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Kant as Both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2016

Sacha Golob*
Affiliation:
King’s College London

Abstract

This article advances a new account of Kant’s views on conceptualism. On the one hand, I argue that Kant was a nonconceptualist. On the other hand, my approach accommodates many motivations underlying the conceptualist reading of his work: for example, it is fully compatible with the success of the Transcendental Deduction. I motivate my view by providing a new analysis of both Kant’s theory of perception and of the role of categorical synthesis: I look in particular at the categories of quantity. Locating my interpretation in relation to recent research by Allais, Ginsborg, Tolley and others, I argue that it offers an attractive compromise on this important theoretical and exegetical issue.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2016 

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