Two studies examined the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection (CRT) and the tendency to accord genuinely moral (non-conventional) status to a range of counter-normative acts — that is, to treat such acts as wrong regardless of existing social opinion or norms. We contrasted social violations that are intrinsically harmful to others (e.g., fraud, thievery) with those that are not (e.g., wearing pajamas to work and engaging in consensual acts of sexual intimacy with an adult sibling). Our key hypothesis was that more reflective (higher CRT) individuals would tend to moralize selectively — treating only intrinsically harmful acts as genuinely morally wrong — whereas less reflective (lower CRT) individuals would moralize more indiscriminately. We found clear support for this hypothesis in a large and ideologically diverse sample of American adults. The predicted associations were not fully accounted for by the subjects’ political orientation, sensitivity to gut feelings, gender, age, educational attainment, or their placement on a sexual morals-specific measure of social conservatism. Our studies are the first to demonstrate that, in addition to modulating the intensity of moral condemnation, reflection may also play a key role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain as such.

It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e.g., "The Teamwork Game") can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled "The Teamwork Game" tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.

Recently, it has been suggested that people are spontaneously inclined to cooperate in social dilemmas, whereas defection requires effortful deliberation. From this assumption, we derive that defection should entail more cognitive conflict than cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the current study presents a first application of the response dynamics paradigm (i.e., mouse-tracking) to social dilemmas. In a fully incentivized lab experiment, mouse movements were tracked while participants played simple two-person social dilemma games with two options (cooperation and defection). Building on previous research, curvature of mouse movements was taken as an indicator of cognitive conflict. In line with the hypothesis of less cognitive conflict in cooperation, response trajectories were more curved (towards the non-chosen option) when individuals defected than when they cooperated. In other words, the cooperative option exerted more “pull” on mouse movements in case of defection than the non-cooperative option (defection) did in case of cooperation. This effect was robust across different types of social dilemmas and occurred even in the prisoner’s dilemma, where defection was predominant on the choice level. Additionally, the effect was stronger for dispositional cooperators as measured by the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality model. As such, variation in the effect across individuals could be accounted for through cooperativeness.

Rational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.

People tend to prefer smaller and sooner (SS) rewards over larger and later (LL) ones even when the latter are much larger. Previous research have identified several ways to enhance people’s patience. Adding to this literature, the current paper demonstrates that introduction of upfront losses as well as gains to both SS and LL rewards can decrease people’s impatience. This effect is incompatible with both the normative exponential and descriptive hyperbolic discounting models, which agree on the additive assumption and the independence assumption. We also exculde the integration explanation which assumes subjects integrate upfront money with final rewards and make a decision with bottom line at the end. We consider several possible explanations, including the salience hypothesis, which states that introducing upfront money makes the money dimension more salient than not and thus increases the attractiveness of LL options.

How accurate are laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions of events? The economic and psychological literatures provide opposing answers. A classical economic view assumes that ordinary decision makers consult perfect expectations, while recent psychological research has emphasized biases in perceptions. In this work, we test laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions. To establish a ground truth against which accuracy can be assessed, we control the information seen by each subject to establish unambiguous normative answers. We find that laypeople’s statistical intuitions can be highly accurate, and depend strongly upon the elicitation method used. In particular, we find that eliciting an entire distribution from a respondent using a graphical interface, and then computing simple statistics (such as means, fractiles, and confidence intervals) on this distribution, leads to greater accuracy, on both the individual and aggregate level, than the standard method of asking about the same statistics directly.

We investigated the relations between numeracy and superior judgment and decision making in two large community outreach studies in Holland (n=5408). In these very highly educated samples (e.g., 30–50% held graduate degrees), the Berlin Numeracy Test was a robust predictor of financial, medical, and metacognitive task performance (i.e., lotteries, intertemporal choice, denominator neglect, and confidence judgments), independent of education, gender, age, and another numeracy assessment. Metacognitive processes partially mediated the link between numeracy and superior performance. More numerate participants performed better because they deliberated more during decision making and more accurately evaluated their judgments (e.g., less overconfidence). Results suggest that well-designed numeracy tests tend to be robust predictors of superior judgment and decision making because they simultaneously assess (1) mathematical competency and (2) metacognitive and self-regulated learning skills.

Punishment is an important method for discouraging uncooperative behavior. We use a novel design for a public goods game in which players have explicit intended contributions with accidentally changed actual contributions, and in which players can apply costly fines or ostracism. Moreover, all players except the subject are automated, whereby we control the intended contributions, actual contributions, costly fines, and ostracisms experienced by the subject. We assess subject’s utilization of other players’ intended and actual contributions when making decisions to fine or ostracize. Hierarchical Bayesian logistic regression provides robust estimates. We find that subjects emphasize actual contribution more than intended contribution when deciding to fine, but emphasize intended contribution more than actual contribution when deciding to ostracize. We also find that the efficacy of past punishment, in terms of changing the contributions of the punished player, influences the type of punishment selected. Finally, we find that the punishment norms of the automated players affect the punishments performed by the subject. These novel paradigms and analyses indicate that punishment is flexible and adaptive, contrary to some evolutionary theories that predict inflexible punishments that emphasize outcomes.

The economic literature on negotiation shows that strategic concerns can be a barrier to agreement, even when the buyer values the good more than the seller. Yet behavioral research demonstrates that human interaction can overcome these strategic concerns through communication. We show that there is also a downside of this human interaction: cynicism. Across two studies we focus on a seller-buyer interaction in which the buyer has uncertain knowledge about the goods for sale, but has a positive expected payoff from saying “yes” to the available transaction. Study 1 shows that most buyers accept offers made by computers, but that acceptance rates drop significantly when offers are made by human sellers who communicate directly with buyers. Study 2 clarifies that this effect results from allowing human sellers to communicate with buyers, and shows that such communication focuses the buyers’ attention on the seller’s trustworthiness. The mere situation of negotiated interaction increases buyers’ attention to the sellers’ self-serving motives and, consequently, buyers’ cynicism. Unaware of this downside of interaction, sellers actually prefer to have the opportunity to communicate with buyers.

It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate repeated investment decisions in two-valued options that differ in their riskiness, looking for the effects of recent decisions and their outcomes on upcoming decisions. We compare these effects to those evident in all-or-none choice between the same risky options. The “state of the world”, namely, the likelihood of the high versus the low outcomes of the options, is manipulated. We find that aggregate allocation diverges from uniformity (i.e., from 1/n), and is sensitive to outcome probabilities, with the pattern of results indicating reactivity to the outcome of the previous decision. Round-to-round dynamics reveal that the outcome of the previous decision has an effect on the subsequent decision, on top of inertia; the aspects of the outcome that influence the next decision indicate an effect of a missed opportunity, if there was one, in the previous decision. Importantly, recent outcomes have a similar effect in diversification decisions and in all-or-none choice.

The expression of emotion can play a significant role in strategic decision-making. In this study, we hypothesized that emotion expression alters behavior in morally charged negotiation. We investigated the impact of facial displays of discrete emotions, specifically anger and sadness, in a morally charged multi-issue negotiation task. Our results indicate that if a negotiator associated moral significance to the object of the negotiation, displays of anger resulted in reduced concession making whereas displays of sadness increased concession making. Moral significance of the issues fostered an emotional matching mechanism of sorrow, where a sorrow expression from one party elicited a sorrow expression from the other. Taken together, the results indicate that emotional expressions can affect morally charged negotiation in ways that can inhibit as well as promote cooperation.

We describe the “evaluability bias”: the tendency to weight the importance of an attribute in proportion to its ease of evaluation. We propose that the evaluability bias influences decision making in the context of charitable giving: people tend to have a strong preference for charities with low overhead ratios (lower administrative expenses) but not for charities with high cost-effectiveness (greater number of saved lives per dollar), because the former attribute is easier to evaluate than the latter. In line with this hypothesis, we report the results of four studies showing that, when presented with a single charity, people are willing to donate more to a charity with low overhead ratio, regardless of cost-effectiveness. However, when people are presented with two charities simultaneously—thereby enabling comparative evaluation—they base their donation behavior on cost-effectiveness (Study 1). This suggests that people primarily value cost-effectiveness but manifest the evaluability bias in cases where they find it difficult to evaluate. However, people seem also to value a low overhead ratio for its own sake (Study 2). The evaluability bias effect applies to charities of different domains (Study 3). We also show that overhead ratio is easier to evaluate when its presentation format is a ratio, suggesting an inherent reference point that allows meaningful interpretation (Study 4).

The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes — of which one of the rolls would be paid out — while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.

Glöckner and Bröder (2011) have shown that for 77.5% of their participants’ decision making behavior in decisions involving recognition information and explicitly provided additional cues could be better described by weighted-compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) Models than by non-compensatory strategies such as recognition heuristic (RH) or Take the Best (TTB). We investigate whether this predominance of PCS models also holds in memory-based decisions in which information retrieval is effortful and cognitively demanding. Decision strategies were analyzed using a maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, taking into account choices, response times and confidence ratings simultaneously. In contrast to the memory-based-RH hypothesis, results show that also in memory-based decisions for 62% of the participants behavior is best explained by a compensatory PCS model. There is, however, a slight increase in participants classified as users of the non-compensatory strategies RH and TTB (32%) compared to the previous study, mirroring other studies suggesting effects of costly retrieval.

Interventions to increase cooperation in social dilemmas depend on understanding decision makers’ motivations for cooperation or defection. We examined these in five real-world social dilemmas: situations where private interests are at odds with collective ones. An online survey (N = 929) asked respondents whether or not they cooperated in each social dilemma and then elicited both open-ended reports of reasons for their choices and endorsements of a provided list of reasons. The dilemmas chosen were ones that permit individual action rather than voting or advocacy: (1) conserving energy, (2) donating blood, (3) getting a flu vaccination, (4) donating to National Public Radio (NPR), and (5) buying green electricity. Self-reported cooperation is weakly but positively correlated across these dilemmas. Cooperation in each dilemma correlates fairly strongly with self-reported altruism and with punitive attitudes toward defectors. Some strong domain-specific behaviors and beliefs also correlate with cooperation. The strongest example is frequency of listening to NPR, which predicts donation. Socio-demographic variables relate only weakly to cooperation. Respondents who self-report cooperation usually cite social reasons (including reciprocity) for their choice. Defectors often give self-interest reasons but there are also some domain-specific reasons—some report that they are not eligible to donate blood; some cannot buy green electricity because they do not pay their own electric bills. Cooperators generally report that several of the provided reasons match their actual reasons fairly well, but most defectors endorse none or at most one of the provided reasons for defection. In particular, defectors often view cooperation as costly but do not endorse free riding as a reason for defection. We tentatively conclude that cooperation in these settings is based mostly on pro-social norms and defection on a mixture of self-interest and the possibly motivated perception that situational circumstances prevent cooperation in the given situation.

This paper provides a novel interpretation of focal point responses (0, 50, 100 percent) in terms of ambiguous beliefs dynamics that arise in new developments of decision theory such as Choquet expected utility theory. In particular, focal point responses that have been updated from nonfocal responses can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that account for psychological bias. A focal point response of 100 that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Overestimating Update Rule. A focal point response of zero that has been updated from a nonfocal response can be represented by a non-additive belief that has been updated according to the Underestimating Update Rule. Focal point responses given consistently over time are not subject to psychological bias, and can be represented by additive probability distributions. Estimation results show such a model to be a very good fit to the data.

In two experiments, we explored the possible drawbacks of applying the anchoring tactic in a negotiation context. In Study 1, buyers who used the anchoring tactic made higher profits, but their counterparts thought their own results were worse than expected and thus were less willing to engage in future negotiations with them. Study 2 showed that using the anchoring tactic in a market decreased accumulated profits by increasing the rate of impasses and prolonging the negotiations. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Signal detection theory (SDT) was developed to analyze the behavior of a single judge but also can be used to analyze decisions made by organizations or other social systems. SDT quantifies the ability to distinguish between signal and noise by separating accuracy of the detection system from response bias—the propensity to over-warn (too many false positives) or under-warn (too many misses). We apply SDT techniques to national and state-level data sets to analyze the ability of the child welfare services systems to detect instances of child maltreatment. Blacks have higher rates of referral and the system is less accurate for them than for Whites or Hispanics. The incidence of false positives—referrals leading to unsubstantiated findings—is higher for Blacks than for other groups, as is the incidence of false negatives—children for whom no referral was made but who are in fact neglected or abused. The rate of true positives–children for whom a referral was made and for whom the allegation was substantiated–is higher for Blacks. Values of d′ (signal strength) are roughly the same for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics but there are pronounced group differences in C (a measure of the location of the decision threshold). Analyses show that the child welfare services system treats Blacks differently from Hispanics and Whites in ways that cannot be justified readily in terms of objective measures of group differences. This study illustrates the potential for JDM techniques such as SDT to contribute to understanding of system-level decision making processes.

In a highly uncertain world, individuals often have to make decisions in situations with incomplete information. We investigated in three experiments how partial cue information is treated in complex probabilistic inference tasks. Specifically, we test a mechanism to infer missing cue values that is based on the discrimination rate of cues (i.e., how often a cue makes distinct predictions for choice options). We show analytically that inferring missing cue values based on discrimination rate maximizes the probability for a correct inference in many decision environments and that it is therefore adaptive to use it. Results from three experiments show that individuals are sensitive to the discrimination rate and use it when it is a valid inference mechanism but rely on other inference mechanisms, such as the cues’ base-rate of positive information, when it is not. We find adaptive inferences for incomplete information in environments in which participants are explicitly provided with information concerning the base-rate and discrimination rate of cues (Exp. 1) as well as in environments in which they learn these properties by experience (Exp. 2). Results also hold in environments of further increased complexity (Exp. 3). In all studies, participants show a high ability to adaptively infer incomplete information and to integrate this inferred information with other available cues to approximate the naïve Bayesian solution.

We explore different contexts and mechanisms that might promote or alleviate the gender effect in risk aversion. Our main result is that we do not find gender differences in risk aversion when the choice is framed as a willingness-to-accept (WTA) task. When the choice is framed as a willingness-to-pay (WTP) task, men are willing to pay more and thus exhibit lower risk aversion. However, when the choice is framed as a willingness to accept task, women will not accept less than men. These findings imply gender differences in the endowment effect. We also find that the effect size of the gender difference in risk aversion is reduced or eliminated as the context changes from tasks framed as gambles to other domains; and that attitudes toward gambling mediate the gender effect in gambling framed tasks.