984-1988) then committed the country to a monetarist and antistatist model. In Bolivia following the enormous instability and hyperinflation during the government of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1982-1985), the country adopted a neoliberal approach under the presidency of Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985-1988).

Looking back over patterns of economic adjustment and structural reform in Latin America since the debt crisis began in 1982, two broad trends stand out. The first is the dramatic fluctuation in macroeconomic policy between the orthodox programs traditionally advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the more interventionist or “heterodox” strategies that marked the policy environment after 1985 (Sheahan 1989). Although the orthodox-heterodox policy cycle is hardly new to the region and in fact has characterized the policy-making experience over the entire postwar era (Kaufman 1990), the 1980s represented the intensification of this cycle, especially in the extremity to which each set of policies was applied. The second trend follows from the first: the inability of states to follow through coherently on any given policy course (Fishlow 1989). While some exceptions to this trend can be cited (Chile, for example), the Latin American pattern has generally been one of failed adjustments and changed courses.

This article proposes a conceptual framework to discuss the left and left turns in Latin American politics. It then proceeds to argue that winning elections—the recurrent criterion for these turns—might generate tremendous enthusiasm but is also a restrictive benchmark. Other indicators I discuss here include the left's agenda-setting capacity, its redefinition of the political and ideological center, and its incipient challenge of the liberal setting of politics as actors experiment with post-liberal arrangements.

The electoral implications of conditional cash-transfer programs have been widely debated in recent years. In the particular case of Brazil analysts have argued that the social policies that President Lula da Silva's first government implemented enabled the Workers' Party to broaden its electoral clientele from middle-class and highly educated voters to low-income and poorly educated individuals from the Northeast. The conditional cash-transfer program known as Bolsa Família (BF) is said to have played a key role in this shift of electoral support and to have worked as a powerful clientelistic tool for Lula. Using survey data, this article challenges this view by showing that, despite changes in the profile of Lula's supporters, the BF program cannot account for them. Poor voters vote differently across regions; BF recipients were already Lula voters in 2002 and cast ballots for him during his reelection at the same rate as nonrecipients.

This article revisits debates concerning poverty, inequality, and development in Latin America and explores a possible “high road” to globalization capable of achieving both more rapid economic growth and significant and lasting reductions in poverty and inequality. In reconnoitering the contours of this path, the authors probe a partial convergence in theory, concepts, and policies that may offer new opportunities for bridging the yawning chasms that heretofore have divided multilateral financial organizations, local governing elites, and academics as well as Center-Left political parties, organized labor, social movements, and NGOs. The article concludes with an assessment of the capacity of this emerging political agenda and attendant “polycentric development coalitions” to deepen and extend democracy effectively beyond the electoral arena to include basic issues of justice and equity.

Among the policy changes associated with neoliberalism in Latin America, tax reform has played a leading role as it has been crucial not only to price stabilization but also to managing economic liberalization. But it also has a larger significance, since it involved a reconstitution of core state powers, and these could prove useful to any future government that seeks to expand the state's economic role. This paper seeks to determine its causes more precisely by analyzing data from fifteen Latin American countries from 1977 to 1995. Findings show that the definition of “tax reform” has been remarkably similar across the region with less progressivity, fewer exemptions, a new leading role for the value-added tax (VAT), and the strengthening of tax administration. The data analysis then finds reform is predicted by (in roughly descending importance) past inflation, explicit IMF performance conditions, new administrations, more authoritarian-elected governments, the dominance of the president's party in the legislature, established electoral systems, closed-list proportional representation, less polarized party systems, and more numerous parties. Little or no support exists for the causal importance of past changes in gross domestic product (GDP), the constitutional powers of the president, party institutionalization, or partisan balance. The analysis concludes by placing these results in historical context, referring to theories of state formation and the building of institutions in exchange for resources.

In contrast to the rich scholarship documenting the traumatic post-contact destruction of indigenous populations in the Latin American tropics, little is known about their contemporary population dynamics. What accounts for the “demographic turnaround” reported for some groups? How widespread is population recovery, and what are its implications for indigenous political resurgence? We address these questions by compiling recent (post-1980) demographic indicators for over one hundred lowland indigenous populations. Despite remarkable socioeconomic and cultural diversity among these groups, we find compelling evidence that they nevertheless share a common trajectory of very rapid growth over the past two decades, especially in contrast to non-indigenous populations. We briefly review the implications of their dramatic physical resurgence and show how closer attention to this phenomenon is overdue. We discuss the relevance of indigenous societies' recovery to scholarship and praxis in the areas of health and education, cultural and political gains, and demographic theory.

A heated debate has arisen over U.S. policy toward the large number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who have come to the United States in recent years. The question is whether the U.S. government should continue to deport these individuals or should offer them some special protection. The key point of debate is the motivation of the émigrés. Officials of the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Justice have maintained that Salvadorans and Guatemalans who come here are merely economic migrants in search of a better life, and that as such, they are ineligible for any special treatment under U.S. immigration law. According to representatives of the Reagan administration, the fact that many Central Americans pass through Mexico on their way to the United States is evidence of their economic motivations.

This study examines the political and economic determinants of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America. The analysis focuses on fifteen Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period of 1979 to 1996. Market size, workers' skill levels, and political instability are found to have a statistically significant effect on the investment behavior of U.S. multinational firms. In addition, we find that a poor human rights record and military coups d'etat positively influenced U.S. FDI flows during the time series.

In the twentieth century, big business in Mexico invested much more in voluntary encompassing associations than business did elsewhere in Latin America. Multisectoral associations like the CCE, the CMNH, Coparmex, and COECE are rare in the other large countries of the region. Three primary factors gave Mexican business stronger incentives to invest in these associations. First, Mexican business was excluded from elections, PRI politics, and appointments to top government positions and therefore relied more on associations to channel business's organized participation in politics and policy making. Second, in some periods, government actions were threatening to business interests and prompted defensive organization. Third, in other periods of closer cooperation between business and government, government officials relied heavily on these associations to mediate relations with business, giving big business further incentives to invest in associations.

Brazil and Mexico occupy distinctive positions in the structure of the capitalist world economy. They bear little resemblance to the classic model of a “peripheral” country: they are too industrialized, having many of the modern industries typically found only at the center of the world economy; they supply themselves with too large a share of the finished goods consumed domestically; their exports are too diversified and include too many manufactured items; and they have developed unusually strong states with sophisticated administrative apparatuses capable of promoting and protecting local interests. But neither do Brazil and Mexico possess the characteristics commonly associated with “developed” or “core” nations. Their gross domestic product per capita is far below that of the United States, Japan, or almost any of the countries of Western Europe; their distributions of income are highly skewed compared to those of the developed countries; they are recipient rather than source countries of foreign investment; they are debtor rather than creditor nations; and they are on the receiving rather than the originating end of product innovation and new production techniques.

Intellectual disciplines, very much like human beings, have life cycles. They are conceived and born, they progress through childhood, adolescence, and youth, they reach maturity, they enter old age, and some even die. Even if in the present case the simile is a grandiose one, and if the field of Mexican rural history can hardly lay claim to the status of being a distinct intellectual discipline, the main point nonetheless holds. After a long period of gestation and a halting but promising infancy, the field is standing firmly on two feet. It has a problemática—a set of questions, something resembling a research strategy, and a conceptual framework (much of it admittedly borrowed); it has an identifiable corpus of literature, and its practitioners recognize one another. Yet how mature is it, and where is it going? The purposes of this article are to review the development of the historiography on rural life in colonial and early national Mexico published during the last thirty years, focusing central attention on the study of the hacienda; to assess some of its findings, problems, and growing pains; and to make some suggestions as to where those working in the field might invest their energies in future. Within the overall topical organization of the essay, the literature on the classic Mexican hacienda is examined from thematic, theoretical, and methodological vantage points. These treatments are complementary rather than redundant because the questions historians ask, the explanatory schemes they use, and the sources and methods they rely upon are intimately interrelated, and such a prismatic analysis of a body of literature helps to point up its strengths as well as its weaknesses.

For several years the Círculos Bolivarianos were a key organized component of the movement supporting President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and the question of their democratic qualities a source of considerable controversy, but until recently there was little data to test the competing claims of supporters and opponents. We report the results of a survey of 110 members of Círculos and several interviews carried out in four Venezuelan states during June and July 2004. After providing basic information on the Círculos, we analyze their tendency to contribute to a democratic civil society. We find that respondents had highly democratic goals and methods; however, their organizations embodied a charismatic mode of linkage to Chávez that undermined their ability to become institutionalized. In addition, although the Círculos performed valuable social work, they often reinforced clientelistic relations between Chávez and the voters, and they did not significantly enhance the level of pluralism in the broader civil society.