Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T01:07:13.392Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reflection: Its Structure and Meaning in Kant's Judgements of Taste

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Kristi Sweet
Kristi Sweet
Affiliation:
Texas A&M University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

When Kant announces in a letter to Reinhold that he has discovered a new domain of a priori principles, he situates these principles in a ‘faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure’ (Zammito 1992: 47). And it is indeed in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, named in this letter the Critique of Taste, that we find his elucidation of the relation of the principle of purposiveness to the feeling of pleasure. The kinds of judgements in which our feelings are evaluated in accordance with a principle are what Kant names reflective judgements. And while reflective judgements emerge in the third Critique to include not only judgements of taste, but also judgements of the sublime and teleological judgements of nature, in this paper I will focus on the first, as the question of the relatedness of reflection to pleasure is most pronounced in this context. There is no consensus in Kant scholarship as to what the structure of reflective judgements is, as evidenced by the widely disparate views of those such as Guyer, Allison, Pippin, Ginsborg, Lyotard, and others.

Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 53 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allison, Henry (2001) Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guyer, Paul (1997) Kant and the Claims of Taste (New York: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Gasché, Rodolphe (2003) The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press).Google Scholar
Ginsborg, Hannah (1990) ‘Reflective judgement and taste’, Nous, 24: 63–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginsborg, Hannah. (1991) ‘On the key to Kant's critique of taste’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72: 290–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ginsborg, Hannah. (1995) ‘Purposiveness and normativity’, Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, vol II (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press).Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, Immanuel. (1999) Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Kant, Immanuel. (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Longuenesse, Beatrice (2000) Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1994) Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).Google Scholar
Westphal, Kenneth R (2003) ‘Epistemic reflection and cognitive reference in Kant's transcendental response to skepticism’, Kant- Studien, 94: 135–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zammito, John (1992) The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar