The modern business environment requires managers to make effective decisions in a dynamic and uncertain world. How can such dynamic decision making (DDM) improve? The current study investigated the effects of brief training aimed at improving DDM skills in a virtual DDM task. The training addressed the DDM process, stressed the importance of self-reflection in DDM, and provided 3 self-reflective questions to guide participants during the task. Additionally, we explored whether participants low or high in self-reflection would perform better in the task and whether participants low or high in self-reflection would benefit more from the training. The study also explored possible strategic differences between participants related to training and self-reflection. Participants were 68 graduate business students. They individually managed a computer-simulated chocolate production company called CHOCO FINE and answered surveys to assess self-reflection and demographics. Training in DDM led to better performance, including the ability to solve initial problems more successfully and to make appropriate adjustments to market changes. Participants’ self-reflection scores also predicted performance in this virtual business company. High self-reflection was also related to more consistency in planning and decision making. Participants low in self-reflection benefitted the most from training. Organizations could use DDM training to establish and promote a culture that values self-reflective decision making.

The pursuit of unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking or binge drinking, not only carries various downside risks, but also provides pleasure. A parsimonious model, used in the literature to explain the decision to pursue an unhealthy activity, represents that decision as a tradeoff between risks and benefits. We build on this literature by surveying a rural population in South Africa to elicit the perceived riskiness and the perceived pleasure for various risky activities and to examine how these perceptions relate to the pursuit of four specific unhealthy behaviors: frequent smoking, problem drinking, seatbelt nonuse, and risky sex. We show that perceived pleasure is a significant predictor for three of the behaviors and that perceived riskiness is a significant predictor for two of them. We also show that the correlation between the riskiness rating and behavior is significantly different from the correlation between the pleasure rating and behavior for three of the four behaviors. Finally, we show that the effect of pleasure is significantly greater than the effect of riskiness in determining drinking and risky sex, while the effects of pleasure and riskiness are not different from each other in determining smoking and seatbelt nonuse. We discuss how our findings can be used to inform the design of health promotion strategies.

Are difficult decisions best made after a momentary diversion of thought? Previous research addressing this important question has yielded dozens of experiments in which participants were asked to choose the best of several options (e.g., cars or apartments) either after conscious deliberation, or after a momentary diversion of thought induced by an unrelated task. The results of these studies were mixed. Some found that participants who had first performed the unrelated task were more likely to choose the best option, whereas others found no evidence for this so-called unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The current study examined two accounts of this inconsistency in previous findings. According to the reliability account, the UTA does not exist and previous reports of this effect concern nothing but spurious effects obtained with an unreliable paradigm. In contrast, the moderator account proposes that the UTA is a real effect that occurs only when certain conditions are met in the choice task. To test these accounts, we conducted a meta-analysis and a large-scale replication study (N = 399) that met the conditions deemed optimal for replicating the UTA. Consistent with the reliability account, the large-scale replication study yielded no evidence for the UTA, and the meta-analysis showed that previous reports of the UTA were confined to underpowered studies that used relatively small sample sizes. Furthermore, the results of the large-scale study also dispelled the recent suggestion that the UTA might be gender-specific. Accordingly, we conclude that there exists no reliable support for the claim that a momentary diversion of thought leads to better decision making than a period of deliberation.

Social Value Orientation (SVO) refers to an individual’s preference for the division of resources between the self and another person. Since evidence suggests that hormones influence several facets of human social behavior, we asked whether SVO might fluctuate across the female menstrual cycle. Using self-report data obtained in two independent online studies, we show that cooperative preferences, as indexed by SVO, are indeed significantly more prosocial in the early follicular compared to the midluteal phase in naturally ovulating women. Furthermore, when estimating hormonal variations from norm data, we found estradiol, but not progesterone or testosterone, to be a significant predictor of SVO across the menstrual cycle in both studies, with a negative correlation. Our findings provide evidence that the willingness to cooperate varies across the natural female menstrual cycle and highlight the potential of investigating psychological effects of ovarian sex hormones.

We used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions, individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement (Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment. Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and security were highest in the Voted-Enforced condition. These factors (legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement (Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting (Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal motives for cooperation.

The problems of how self-interested players can cooperate despite incentives to defect, and how players can coordinate despite the presence of multiple equilibria, are among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. In this report, we demonstrate that a plausible and even natural specification of the reference outcome in a game simultaneously predicts systematic cooperation and defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, as well as equilibrium selection and out-of-equilibrium play in coordination games. The predictions hold even if players are purely self-interested, there are no salient labels, the game is played only once, and there is no communication of any kind. Furthermore, the predictions are unique, as opposed to the multiplicity of equilibria in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma and in coordination games. We apply experimental results to test the predictions of the model.

The opportunity to tell a white lie (i.e., a lie that benefits another person) generates a moral conflict between two opposite moral dictates, one pushing towards telling the truth always and the other pushing towards helping others. Here we study how people resolve this moral conflict. What does telling a white lie signal about a person’s pro-social tendencies? To answer this question, we conducted a two-stage 2x2 experiment. In the first stage, we used a Deception Game to measure aversion to telling a Pareto white lie (i.e., a lie that helps both the liar and the listener), and aversion to telling an altruistic white lie (i.e., a lie that helps the listener at the expense of the liar). In the second stage we measured altruistic tendencies using a Dictator Game and cooperative tendencies using a Prisoner’s dilemma. We found three major results: (i) both altruism and cooperation are positively correlated with aversion to telling a Pareto white lie; (ii) both altruism and cooperation are negatively correlated with aversion to telling an altruistic white lie; (iii) men are more likely than women to tell an altruistic white lie, but not to tell a Pareto white lie. Our results shed light on the moral conflict between prosociality and truth-telling. In particular, the first finding suggests that a significant proportion of people have non-distributional notions of what the right thing to do is, irrespective of the economic consequences, they tell the truth, they cooperate, they share their money.

The paper critically reexamines the well-known “Julie and Mark” vignette, a stylized account of two college-age siblings opting to engage in protected sex while vacationing abroad (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Since its inception, the story has been viewed as a rhetorically powerful validation of Hume’s “sentimentalist” dictum that moral judgments are not rationally deduced but arise directly from feelings of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., disgust). People’s typical reactions to the vignette are alleged to support this view by demonstrating that individuals are prone to become morally dumbfounded (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), i.e., they tend to “stubbornly” maintain their disapproval of the act without supporting reasons. In what follows, we critically reassess the traditional account, predicated on the notion that, among other things, most subjects simply fail to be convinced that the siblings’ actions are truly harm-free, thus having excellent reasons to disapprove of these acts. In line with this critique, 3 studies found that subjects 1) tended not to believe that the siblings’ actions were in fact harmless; 2) notwithstanding that, and in spite of holding a number of “counterargument-immune” reasons, subjects could be effectively maneuvered into exhibiting all the trademark signs of a morally dumbfounded state (which they subsequently recanted), and 3) with subjects’ beliefs about harm and standards of normative evaluation properly factored in, a more rigorous assessment procedure yielded a dumbfounding estimate of about 0. Based on these and related results, we contend that subjects’ reactions are wholly in line with the rationalist model of moral judgment and that their use in support of claims of moral arationalism should be reevaluated.

We asked how repeated media reports on technological hazards influence an individual’s risk perception. We looked for two contradictory effects, an increasing effect of repetition on perceived risk with the first few repetitions and a decreasing effect with later repetitions, leading to the inverted U-shaped pattern. In an experiment, we demonstrated the inverted U-shaped relationship between the repetition and perceived risk in the context of food risk. The finding broadens the range of mere-exposure effects and indicates that exposure to risk information can be a double-edged sword, which brings either an increasing or a decreasing perceived risk.

We apply the principles of the “Wisdom of Crowds (WoC)” to improve the calibration of interval estimates. Previous research has documented the significant impact of the WoC on the accuracy of point estimates but only a few studies have examined its effectiveness in aggregating interval estimates. We demonstrate that collective probability intervals obtained by several heuristics can reduce the typical overconfidence of the individual estimates. We re-analyzed data from Glaser, Langer and Weber (2013) and from Soll and Klayman (2004) and applied four heuristics Averaging, Median, Enveloping, Probability averaging-suggested by Gaba, Tsetlin and Winkler (2014) and new heuristics, Averaging with trimming and Quartiles. We used the hit rate and the Mean Squared Error (MSE) to evaluate the quality of the methods. All methods reduced miscalibration to some degree, and Quartiles was the most beneficial securing accuracy and informativeness.

The less-is-more effect predicts that people can be more accurate making paired-comparison decisions when they have less knowledge, in the sense that they do not recognize all of the items in the decision domain. The traditional theoretical explanation is that decisions based on recognizing one alternative but not the other can be more accurate than decisions based on partial knowledge of both alternatives. I present new data that directly test for the less-is-more effect, coming from a task in which participants judge which of two cities is larger and indicate whether they recognize each city. A group-level analysis of these data provides evidence in favor of the less-is-more effect: there is strong evidence people make decisions consistent with recognition, and that these decisions are more accurate than those based on knowledge. An individual-level analysis of the same data, however, provides evidence inconsistent with a simple interpretation of the less-is-more effect: there is no evidence for an inverse-U-shaped relationship between accuracy and recognition, and especially no evidence that individuals who recognize a moderate number of cities outperform individuals who recognize many cities. I suggest a reconciliation of these contrasting findings, based on the systematic change of the accuracy of recognition-based decisions with the underlying recognition rate. In particular, the data show that people who recognize almost none or almost all cities make more accurate decisions by applying the recognition heuristic, when compared to the accuracy achieved by people with intermediate recognition rates. The implications of these findings for precisely defining and understanding the less-is-more effect are discussed, as are the constraints our data potentially place on models of the learning and decision-making processes involved. Keywords: recognition heuristic, less-is-more effect.

A series of 7 experiments found that people defer important decisions more than unimportant decisions, and that this is independent of choice set composition. This finding persists even when deferral does not provide more flexibility (Experiment 2), when deferral has potential disadvantages (Experiment 3), and when deferral has no material benefits and is financially costly (Experiment 4). The effect of importance on deferral was independent of potential choice conflict (Experiment 5 & 6). The only exception was a situation in which one alternative was clearly dominant; here decision importance did not affect the likelihood of deferral (Experiment 7). These results suggest that people use decision importance as a cue for deferral: more important decisions should take more time and effort.

Six experiments investigated how the distance between one’s initial opinion and advice relates to advice utilization. Going beyond previous research, we relate advice distance to both relative adjustments and absolute adjustments towards the advice, and we also investigate a second mode of advice utilization, namely confidence shifts due to social validation.Whereas previous research suggests that advice is weighted less the more it differs from one’s initial opinion, we consistently find evidence of a curvilinear pattern. Advice is weighted less when advice distance is low and when it is high. This is in particular because individuals are much more likely to retain their initial opinions in the light of near advice. Also, absolute opinion adjustments towards the advice increases in a monotone fashion as advice distance increases. This finding is in contrast to the predictions of the theoretical framework previous studies on advice distance are based on, social judgment theory. Instead, they data are more in line with a simple stimulus-response model suggesting that absolute adjustments towards the advice increase with advice distance but—potentially—with diminished sensitivity. Finally, our data show that advice can be utilized even when it receives zero weight during belief revision. The closer advice was to the initial opinions, the more it served as a means for social validation, increasing decision-makers’ confidence in the accuracy of their final opinions. Thus, our findings suggest that advice utilization is a more complex function of advice distance than previously assumed.

UK bookies (bookmakers) herd geographically in less-affluent areas. The present work shows that UK bookies also herd with the special bets that they advertise to consumers, both in their shop window advertising and on TV adverts as shown to millions of viewers. I report an observational study of betting adverts over the 2014 soccer World Cup. Bet types vary in complexity, with complex types having the highest expected losses. Bookies herded on a common strategy of advertising special bets on two levels: by almost exclusively advertising complex bet types with high expected losses, and by advertising representative events within a given complex bet type. This evidence is most consistent with bookies’ advertising targeting a representativeness heuristic amongst bettors. Bookies may know how to nudge bettors toward larger losses.

Although bullshit is common in everyday life and has attracted attention from philosophers, its reception (critical or ingenuous) has not, to our knowledge, been subject to empirical investigation. Here we focus on pseudo-profound bullshit, which consists of seemingly impressive assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually vacuous. We presented participants with bullshit statements consisting of buzzwords randomly organized into statements with syntactic structure but no discernible meaning (e.g., “Wholeness quiets infinite phenomena”). Across multiple studies, the propensity to judge bullshit statements as profound was associated with a variety of conceptually relevant variables (e.g., intuitive cognitive style, supernatural belief). Parallel associations were less evident among profundity judgments for more conventionally profound (e.g., “A wet person does not fear the rain”) or mundane (e.g., “Newborn babies require constant attention”) statements. These results support the idea that some people are more receptive to this type of bullshit and that detecting it is not merely a matter of indiscriminate skepticism but rather a discernment of deceptive vagueness in otherwise impressive sounding claims. Our results also suggest that a bias toward accepting statements as true may be an important component of pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity.

Positive spreading of ratings or rankings in the classical free-choice paradigm is commonly taken to indicate choice-induced change in preferences and has motivated influential theories as cognitive dissonance theory and self-perception theory. Chen and Risen [2010] argued by means of a mathematical proof that positive spreading is merely a statistical consequence of a flawed design. However, positive spreading has also been observed in blind choice and other designs where the alleged flaw should be absent. We show that the result in Chen and Risen [2010] is mathematically incorrect, although it can be recovered in a particular case. Specifically, we present a formal model of decision making that satisfies all assumptions in that article but implies that spreading need not be positive in the absence of choice-induced preference change. Hence, although the free-choice paradigm is flawed, the present research shows that reasonable models of human behavior need not predict consistent positive spreading. As a consequence, taken as a whole, previous experimental results remain informative.

People often make predictions about the future based on trends they have observed in the past. Revised probabilistic forecasts can be perceived by the public as indicative of such a trend. In five studies, we describe experts who make probabilistic forecasts of various natural events (effects of climate changes, landslide and earthquake risks) at two points in time. Prognoses that have been upgraded or downgraded from T 1 to T 2 were in all studies expected to be updated further, in the same direction, later on (at T 3). Thus, two prognoses were in these studies enough to define a trend, forming the basis for future projections. This “trend effect” implies that non-experts interpret recent forecast in light of what the expert said in the past, and think, for instance, that a “moderate” landslide risk will cause more worry if it has previously been low than if it has been high. By transcending the experts’ most recent forecasts the receivers are far from conservative, and appear to know more about the experts’ next prognoses than the experts themselves.

Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives—more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.

Applied to uncertainty communication, politeness theory postulates that when announcing bad news (1) speakers may intend not only to inform, but also to manage (e.g., save) the hearers’ or speakers’ own faces (i.e., face-managing intentions), and (2) speakers may perform face-managing intentions by altering the explicitly communicated probability. Previous research has assumed these two core postulates when explaining various reasoning and judgment phenomena in hearers, but has failed to test them empirically in a comprehensive and direct way: jointly in relation to speakers. To provide this critical evidence, we asked subjects to communicate a predefined numerical probability of two negative outcomes, using a verbal probability scale. Subjects reported their communication intentions afterwards. In line with the first politeness theory postulate, speakers intended not only to be informative but also to tactfully announce bad news or to avoid being blamed in case they made inaccurate (too low or too high) prediction. In line with the second politeness theory postulate, speakers altered their explicitly communicated probability more often and more substantially when adopting face-managing intentions than when adopting informative intentions. We discuss how this evidence corroborates the politeness theory and validates the previous research that focused on hearers.

In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.