What is the relationship between clientelism and political participation in popular urban neighborhoods? This article addresses the question based on qualitative research in two popular neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, drawing on participant observation and interviews with residents, activists, and party brokers. Adding to a growing literature on “participatory clientelism,” we argue for greater attention to the urban context through which this unfolds. To date, research into participatory clientelism has predominantly considered specific practices—participatory innovations or contentious politics—and been limited to the survival of the urban poor and the demand for political support by party brokers. While these are crucial practices, they are not exhaustive of the relations that sustain participatory clientelism, particularly in contexts of territorialized politics. Based on the socio-spatial approach of Henri Lefebvre, influential in urban studies, we define three interconnected dimensions of participatory clientelism and identify them in the cases under study.

In the political debate which swirls around “democratization” Guatemala must be counted. The policies of its first civilian government since the 1960s, now completing its term, have been important for the success of regional peace. Yet a new wave of violence surrounds the preparation for elections and is testing the government's fragile accomplishments. Underlying such phenomena is Guatemala's struggle to discover what democracy really means in the Latin context where elected officials often serve as a façade for ongoing military control.The contest extends the debate beyond bourgeois and popular conceptions of democracy, especially when Guatemala's civilian-military government is characterized as a “permanent counter-insurgency state” (see Anderson and Simon, 1987; exchange of letters in The Nation, 1989; Guatemalan Church in Exile, 1989). Such a portrayal effectively reduces the nation's democratic manifestations to a charade.

The Peronist victories in the 1962 elections, the subsequent military coup, and the nationalistic platform of the President elected in 1963 have again focused attention on the Argentine political scene. Much has been written about these and other aspects of contemporary Argentine politics; however, one major factor that has been almost completely ignored is the split within Argentine Radicalism that produced two separate Radical Parties. This article attempts to point out some of the reasons for the formation of these parties and also to trace their evolution through July, 1963.

The 1957 split was not the first to occur within the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union or UCR); in fact the party was born of the 1891 split of the Civic Union into Nationals and Radicals. Although the UCR had definite internal factions as early as 1897, the first real split in the party came in 1922, when many Radicals left to form the Anti-personalist UCR under the leadership of President Marcelo T. Alvear.

The period immediately following Castro's overthrow of Batista on New Year's Day 1959 was followed by a series of revolutionary trials that attempted to weed out and punish supporters of the fallen dictatorship and “enemies of the revolution.” One of the most unusual of these political trials became a cause célèbre that called into question the general nature of law and justice in Castro's Cuba. The analysis of this case allows us to see clearly the relationship that has traditionally existed between the ideas of law and justice in Latin American culture. This study also touches incidentally upon the ever present judicial problem of defining the responsibility of soldiers for their actions during warfare.

La última conferencia económica de Ginebra, de tan magros resultados, y los “planes” de distintos países han puesto al orden del día el tema del desarrollo económico. Se habla y se escribe, mucho más que antes, en todos los tonos, de importantes objetivos a alcanzar: de creación de riquezas, de reactivación de las economías nacionales, de tecnificación de la agricultura, de modernización de las comunicaciones, de reabsorción de la mano de obra ociosa, en fin, de revitalizar la producción general, elevar el consumo y asegurar en los países, ahora llamados “subdesarrollados”, un más alto nivel de vida.

Tales objetivos pueden ser fácilmente enunciados pero no concretamente alcanzados. Si “la naturaleza no camina a saltos”, tampoco pueden alterarse por decreto las etapas del lógico desarrollo económico sin tener en cuenta las reales posibilidades materiales, técnicas, financieras y culturales de cada país.

This study examines the relationship between personal experience with intimate partner violence (IPV) and political attitudes. I argue that by adopting salient legislation on violence against women, the state enables survivors to evaluate government performance on the basis of their ability to access resources for victims. As such, when survivors are unable to reach specialized public services, they might downgrade their evaluations of government performance. Focusing on Brazil and using survey data and qualitative interviews, this study finds that IPV survivors who have not used specialized services hold more negative views of government performance compared to nonvictims. Further analysis, including a series of placebo tests, lends additional support to the main results. This study has an intersectional component, as it also examines the relationship between race and access to services. These findings have implications for victims’ democratic rights and access to justice.

Earlier empirical research on party list proportional representation systems shows that women spend less on campaigns than men, particularly when quotas are applied. An analysis of the candidate campaign expenses for the 2014 and 2018 Colombian Lower Chamber elections provides a novel test of this gender gap and its underlying causes. The research design leverages Colombia’s unique context of electoral institutions, with interdistrict variation in terms of quota rules, and the availability of detailed information on campaign spending and funding. The regression models show that the gender gap in campaign spending is limited to districts with quota rules and disappears among incumbents and candidates listed first on the ballot. As for funding, women candidates are most disadvantaged with regard to personal funds and corporate donations but attract as many individual donations as men do.

Emerging from the voting pattern of the Brazilian congressional elections of October 7, 1962, is a reassuring pattern of political growth and responsible participation by the Brazilian electorate.

Congressional elections demand a regional approach. North Americans perhaps understand this better than most people. A great deal of caution is used before establishing a national trend of events in the United States by using, for example, the Arkansas returns. Similarly, to claim that New York speaks for the nation is dangerous.

The same caution should also be used in Brazil. The tight race for the governorship of Pernambuco tells the story of almost equally-balanced forces in that state. The Sao Paulo returns may provide some positive indicators of the 1965 presidential race. Rio Grande do Sul demonstrated the basically-conservative nature of the electorate in that area. In contrast, the state returns in Guanabara seem to present an example of complete political irresponsibility and immaturity.

In recent years, a considerable amount of scholarly research has been devoted to the analysis of public enterprise in Latin America. The number of individuals actively engaged in research and their output of materials has increased since the mid-1970s. Partially as a result of this heightened interest, several conferences have been organized to deal with public enterprises, and increasingly detailed information has been made available by governments. Most of this information still receives an extremely limited circulation and is therefore unavailable to the majority of scholars.

Much of economic planning in Latin America has been oriented toward promoting industrialization. These plans have generally given a major role to government, and no doubt there is a significant role that the public sector can and must play in capital mobilization as well as in performing other functions. In most countries, the infrastructural needs alone are enormous and constitute a major challenge for the still rudimentary machinery of public administration and the generally weak fiscal systems.

Clearly, however, a very large portion of the capital requirements of industrialization has been supplied by the private sector—with important assistance from foreign enterprises, to be sure, but with the domestic private sectors supplying most of the financing needed to maintain what has been, in most countries, a relatively high rate of industrial development. The focus of this paper is on the mechanism by which this capital has been mobilized by the private sector and on the changes that appear to occur in that mechanism during the process of industrialization.

Changes in the volume of new loans issued by the developing countries in Latin America have had a significant impact on the foreign exchange value of their currencies, and on most of their domestic macroeconomic variables. During the 1972-82 decade, the annual increase in external debt of many of these countries exceeded the interest payments on this debt. The result was a net cash inflow derived from the sale of new loans abroad. Consequently, at the time, no real economic cost was associated with this increase in external debt. After 1982 this situation changed. The annual increase in external debt diminished to the point where it was less than the scheduled interest payments. At that point Latin American borrowers began to experience a net cash outflow on their debt account. Thus, in order to generate the foreign exchange needed to pay even part of these scheduled interest charges, the economy had to undergo a costly adjustment process.

Brazil has been a classic example of plantation society. In recent years, however, a new Brazil has been emerging in a process vividly described by Charles Wagley as "the Brazilian Revolution", by which the old society has been transformed as new groups have gradually risen from industry, commerce, the professions, and the bureaucracy, until the overall Brazilian society no longer bears the stamp of plantation society.

In this paper an attempt will be made to show how the plantation developed into the organizing force of Brazilian society throughout the Colonial and Empire periods by extending its form and control patterns to the larger society which surrounded it. By the end of the nineteenth century, due to a series of crises, economic, social, and political, the classic plantation system underwent modifications which, if they had gone unchecked, would have strengthened it more than ever.

Economic development—defined by growth of GNP per capita—among the poor countries of the world during the last 25 years has been higher than in almost any other period in mankind's history. Although this growth might have not been as high as that expected by some policy makers, the 1950-1975 period shows an overall improvement over the recent past. In spite of this apparent surge in growth, many policy makers and social scientists have shown disappointment and dismay at some characteristics of the recent increases in GNP (Morawetz, 1977).

The pivotal role energy plays in national economics not only converts the access to sources of supply into a vivid issue of foreign policy concern, but also causes an understandable preoccupation with investment capabilities and self-sufficiency. A report prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 predicted a bright future for nuclear energy in the i developing countries and encouraged use of this form of energy after numerous field studies.

A nation that commits itself to nuclear energy by purchasing nuclear power-generating technology but not fuel cycle facilities incurs the risk of becoming dependent upon the supplier country because a quick switch to alternative sources of supply is difficult in cases of curtailment of fuel.

Since 1930 the military has overthrown the Government of Argentina four times: in 1930, when General Uriburu overthrew the constitutional government of Hipólito Irigoyen; in 1943, when General Ramírez overthrew Ramón Castillo and initiated a confused series of events which led ultimately to the accession to the presidency of Juan Perón in 1946; in September, 1955, when officers of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force combined their forces to oust Perón himself; and in March, 1962, when a small group of officers staged a coup which deposed Arturo Frondizi, the first elected president to follow Perón.

There has been no official population census of Cuba since the decennial count of 1953. The Castro government, which came to power in January 1959, has not seen fit to continue census-taking on decennial basis, which would have regularly called for an enumeration in 1963. Until 1958 Cuban government agencies, including the National Bank and the National Economic Council, published annual estimates, intending presumably to adjust them in accordance with what would have been a census in 1963. The revolutionary government has continued annual estimates, but until recently, made no official announcement of them. In 1967, for the first time, the year-by-year estimates became available in official statistical publications.

Much interest has been associated with the population trends by students of Cuba because of a number of factors which presumably would affect them, notably the extraordinary emigration from the island. There have been attempts to arrive at estimates independently.

Export-import merchants played a central role in the industrialization of Brazil. Many of the Brazilian Empire's noted entrepreneurs began as merchants, including the Barão de Mauá, perhaps the most famous of all, and the noted Bahian industrialist-philanthropist, Luís Tarquínio. Individual merchants served as cadres and furnished capital for early industrialization in both Bahia (Almeida, 1951: 14) and São Paulo (Dean, 1969: 19-33). That export-import merchants would play a prominent role in Brazilian development, particularly during the Empire, was logical. As intermediaries in an economy largely devoted to exporting and importing, merchants occupied a central position in the Empire's economic structure. Brazil's merchant elite was also a natural vehicle for modernizing influences from abroad because of its international trade connections and its cosmopolitan membership. For new enterprises, merchants were one of the few sources of capital and virtually the only source of business expertise.

Since its “depenalization” in 1993, the U.S. dollar has become possibly a more significant component of Cuba's money supply than the old peso. What are the alternatives? The euro seems inappropriate, given the inevitability of eventual normalization of relations with the United States. More advantageous would be to restore the Cuban peso, though this would involve unifying the bifurcated economic structure and the dual monetary and exchange rate systems. The Cuban government has yet to announce its plans. This study argues that an appropriate mix of exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, and income or wage and salary policies should support a rehabilitation of the Cuban peso.

While invalid voting is often treated as protest behavior in an electoral context, its association with actual political protests has not yet been empirically demonstrated. The relative scarcity of research on the topic is likely due to the hybrid nature of invalid voting as a both formal and informal political gesture. The novel availability of event-based data for public protests in Latin America allows for testing whether their occurrence is connected with changes in spoiled and blank ballots. Using an appropriate dynamic regression model covering variations in the 148 intervals between Latin American legislative elections in the 1979–2021 period, this study finds a strong connection between the emergence of antigovernment protests and surges in invalid voting (and vice versa). This relationship still holds at parity of economic conditions and it is reinforced by a lack of alternation in the party of power. Conversely, the appearance of workers’ strikes appears to work as a substitute for this behavior, which is also chosen by voters when democracy deteriorates, while corruption has no independent impact on invalid voting. Overall this work’s findings promise to send the research agenda on invalid voting in a new direction, previously unexplored because of an absence of fitting data.